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Dissertation Abstract
Genocide in East Turkestan: Exploring the Perspectives of Uyghurs in the Diaspora and
Their Resistance to Chinese State Violence
The Uyghurs of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region—or East Turkestan, as
many Uyghurs call their Indigenous homeland in northwestern China, are a Muslim
ethnic group whose culture and identity are being systematically destroyed by the
Chinese state. Since 2016, Uyghurs have been imprisoned in China’s “re-education
camps” on an enormous scale, numbering up to three million. Uyghurs have experienced
discrimination and marginalization in China for many years, yet relatively little attention
has been given to what has now become a set of gross human rights violations amounting
to crimes against humanity and genocide. The purpose of this study was twofold. First,
by working in collaboration with Uyghur diaspora members, this study aims to share and
amplify their perspectives on the atrocities in their homeland. Five themes and 16 sub
themes emerged from data collected through interviews, observations, field notes,
document analysis, and archival research. These include 1) intense repression starting in
2014, 2) numerous illegitimate reasons for imprisonment, 3) severed contact with family
members since 2017, and 4) exploitation of Uyghur land, property, and culture. The
second purpose of this study is to highlight how Uyghurs in diaspora communities around
the world have been speaking out in resistance to Chinese hegemony at great risk to
themselves and their family members. I examined the efforts of local and international
Uyghur organizations, high profile Uyghur individuals, and San Francisco Bay Area
Uyghur activism. In this dissertation, I seek to honor the stories of Uyghur diaspora
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members, describe their resistance in the face of tremendous struggle, and present data to
raise awareness of the magnitude of this human rights issue in the hope of calling people
to action and holding governments and international human rights mechanisms
accountable to stop the Uyghur genocide.
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CHAPTER I: THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
Introduction
I first learned about Uyghurs in 2015 when I was working at an international high
school in San Francisco. Our school had a large Chinese student population, and in the
middle of the fall semester, a couple of Uyghur brothers entered our program. I began to
read about Uyghurs, and I became interested in their culture. I spoke with my students
and their relatives about their families, and it was then that I began to learn about the
difficult relationship between Uyghurs and Han Chinese in Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR), which many Uyghurs refer to as East Turkestan. I began
my doctoral studies in 2016, and my first semester projects were focused on Uyghurs. I
did an oral history project with a Uyghur community member in which I first learned
about the extent of the oppression and conflict in XUAR following the Urumqi riots of
2009. I returned to this subject after being contacted by members of the Uyghur
community who wanted people to know their stories, and after learning about the massive
scale of Uyghur internment in “re-education camps” in East Turkestan. It is my sincere
hope that their voices will be heard and their concerns acknowledged, and that the
situation in the Uyghur homeland will be regarded as a gross human rights violation
amounting to crimes against humanity and genocide, which deserves attention and action
by the international community.
As a Russian Jewish immigrant who left my own homeland as a child with my
parents because of religious and cultural persecution, and having heard about Russian
pogroms and the Holocaust from my earliest memories, I feel particularly compelled to
engage in this issue. Although the refrain “Never Again” has been uttered repeatedly in
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relation to other crimes against humanity, little has been done to address the plight of the
Uyghurs, primarily because of the international community’s unwillingness to challenge
and apply pressure to China, a leading economic power (Roberts, 2020).
Most popular media sources which have been reporting on the situation in East
Turkestan address the mass internment of Uyghurs in camps, forced labor, and the heavy
surveillance in the region. Largely missing from the current literature are empowering
narratives of Uyghur resistance, as this dissertation offers. As Uyghurs continue to be
disappeared and their family members have no recourse, while the international
community stands by or neglects to take action because of economic relations with China
and global Islamophobia (Ali, 2016; Chatzky & McBride, 2020; Kuo & Kommenda,
2018; Ma, 2019), Uyghurs’ identity and culture are being systematically destroyed in the
interests of economic development, much like other Indigenous populations around the
world have experienced for centuries.
Over the course of writing my dissertation, the language and narratives used to
describe the Uyghur situation in East Turkestan have shifted. Roberts (2018), Rogin
(2018), Werleman (2019), and others have addressed this as an issue of ethnic cleansing.
An independent German scholar, Adrian Zenz, is largely responsible for the large-scale
media attention finally being given to the issue since 2018. Zenz (2019) began using the
phrase “cultural genocide” to refer to what was happening to the Uyghurs in XUAR. The
current situation amounts to outright genocide, which Abbas (2019), the editorial board
of The Washington Post (2020), and others, including several world governments and
reports, have now just recently declared (Gerin, 2021; Mattis, 2021; Newlines Institute,
2021; U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2021). I intend to contribute to this discussion
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and highlight how Uyghurs themselves continue to be actively engaged in their struggle
for survival as an ethnic group.
Statement of the Problem
The Uyghurs of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region—or East Turkestan, as
many Uyghurs call their Indigenous homeland in northwestern China, are a marginalized
Muslim ethnic group whose culture and identity are being systematically destroyed. Since
2016, Uyghurs have been imprisoned in China’s “re-education camps” on an enormous
scale (Werleman, 2019; Roberts, 2018; Rogin, 2018). Uyghurs have experienced
discrimination and marginalization in China for many years, yet relatively little attention
has been given to what has now become a gross human rights violation amounting to
crimes against humanity and genocide. By varying accounts, it is estimated that anywhere
from one to three million Uyghurs have been imprisoned in the camps (Greitens et al.,
2020; Zenz, 2018). In recent years, reports have emerged from journalists, scholars,
Uyghur relatives of people who have been imprisoned in the camps, and former Uyghur
prisoners themselves who have been released. These reports include accounts of sexual
violence, torture, organ harvesting, forced and coerced sterilization, imposed
medications, forced eating of pork (which practicing Muslims avoid), and forced labor—
all within (and beyond) the horrible conditions of the camps (Danilova, 2018; Denyer,
2018; Ferris-Rotman, 2019; Hoja, 2019; Lynch, 2019; Newlines Institute, 2021; Rahim,
2019; Zenz, 2020).
I examined this issue as a case study to investigate how Uyghur people are
struggling to survive in the face of Chinese nationalism, counterterrorist rhetoric, and
repressive policies. I considered the social, political, and economic mechanisms used by
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the Chinese government to perpetuate systemic discrimination with impunity against
Uyghurs as an ethnic group. Most significantly, my intention was to highlight how
Uyghurs have resisted Chinese state oppression and continue to do so in order to preserve
their culture and identity.
Background and Need
Uyghurs are one of China’s 56 officially recognized ethnic groups. They reside
primarily in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in northwestern China,
and it is estimated that their total population is around twelve million. Many Uyghurs
refer to their homeland as East Turkestan, as “Xinjiang” is the Chinese-given name and
means “new frontier.” Uyghurs have lived on this land since the 6th century. Uyghurs are
Muslim and speak a Turkic language which uses an Arabic-derived writing system. They
are known for their music, dancing, poetry, calligraphy, and unique food. They maintain
Islamic traditions, and their appearance is distinctly Central Asian. The majority of
people in China are Han Chinese, comprising nearly 92% of the total population. In
Xinjiang province, Han make up approximately 40% of the population, yet they hold the
majority of jobs in the region. In Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, Uyghurs make up only
13% of the total population of 2.1 million people (Kaltman, 2007). There have been
violent clashes between the Uyghurs and Han Chinese on and off since the 1990s
(Bhattacharya, 2003; Roberts, 2020). Uyghurs have been subjected to repressive state
policies and institutionalized discrimination, and many have disappeared, yet until
recently, relatively little attention has been drawn to this issue (Holdstock, 2015).
Since 2016, Uyghurs have been imprisoned in “re-education camps,” officially
called “Vocational Education and Training Centers,” on a massive scale. It is estimated
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that anywhere from one to three million Uyghurs now reside in these camps, which are
likened to concentration camps (Werleman, 2019; Roberts, 2018; Rogin, 2018). With
their parents imprisoned, thousands of Uyghur children have been placed in boarding
schools, which also serve as indoctrination centers that seek to strip them of their
language and culture. Reports have also emerged which reveal China’s attempts to limit
the population growth of Uyghurs through coerced or forced sterilization. This
dissertation highlights the voices of those in the Uyghur diaspora in what has been
happening in their homeland in recent history.
Purpose of the Study
What is happening in East Turkestan to the Uyghurs amounts to crimes against
humanity and genocide (Gerin, 2021; Mattis, 2021; Newlines Institute, 2021; U.S.
Holocaust Memorial Museum 2021; Werleman, 2019). I hope that amplifying the voices
of Uyghur people and their harrowing recent history through this study will lead to
greater interest and awareness of the gross human rights violations taking place in
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (East Turkestan). I hope that this, in turn, will
draw more attention to this situation so that it will be regarded as a significant human
rights issue which deserves closer examination and action by the international
community.
Uyghurs in diaspora communities around the world have been speaking out in
resistance to Chinese hegemony at great risk to themselves and their family members. As
an ethnic group, they are struggling to retain their identity and keep their culture from
being exterminated. Members of the Uyghur diaspora in the Bay Area have been willing
to speak about their experiences and those of their family members despite the great risk
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to their safety. In this dissertation, I seek to honor their stories, highlight their resistance
in the face of tremendous struggle, and raise awareness of the magnitude of this human
rights issue.
Theoretical Framework
In addition to examining the human rights violations related to the Uyghur
genocide, the dimensions of this crisis can be understood by considering Campbell’s
(2009) theory of genocide as a form of social control. Furthermore, as an Indigenous
group that is being oppressed and dispossessed by a hegemonic power in its own
homeland, the dynamics of this situation can be explained through a settler colonial lens.
The ongoing genocide has been enabled by technological advances of the 21st century,
China’s growth as a global economic superpower, and its positioning of Uyghurs as a
terrorist threat (Byler, 2019; Chatzky & McBride, 2020; Roberts, 2018). As such, terror
capitalism is another aspect of this issue which is also discussed below (Byler, 2019).
Genocide as Social Control
The United Nations’ definition of genocide, as outlined in the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, is one of many existing definitions
(Campbell, 2009). Although the U.N. definition is useful in identifying and punishing
genocide as a crime under international law, it does not provide an understanding of the
social dimensions or logic of genocide. Campbell (2009) suggests that “genocide is
moralistic... and (therefore) can be explained with a theory of social control” (p. 151). He
points out that, “while genocide typically is condemned by others, it occurs not when
moral evaluations are disregarded by its perpetrators, but when they are present and
applied” (Campbell, 2009, p. 151). In the case of the campaign against Uyghurs in
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XUAR, the Chinese government has justified its repressive and genocidal actions by
claiming they are fighting terrorism, with Uyghurs positioned as a supposed threat to the
stability of Chinese society.
The term “terrorism” has not been universally agreed upon, though it “has long
been characterized as an illegitimate form of armed struggle” (Roberts, 2020, p. 11).
Roberts (2020) suggests that “many international actors seek to maintain a vague
definition of the phenomenon because such imprecision allows them more latitude to use
the label selectively” (p. 11). Following former U.S. President George W. Bush’s
declaration of the Global War on Terror in 2001, the terrorist label was used to
dehumanize those who were deemed a threat. China seized upon this by convincing both
the U.S. government and the UN Security Council in September 2002 to label the littleknown Uyghur group, Eastern Turkistan 1 Islamic Movement (ETIM), a terrorist
organization. Following this designation, all Uyghurs were treated with suspicion, despite
ETIM presenting “no real threat to China or the world” (Roberts, 2020, p. 99). ETIM was
finally removed from the United States’ terrorist organization list in November 2020
(Kashgarian, 2020).
Campbell (2009) says that “genocide is normally a form of social control—a
response to behavior defined as deviant” (p. 155). Although China has used the notion of
Uyghurs as a terrorist threat to rationalize and justify the government’s actions, the actual
targeted deviant behavior is Uyghurs’ practicing of Islam and maintaining their cultural
identity. In the logic of genocide, “The perpetrators express moral grievances against the
targeted ethnic group” (Campbell, 2009, p. 155). In addition to terrorism, the broad moral
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The spelling of East Turkistan/East Turkestan varies. Both versions are correct and correspond to the
respective source throughout this dissertation.
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grievances expressed by China against the Uyghurs include “separatism,” which can be
considered a call for self-determination, and “extremism,” which is “any expression of
Islam not approved by the state” (Roberts, 2020, p. 94). By 2014, these grievances had
been established as logic in XUAR, and “all of the required procedures were already
being put into place for carrying out the systematic destruction of Uyghur identity we are
witnessing today” (Roberts, 2020, p. 203). Mass internment and indoctrination in the
camps has been one attempt to eradicate Uyghur culture by force. The extension of this
project—”the omnipresent implicit threat of internment”—has stoked fear into the
Uyghur population, which, in turn, has coerced Uyghurs to comply with state
assimilationist programs, as refusal to participate “would raise suspicion from the state of
‘extremist’ inclinations” (Roberts, 2020, p. 222). Thus, the genocide of Uyghurs in
XUAR can be understood as a multi-faceted, deliberate, planned, coordinated form of
social control on the part of the Chinese government.
Settler Colonialism
Uyghurs consider themselves to be Indigenous to Xinjiang province (East
Turkestan). I believe their plight can be partially understood through a settler colonial
lens, drawing from Patrick Wolfe’s (2006) seminal piece on “Settler colonialism and the
elimination of the native.” Wolfe (2006) states that “The question of genocide is never far
from discussions of settler colonialism” (p. 388). Scholars have recently begun to
characterize modern China’s historical relationship to Uyghurs and their homeland as a
colonial “process of domination that continues and… is intensifying in the present”
(Roberts, 2020, p. 23). Wolfe (2006) reminds us that “settler colonizers come to stay:
invasion is a structure not an event” (p. 388). China has never recognized Uyghurs as the
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Indigenous population of XUAR (East Turkestan). As such, China has not acknowledged
that Uyghurs deserve “either sovereignty over the region or special rights to selfgovernance within it” (Roberts, 2020, p. 24). Instead, Uyghurs have long suffered under
repressive Han Chinese rule.
Wolfe (2006) suggests that there is a relationship between genocide and settler
colonialism, which he calls “the logic of elimination” (p. 387). He states that “elimination
is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society” (Wolfe, 2006, p. 388). Furthermore,
Wolfe (2006) says that the primary motivation driving settlers toward elimination is their
desire for territory. Roberts (2020) points out that there have been opportunities in
China’s long history “that could have allowed for the peaceful integration of the Uyghur
homeland into modern China” (p. 60). This would have required China’s
acknowledgement of the region’s history of colonization, as well as Uyghurs’ Indigenous
status. Instead, “the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would adopt a strategy that would
ultimately marginalize and dehumanize the Uyghur people as a whole” (Roberts, 2020, p.
60). In the decade following the declaration of the Global War on Terror, the atmosphere
in XUAR grew increasingly tense. As Roberts (2020) points out, “these tensions had little
to do with ‘terrorism’... Rather, (they) had much more to do with development, settler
colonialism, and the threat of assimilation” (p. 129).
Wolfe (2006) states that, “settler colonialism destroys to replace” (p. 388). As the
review of the literature will show, Uyghur holy sites, including mosques, shrines, and
cemeteries, have been desecrated and demolished throughout XUAR as part of a
coordinated campaign since the mid-2000s (Hiatt, 2019; Kashgarian, 2019; Kuo, 2019;
Rivers, 2020; Sintash, 2019). The few mosques which remain have had their domes,
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minarets, and religious symbols and inscriptions removed (Hiatt, 2019; Kashgarian,
2019; Sintash, 2019). In many cases, the religious inscriptions have been replaced with
party banners (Hiatt, 2019). Moreover, the city of Kashgar, which is considered a
historical and cultural center for Uyghurs, has been modernized to serve as an
international commercial hub. The Old City of Kashgar was demolished in the early
2000s, despite containing “most of the best-preserved examples of traditional Central
Asian urban residential architecture in the world” (Roberts, 2020, p. 137). Along with the
destruction of important cultural and historical sites, the modernization of Kashgar
displaced Uyghurs, removing them from their homes by force. It should be noted that
Kashgar’s geographic location positions it as a “center of the PRC’s regional trade,
production, and commerce” (Roberts, 2020, p. 137).
China’s development of Xinjiang has not been limited to Kashgar. Traditional
Uyghur communities have been displaced and symbols of Uyghur culture have been
erased throughout the region. In Urumqi in the early 2000s, the primary Uyghur
neighborhood (Erdaoqiao) was turned into “a tourist attraction and a center of formal
commerce, establishing a new expansive and sanitized bazaar boasting the ‘largest
market of ethnic minority goods in Xinjiang’, an ‘ethnic dance ballroom’, and numerous
new commercial buildings” (Roberts, 2020, p. 138). Wolfe (2006) says that “renaming is
central” to settler colonial projects (p. 388). In Xinjiang, the CCP has been capitalizing
on the exploitation of Uyghur culture and identity under the “ethnic” label to serve its
own economic aims, while presenting a false sense of ethnic harmony to tourists.
Wolfe (2006) also suggests that “assimilation is one of a range of strategies of
elimination” (p. 401). In the early 2000s, the PRC imposed its “bilingual” education
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program in Xinjiang, which essentially required everyone to learn Mandarin. In 2002, the
state closed Xinjiang University’s Uyghur language track. In 2004, the regional
government mandated that “all students at all educational levels... receive instruction in
Mandarin” (Roberts, 2020, p. 139). These policies were coupled with a reduction of nonMandarin publications and radio and television programs. In addition to targeting the
Uyghur language, the CCP employed an “aggressive strategy of economic and cultural
integration”, particularly in southern Xinjiang (Roberts, 2020, p. 149). This led to
“massive urban development in the Uyghur cities of the south” while also “helping (to)
tip the demographic balance in these urban centers increasingly towards the Han”
(Roberts, 2020, p. 151). Today’s mass internment and indoctrination of Uyghurs in the
camps can be viewed as the extrapolation of these earlier assimilationist policies.
Terror Capitalism
Byler (2019) proposes that since the Urumqi riots of 2009, China has engaged in a
continuously growing process of Uyghur dispossession, which he calls “terror
capitalism” (p. 24). By positioning Uyghurs as a terrorist threat, China has been able to
justify the psychological terror imposed upon Uyghurs in their homeland, while
simultaneously exploiting their land for profit by developing global cities and
infrastructure in XUAR as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Furthermore, Byler (2019)
suggests that the Chinese counter-terrorism project became a Uyghur human engineering
project, which has now become a growth industry for the state.
Terror capitalism has been made possible because of the technological advances
of the 21st century. The scale of how it is being used to dominate, exploit, and socially
eliminate Uyghurs as part of a state-directed human engineering project is unique to
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China. The ubiquitous surveillance of Uyghurs in XUAR and throughout China, along
with the routinization of confrontations with police has turned “the violence of the human
engineering project into a technical operation that masks the shattering of families and
lives as a kind of standard operating procedure” (Byler, 2019, p. 329). Byler (2019) also
addresses China’s role in globalization and development, which includes “clearing space
for new forms of investment and profit” (Byler, 2019, p. 25). The economic partnerships
China has forged with other countries explains, in part, why many nations have not held
China accountable for its actions in East Turkestan.
Since the publication of Byler’s thesis, an abundance of evidence has emerged
which shows that Uyghurs have been forced into low-wage labor under oppressive
conditions on a large scale (Buckley & Ramzy, 2020; Fifield, 2020; Xu, 2020; Zenz,
2019). In 2019, Byler suggested that terror capitalism in China was “focused... more on
the ways that capital comes to imagine the future in terms of racial-ethnic-nationalreligious homogeneity” rather than labor exploitation (p. 26). It is now known that terror
capitalism in China includes labor exploitation, in addition to Uyghurs being “subjected
to experiments in policing, mass internment and indoctrination processes without
recourse to legal protections” (Byler, 2019, p. 27).
The combined impacts of settler colonialism and terror capitalism on the Uyghur
population in East Turkestan have amounted to genocide and crimes against humanity.
Campbell’s understanding of genocide as a form of social control is consistent with
Byler’s (2019) description of the Uyghur human engineering project in that “moral
evaluations... are present and applied” (Campbell, 2009, p. 151). Byler describes terror
capitalism as, ultimately, “a process of social elimination of a people” (Byler, 2019, p.
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24). The review of the literature in Chapters II and III show that Uyghurs are suffering
both physical and social elimination, and their culture and identity are being
systematically destroyed.
Research Questions
The research questions that guided this study are as follows:
1. What are the perspectives of North American Uyghurs of the diaspora on the
genocide happening in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (East Turkestan)?
2. How have Uyghurs of the diaspora engaged in acts of resistance against Chinese,
state-sanctioned, colonial hegemony?
Educational Significance
Ercilasun and Ercilasun (2018) suggest that diaspora communities have “become
prominent non-state actors in today’s increasingly globalized world” (p. 87). As such,
they “contribute to our understanding of the complex organization of contemporary
transnational politics” (Ercilasun & Ercilasun, 2018, p. 88). Uyghur diaspora
communities exist all over the world, and it is estimated that 1-1.6 million Uyghurs reside
in these communities outside of China (Amnesty, 2020). The first wave of Uyghur
emigration from China started in the 1960s. From the 1960s to the early 1990s, most
Uyghurs leaving China settled in Turkey, forming a sizable diaspora community. To date,
the largest Uyghur diaspora community lives in Turkey, numbering approximately
60,000 people (Ercilasun & Ercilasun, 2018). Significant numbers of Uyghurs also reside
in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan (Amnesty, 2020). In the 1990s, Uyghur
diaspora communities began growing in Europe and the United States. Uyghurs moved
primarily to Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, and Belgium. In the U.S., most
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Uyghurs settled in Virginia, Maryland, Washington D.C., and Los Angeles (Debata and
Tian, 2011).
Through the early 2000s, Uyghurs continued to leave China to settle elsewhere or
study abroad. In the 2010s, travel became much more restrictive for Uyghurs, and the
Chinese government began pressuring Uyghurs living overseas to return to Xinjiang (De
Bourmont, 2018). From 2017 to the present, Uyghurs of the diaspora have been widely
targeted and harassed by the Chinese government with the threat of harming their family
members who are back in Xinjiang (Amnesty, 2020; De Bourmont, 2018; Haas, 2019). A
Uyghur in Germany reported that he was contacted by a Chinese official who ominously
said, “You’re living overseas, but you need to think of your family while you’re running
around doing your activism work in Germany... You need to think of their safety” (Haas,
2019, p. 2). Similarly, Uyghurs living in diaspora communities in the Netherlands,
Finland, Sweden, Germany, and France have “all complained of threats against family
members back in Xinjiang, and some were asked to spy for China” (Haas, 2019, p. 2). I
have heard similar reports from Uyghurs in the United States.
In 2018 it was reported that China was “creating a global registry of the Uyghur
diaspora, even if they are citizens of other countries” (Perper, 2018, p. 1). A Uyghur in
Germany reported that “a Chinese agent asked for photos of Eid and other celebrations,
and specifically asked for information on Uyghurs who had recently arrived in Europe”
(Haas, 2019, p. 3). Uyghur family members in Xinjiang have also been targeted and
coerced by Chinese government officials to obtain personal information from relatives
living abroad, including license plate numbers, bank account details, home and work
addresses, and identification (ID) cards (Perper, 2018).
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Reports from 2017 to the present reveal a severing of family ties between
Uyghurs of the diaspora and those in Xinjiang, with relatives in Xinjiang telling family
members abroad to stop contacting them, or simply cutting off contact. I first learned of
this in 2018 when Uyghur college students studying in the United States were suddenly
told by their parents that they were on their own and had to fend for themselves. A
Uyghur in Scandinavia reported that his relatives were too afraid to speak to him, either
hanging up the phone when they heard his voice or not answering at all (De Bourmont,
2018). He also said that he learned about his mother’s imprisonment in a camp by
exchanging coded messages with a cousin outside of Xinjiang. James Millward, a
respected scholar on Xinjiang, stated that “many families have had to delete contacts off
their phones”, presumably for their own and/or their relatives’ safety (De Bourmont,
2018, p. 4). Based on their direct experience and shared history, Uyghurs of the diaspora
provide a unique transnational perspective on what has been happening in Xinjiang,
which, as described above, has reached beyond the borders of their homeland.
In addition to the value of learning about the Uyghur situation itself, by
examining their situation as a case study, I believe parallels can be drawn between
oppressive mechanisms in China and other societies, including the United States. By
broadening the scope of the findings and implications of this study, the forces of
oppression and genocide may be identified and addressed in the hope that they can be
resisted and eventually dismantled. I suggest that raising awareness of the situation in
East Turkestan and identifying the mechanisms of repression may be a way to work
toward justice in multiple contexts. I believe that engaging students, including those from
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China, in critical pedagogy in order to consider the issues surrounding this conflict, and
conflict in general, may be a way to raise their critical consciousness (Freire, 2000).
Furthermore, learning about the conventions and related documents which uphold
human rights globally is an important piece of human rights education. Studying these
documents within the context of a real life situation, such as this one, may be useful in
understanding their value and applications (Bajaj, 2017; Mihr & Schmitz, 2007).
Analyzing the Uyghur situation as a case study may be used to facilitate a meaningful
path to working toward justice, both with respect to the situation in Xinjiang and
otherwise.
The following two chapters discuss the history and dimensions of the Uyghur
genocide in East Turkestan and situate the Uyghur experience within the context of the
Global War on Terror and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The current literature on this
subject elucidates many of the repressive mechanisms used against the Uyghur people
and shows how these tactics have circumscribed Uyghur life and crushed their identity.
The review of the literature discusses how China has implemented the logic of
exploitation and profitability to subjugate Uyghurs, quash dissent, and eliminate their
culture in their own Indigenous homeland through a colonial relationship of domination.
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CHAPTER II: THE UYGHUR GENOCIDE: UNDERSTANDING ITS HISTORY
AND DIMENSIONS
The Uyghurs of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in northwestern
China are a marginalized Muslim ethnic minority group who have suffered under China’s
repressive rule for decades. They are currently being imprisoned in “re-education
camps,” prisons, and forced labor facilities on an enormous scale, and their culture is
being systematically destroyed (Hoshur, 2019; Roberts, 2018; Rogin, 2018; Werleman,
2019; Wright, Watson, & Westcott, 2021; Zenz, 2019). In the review of the literature, I
provide some background to show the multiple ways in which Uyghurs are being
controlled and oppressed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). I will also discuss the
Global War on Terror, post-September 11th tactics, and the rise of global Islamophobia,
which have justified and enabled China’s actions in East Turkestan. Furthermore, I
describe the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which relies upon the capital city of East
Turkestan, Urumqi, and the heart of the Uyghur homeland, Kashgar, for its success. The
development of the infrastructure for the BRI coincides with the mass internment of
Uyghurs in camps.
Oppression and Vilification of Uyghur People
Historical, Social, and Economic Context
A mountain range divides East Turkestan (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,
XUAR, or Xinjiang) into northern and southern regions. Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital, is in
the northern part of XUAR and is the primary center of manufacturing and business. Han
Chinese make up approximately 80 percent of the population here. This is primarily due
to migration from inner China since 1949 (Holdstock, 2015). The southern part of
Xinjiang is known as the Tarim Basin and is mostly desert (the Taklamakan desert). Most
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Uyghurs, about 80%, live in this southern region. It wasn’t until 1884 that the region was
“unified” into one province by the rulers of the Qing dynasty. “Xinjiang” means “new
territory” in Chinese, and this name dates back to this time. Many Uyghurs consider
“Xinjiang” to be the oppressor’s name given to the region and prefer to refer to their
homeland as “East Turkestan.” Uyghurs consider themselves to be Indigenous to the
Tarim Basin, and they are believed to have settled there in the sixth century CE (Kaltman,
2007).
Figure 2.1: Map of China and East Turkestan
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In the 1950s, the Communist Party began to take control of Xinjiang. In 1954, the
Bingtuan, a government military group which later became known as the Xinjiang
Production and Construction Corps, was formed under the Communist Party leader Mao
Zedong’s orders (Millward, 2007). The Bingtuan was involved in several incidents of
armed conflict. In October of 1955, the province was officially named “Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region,” but it was clear that “autonomous” did not mean “independent”
(Millward, 2007). Beginning in 1956, Maoist policies were enacted which created “a
climate of communist puritanism, xenophobia and rejection of cultural artifacts and
expression” (Millward, 2007, p. 254). One of the effects in Xinjiang was “heightened
official intolerance and repression of many aspects of… ethnic cultures” (Millward,
2007, p. 254).
Between 1959 and 1961, over a million Han arrived in Xinjiang, most of whom
were migrants looking for work. In the late sixties, there were numerous armed conflicts
in Xinjiang as part of the Cultural Revolution, a policy under Mao’s government that
introduced the “official intolerance of non-Han customs and erosion of minority rights”
(Millward, 2007, p. 276). The Cultural Revolution attacked “the three ‘olds’ (old ideas,
old customs, and old habits)” (Roberts, 2020, p. 48). Older Han who maintained
traditional Chinese customs and ideas also suffered during this time under the new,
youth-propelled regime. For Uyghurs, the Cultural Revolution resulted in the destruction
of many cultural and religious institutions, and it “temporarily curtailed the use of the
Uyghur language in official documents, broke up communities… and fostered an
uneducated generation of Uyghurs who had no sustained access to standard education”
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(Roberts, 2020, p. 49). With the death of Mao in 1976, gradual change began to take
place.
The 1980s were a relatively peaceful time, and the government invested in
developing the region of Xinjiang. During this time, there was a greater tolerance for
religious diversity and expression. “Xinjiang’s Islamic Association was allowed to meet
for the first time in 17 years; an Arabic alphabet was reinstated; and thousands of
mosques were built or reopened” (Holdstock, 2015, p. 55). Though this new tolerance
was certainly a change for the better, it was not necessarily motivated by a respect for
Muslims or ethnic unity. During this time, China was developing relationships with
potential business partners from the Muslim world, and repression of Muslims at home
would not have aided in these relationships (Holdstock, 2015). Changes in agricultural
policies also took place in this new era. This benefited Uyghurs who had family farms,
though the government retained control of much of the arable land. Nonetheless, living
standards improved considerably for many people in Xinjiang in the early 1980s
(Holdstock, 2015).
East Turkestan contains a wealth of natural resources, including coal, oil, natural
gas, minerals and cotton. In the 1990s the Chinese government organized its efforts to
develop the region with a focus on its natural resources (Millward, 2007). There were
significant changes in urban planning which demolished old housing and built new
apartment blocks, created new city centers and shopping centers, and commercialized
former public spaces. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991—and the subsequent
independence of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan—resulted in an intensification
of security in XUAR out of fear of Uyghur resistance to Chinese rule. “Between 1990
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and 1995, security forces arrested some 1,831 Uyghurs under suspicion of nationalist and
religious sentiments” (Roberts, 2020, p. 54). During this time, with promises of economic
opportunity, increasing numbers of Han were migrating into Xinjiang to find work. As
this continued, “Uyghurs and other minorities were getting relatively poorer while the
proceeds from the exploitation of Xinjiang’s natural resources were fueling the
development of infrastructure and Han-majority cities in the north” (Holdstock, 2015, p.
92).
Han and Uyghur communities became increasingly segregated, both physically
and culturally, and it was in the 1990s that a new desire for independence took hold and
separatist groups were formed. In April 1990, Uyghurs protested against forced family
planning, nuclear weapons testing in the remote southeastern region of Xinjiang, and oil
exploitation throughout the region. This protest began peacefully in a mosque and then
turned into a violent riot, now referred to as “the Baren uprising” (Bovington, 2004). Just
a few years earlier in 1985, Uyghur students in Beijing had also protested against nuclear
testing in Xinjiang. During the Baren uprising, there were calls to overthrow communism
and claims that “Islam would conquer Marxism-Leninism” (Bovington, 2004, p. 33). In
the history of Xinjiang, there have been two East Turkestan Republics: the first
established in 1933 and was dissolved in 1934, and the second formed in 1944 and
existing until 1946 (Millward, 2007). Since the 1990s, the East Turkestan Independence
Movement (ETIM), which is sometimes also called the East Turkestan Islamic
Movement, has advocated for an independent, self-governing Xinjiang named “East
Turkestan.” This desire for separatism and independence became and continues to be a
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major source of tension between Uyghurs and the Chinese government, as well as among
Uyghurs themselves.
On February 4, 1997 in the remote city of Ghulja (Yining) in western Xinjiang,
police arrested approximately 200 people at mosques and private study groups. The
following morning, February 5th, about 500 young Uyghur men protested peacefully
against the arrests. Riot police attacked them with dogs and fired into the crowd,
eventually arresting hundreds of people. Later that day, there was another protest by the
relatives of the men who had been arrested, including women and children. Riot police
used tear gas and water cannons on them, and there were more arrests (Holdstock, 2015).
Over the next few days, more people got involved, and the actions turned violent.
Property was destroyed and cars were set on fire. It is not known exactly how many
people died in this event, but it is referred to by Uyghur activists as “the Ghulja
massacre” (interviews). The Chinese government referred to the Uyghurs involved as
“rioters,” which later became “separatists,” which has now become synonymous with
“religious extremists” and “terrorists.”
The Ghulja incident brought some international attention to the ethnic conflict in
Xinjiang, but the situation remained relatively peaceful for several years afterward. It
wasn’t until 2009 that a greater awareness of the issues came into public view. On July 5,
2009, Uyghur university students in Urumqi protested against the brutal, mob-instigated
killing of Uyghur workers at a toy factory in the eastern city of Shaoguan in Guangdong
province a couple of weeks before on June 25th. Unsubstantiated rumors on the internet
suggested that Uyghur male workers had raped a Han Chinese woman. A violent clash
ensued in which “Han workers ambushed sleeping Uyghur workers in their dormitory”
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(Roberts, 2020, p. 146). Over the course of the night, two Uyghur men were killed, and
120 workers were injured, most of them Uyghurs (Jacobs, 2009). It was reported that
more than 1,000 workers had been involved in the violence. Authorities were not
commenting on the incident, and no one was being held responsible for the killings
(Holdstock, 2015).
At the time, Uyghurs were getting their news primarily through websites, one of
which was run by Ilham Tohti, who was imprisoned for life on charges of “inciting
separatism” in 2014. Through text messaging and online message boards, a
demonstration was coordinated in Urumqi on July 5th at People’s Square at 5pm. Though
the killing of the men at the toy factory was the official reason for the demonstration, the
violence “unleashed in Urumqi in July 2009 was a boiling over of the tensions that
development, settler colonialism, and Uyghur marginalization in the region had fostered”
(Roberts, 2020, p. 147).
It is estimated that about 1,000 Uyghurs gathered in the square for a peaceful
protest. Police and soldiers were present and tried to disperse the crowd, though
unsuccessfully. The crowd migrated south through the city and picked up more people
along the way. Police had set up a roadblock to prevent them from entering Han
neighborhoods, and the crowd was met with tear gas and warning shots. “According to
many accounts, there were beatings and shootings as well” (Holdstock, 2015, p. 187).
Some of the protesters began throwing stones at the soldiers and police. It is thought that
this is the point at which the protest turned into a riot, which ended up continuing through
the night. The protesters entered different neighborhoods, set cars and buildings on fire,
and attacked Han residents. Many people were beaten and killed. The situation was not
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brought under control until the next day, July 6th, when an additional 20,000 security
forces came into the city (Human Rights Watch, 2009).
On July 7th, groups of Han gathered with sticks, meat cleavers, metal pipes and
shovels to retaliate against the Uyghurs. “Uyghur shops were smashed and burnt, stalls
were turned over, and there were a number of beatings and murders” (Holdstock, 2015, p.
192). According to a Human Rights Watch report (2009), the total number of people
killed in the riots was officially reported as 197, most of whom were Han, and nearly
2,000 people were injured, though the actual numbers are thought to be much higher. The
events of the Urumqi riots are considered to be the “worst ethnic violence in (the
People’s Republic of China) PRC history,” and they marked a breakdown in relations
between Uyghurs and Han (Roberts, 2018, p. 242). The aftermath has continued in East
Turkestan to the present day.
In the days following the Urumqi riots, Chinese authorities blocked the internet,
international phone lines and text messaging, and security forces detained hundreds
of Uyghur men and teenage boys. The Human Rights Watch (2009) report states that,
According to witnesses, the security forces sealed off entire neighborhoods,
searching for young Uyghur men. In some cases, they first separated the men
from other residents, pushed them to their knees or flat on the ground, and, at least
in some cases, beat the men while questioning them about their participation in
the protests. Those who had wounds or bruises on their bodies, or had not been at
their homes during the protests, were then taken away. (pp. 5-6)
The families of the men and boys who were taken by police were unable to get any
information about where they were taken or what was going to happen to them–they had
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“disappeared” (Human Rights Watch, 2009). According to interviews, these enforced
disappearances continue today on an even larger scale, and many Uyghurs live in fear
that their children will be next.
A number of violent incidents involving Uyghurs have taken place since the
Urumqi riots in different parts of China. Several of the most noteworthy include the
following. In 2013, a Uyghur family drove a car into a crowd in Beijing in Tiananmen
Square. The car exploded, and the family and 5 other people were killed, and more than
40 people were injured (Holdstock, 2015). Accounts of this incident vary. In March of
2014 in Kunming, a city in southern China, Uyghurs armed with knives attacked people
in a train station, killing 29 and leaving 130 wounded. In response to this incident,
China’s president Xi Jinping said the government would “sternly punish the terrorists”
(Buckley, 2014, p. 3). This event is commonly referred to as “China’s 9/11.” In May of
2014, there were two major incidents in Urumqi. Early in the month, a bomb went off at a
train station, and this was coupled with a knife attack. One person was killed and 79 were
wounded. This attack took place just a few hours after President Xi made his first visit to
Xinjiang (Buckley, 2018). Later in the month, 31 people were killed and more than 90
injured when cars drove into an open-air market and threw explosives out of their
windows. These attacks were blamed on “Islamic militants from Xinjiang,” and Chinese
President Xi vowed again to “severely punish terrorists” (Kanat, 2014).
Roberts (2020) states that there is no evidence to suggest these violent acts were
“undertaken by a larger organization or that the attackers had the support of groups
outside China” (p. 170). Instead, “the attackers appeared to be acting on their own and
responding to their particular situation” (Roberts, 2020, p. 171). Nonetheless, following
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these attacks, “the Han Islamophobic fear of Uyghurs increased significantly” throughout
China, and President Xi promised to “go all out to maintain social stability… and crush
the ‘violent terrorists’” (Roberts, 2020, p. 171).
Relations between Uyghurs and Han have become progressively worse in recent
years. Both groups hold biases and are prejudiced against the other, though conditions for
Uyghurs have steadily deteriorated, while opportunities for Han have continued to
increase (Kaltman, 2007). Divisions among Uyghurs themselves also exist. Certainly not
all Uyghurs support or are involved in violent activity, yet they are not given
opportunities to participate in society because of stereotyping and discrimination. Even
before the riots, a Uyghur businessman stated,
It’s difficult for Uyghurs to excel in a Han society that is racist toward its nonHan members. It’s too bad that Han government policies, including hiring
practices and education policies hold Uyghurs back. It’s too bad that many
Uyghurs lash back by committing crimes, giving Uyghurs an even worse name
and causing more Han to view us with disdain, in turn causing the Uyghurs to
hate the Han even more. It’s a terrible cycle, and one that will not be broken.
Xinjiang will not be freed. (Kaltman, 2007, p. 133)
In numerous interviews conducted with Han and Uyghurs in different parts of
China, Kaltman found that both groups presumed that the other disliked them and would
easily turn against them (Kaltman, 2007). Most of the Uyghurs Kaltman interviewed
believed that their ability to achieve economic and social stability was limited by racism
within the Han-dominated society. The Han who he interviewed generally believed that
Uyghurs limited themselves by not making more of an effort to integrate into their
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society, thereby affirming the Uyghur perspective that the Han feel their culture is
dominant (Kaltman, 2007). These interviews took place before the Urumqi riots of 2009.
By all accounts, there was a dramatic shift in society after the riots, and the situation
became even more difficult for Uyghurs. Society became more segregated, living
conditions deteriorated, and jobs became virtually nonexistent, even for educated
Uyghurs.
In May 2014, following the aforementioned attacks, the Chinese government
launched a new campaign in XUAR called “Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism,”
commonly referred to as the “Strike Hard Campaign” (Human Rights Watch, 2018).
“Strike hard” tactics were implemented across China in the 1990s as part of a general
crackdown on crime; however, in Xinjiang, the campaign was focused on Uyghurs.
Stemming from the 1990s, “the PRC launched a series of security campaigns to combat
Uyghur separatism in the XUAR... which increased in their intensity over the course of
the decade” (Roberts, 2018, p. 233). Amnesty International (1999) reported that
thousands of Uyghurs had been arbitrarily detained, and many of the detainees had been
tortured. Furthermore, many prisoners—both men and women—were executed (Amnesty
International, 1999).
Close surveillance, interrogation, detainment, and punishment of Uyghurs
continued in Xinjiang in the early 2000s, and by 2010, the message was “that all Uyghurs
should be considered as potential terrorists or at least as potential sympathizers with
terrorism” (Roberts, 2018, p. 243). In 2014, large-scale, government sanctioned raids on
Uyghur homes and businesses began to take place at all hours of the day and night under
the new “Strike Hard Campaign” (Kashgary, 2014). This iteration of the crackdown
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focused on finding religious materials by targeting Uyghur cell phones, computers,
printed materials, DVDs, and CDs, often by forcibly entering people’s homes. Uyghurs
who refused to cooperate were shot by armed police (Kashgary, 2014). Moreover,
Uyghurs who worked for the government “were being pressured into signing written
pledges to renounce Islam” during this time (Kashgary, 2014, p. 243). By all accounts,
these repressive policies surged when Chen Quanguo became the Communist Party
Secretary in XUAR in 2016 (Dooley, 2019; Human Rights Watch, 2018; Roberts, 2018).
James Millward, a respected scholar on Uyghurs and Xinjiang who has been studying the
region for three decades, said in an op-ed in the New York Times that “state repression in
Xinjiang has never been as severe as it has become since early 2017” (Millward, 2018, p.
1). Other scholars agree that the situation is becoming progressively worse (Roberts,
2018; Rogin, 2018; Zenz, 2019).
In my discussions with Uyghurs of the diaspora in 2016, I learned that police in
East Turkestan were at liberty to check identification and search their bags at will, and
arrests without any explanation were common. At the time, out of fear of being arrested
and subsequently disappearing, Uyghurs did not go out at night, and many tried to send
their children abroad to keep them safe. Since then, the situation has become
progressively worse with the mass introduction of “re-education” or “vocational training”
centers, which have been likened to concentration camps (Abbas, 2019; Iones, 2019;
Simmons, 2019, Stewart, 2019). Uyghurs now consider themselves lucky if they know
fewer than 10 people who have spent time in the camps.
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The Camps
In 2016, Chen Quanguo was appointed the Communist Party Secretary in XUAR
after holding this role for five years in Tibet. Chen was also appointed to the exclusive
25-member Politburo in China, which is the elite, Communist Party group responsible for
making all significant decisions in China. Chen is a former soldier who became a
politician, and he is widely regarded as the architect of the crackdown on Uyghurs and
other Muslims in Xinjiang, including mass detention in the camps (Buckley, 2018;
Wong, 2019).
News of the camps, or “large internment facilities,” began to emerge in English in
2017 (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2019). Human Rights Watch released a report calling on the
Chinese government to “free people held in unlawful ‘political education’ centers in
Xinjiang and shut them down” (Human Rights Watch, 2017, p. 1). Radio Free Asia was
the first news organization to announce the presence of “re-education camps” in Xinjiang
in English (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2019). In this article, Radio Free Asia claimed that
thousands of Uyghurs were locked away in what were then called “Professional
Education Schools,” formerly known as “Socialism Training Schools” and “Counterextremism Training Schools,” for being religious (Muslim) or having relatives abroad
(Sulaiman, 2017). Widespread international news and an understanding of the extent of
the network of camps and the scale of the numbers of prisoners didn’t start until almost a
year later in May 2018 when Shawn Zhang, a Chinese law student in Canada, found
evidence of the camps by using satellite imagery and through Chinese government
documents. Zhang observed that the “camps really don’t look like vocational skills
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training centres like the Chinese government calls it. It looks more like a prison—they’re
heavily guarded with razor-wire everywhere” (Azizi, 2018, p. 1).
Another independent researcher, Adrian Zenz, brought the full scale of the
problem into public view by publishing a paper about the extent of the camps in May
2018. Zenz (2018) used Zhang’s work, along with his own extensive research, to uncover
a vast network of camps. Zenz (2018) estimated that the number of detainees in the
camps ranged from several hundred thousand to over one million Uyghurs and other
Turkic Muslims. Zenz also referred to the actions of the Chinese government in Xinjiang
as “the country’s most intense campaign of coercive social re-engineering since the end
of the Cultural Revolution” (Zenz, 2018, p. 124). The contributions of Zenz’s work to
raising awareness of the situation in Xinjiang cannot be overstated. From 2018 to the
present day, he has continued to research and speak out about the gross human rights
abuses carried out in Xinjiang against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims. In 2019, Zenz
and other scholars began using the term “cultural genocide” to refer to what was
happening to the Muslim minority in Xinjiang.
Leaked Documents
In November 2019, The New York Times published a set of highly classified,
leaked Chinese government documents from 2017, which clearly revealed the deliberate
plan to detain Uyghurs and other Muslims in Xinjiang en masse in indoctrination camps
(Ramzy & Buckley, 2019). The documents were obtained by the International
Consortium of Investigative Journalists and consisted of over 400 pages. These
documents are referred to as “The China Cables” (BBC, 2019; Allen-Ebrahimian, 2019).
The China Cables include 161 pages of instructions for controlling the Uyghur population
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in Xinjiang, along with orders on how to treat detainees in the camps, emphasizing
“showing no mercy” (Ramzy & Buckley, 2019). These orders demand that no one be
allowed to escape and that “behavioral violations” are to be met with discipline and
punishment (BBC, 2019; Ramzy & Buckley, 2019). The extreme monitoring and control
of every aspect of a detainee’s life in the camps—including sleeping, using the toilet,
bathing, eating, and studying—are detailed in the documents. Furthermore, the officials
working in the camps are instructed to “promote the repentance and confession of the
students for them to understand deeply the illegal, criminal and dangerous nature of their
past activity,” even though no crimes have been committed (BBC, 2019, p. 1).
The China Cables also include a meticulous script for officials to use when
speaking to young people who return home from studying elsewhere to find their parents,
other relatives, and neighbors missing. Local officials were instructed to contact students
as soon as they returned, answer their questions using the script, and threaten that “their
(the students’) behavior could either shorten or extend the detention of their relatives”
(Ramzy & Buckley, 2019, p. 1). In response to questions about the whereabouts of their
missing parents and others, students were to be told that their relatives are being provided
with “free food and education” and live in “good conditions”, emphasizing that it is every
citizen’s “duty”, regardless of their age, to participate in “concentrated education” (New
York Times, 2019). Essentially, the China Cables provided proof that the camps are not
“re-education” or “vocational” centers as China had claimed, but instead are militarized,
punitive, high-security complexes intended to destroy Uyghur (and other Muslim
groups’) identity and culture. The China Cables also confirmed that over a million
Uyghurs and other Muslims have been detained in the camps. In response to the leaked
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documents, Zenz said they reveal that the Chinese government had an intentional plan
from the beginning, and the documents “confirm that this is a form of cultural genocide”
(Associated Press, 2019, para. 7).
A few months after the China Cables were leaked, another Chinese government
document—now known as the Karakax List—was revealed in February 2020. The
Karakax List is a 137-page document which looks like a spreadsheet and contains
personal details about approximately 2,800 residents in western Xinjiang. It focuses on
311 individuals from Karakax County, Xinjiang who were detained in camps in 2017 and
2018 (BBC, 2020). The rest of the people on the list are connected in some way to these
311 individuals. The disturbing amount of detail about the detainees includes information
about what they wear, the number of children they have, how their wives dress, how their
family members behave, how often they pray, and whether or not they’ve applied for a
passport. The Karakax List confirms that people have been detained for having a Muslim
name, growing a long beard, wearing a face veil, visiting a “sensitive” country, applying
for a passport, holding a passport without visiting a foreign country, and accidentally
clicking a link which landed on a foreign website, among other things (CNN, 2020; BBC,
2020; DW, 2020). The document clearly shows that the reasons for detention are not
criminal.
The China Cables and the Karakax List both also reveal the extreme, ubiquitous
extent of surveillance used to monitor Uyghurs’ every move in Xinjiang. Many people
have described the situation as “Orwellian” (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2019; Eady, 2019;
Pamuk & Brice, 2019). Though I do not focus on surveillance in this study, it should be
understood that widespread, constant surveillance, including the use of facial recognition
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software, has enabled the repression and imprisonment of Uyghurs on such a massive
scale (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Furthermore, it has been well-documented that
biometric data, including DNA and blood samples, along with fingerprints and iris scans,
have been collected from Uyghurs since 2017 (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Uyghurs of
the diaspora have said that voice samples were also recorded. All of this information is
stored in police databases and is linked to each person’s identification (ID) number.
Atrocities in the Camps
Harrowing reports detailing Uyghur and other Muslim prisoners’ experiences in
the camps have emerged in recent years. At the most basic level, in addition to
demanding that prisoners sing the praises of Xi and the Communist Party in Mandarin for
hours each day (the Uyghur language is strictly forbidden), inmates have been forced to
eat pork and drink alcohol, going against their religious and cultural principles (RFA’s
Uyghur Service, 2019; Samuel, 2018; Shih & Kang, 2019). Reports have indicated that
the push for Uyghurs and other Muslims to eat pork and drink alcohol is also widespread
in XUAR outside of the camps. As part of the overall effort to sinicize (or make more
Chinese) Uyghurs and other Muslims, officials in Xinjiang have organized what are
called “eating together” events during which pork is served as an “ethnic unity” food
(RFA’s Uyghur Service, 2019. p. 1). Pork production has also substantially increased in
XUAR since 2019. Abstaining from eating pork is considered a sign of “extremism,”
which then provides a reason for internment in the camps (RFA’s Uyghur Service, 2019).
Troubling accounts from survivors of the camps include numerous incidents of
physical and psychological torture. Being subjected to 24-hour video surveillance,
including in bathrooms and sleeping quarters, is itself oppressive and could be considered
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a form of psychological torture, but this is just the surface of the atrocities that have
occurred in the camps. Sophie Richardson, the China director at Human Rights Watch,
said "I think it's fair to describe everyone being detained as being subject at least to
psychological torture, because they literally don't know how long they're going to be
there” (BBC, 2019, para. 14).
The living conditions in the camps are horrendous by all accounts. One detainee
reported that nearly 20 people lived in a room of about 170 square feet. She described the
toilet situation as follows:
Each room had a plastic bucket for a toilet. Every prisoner was given two minutes
a day to use the toilet, and the bucket was emptied only once a day. If it filled up,
you had to wait until the next day. (Stavrou, 2019, p. 3)
Others have reported staying in rooms under similar conditions with even more prisoners
(Schmitz, 2018). The detainee above was also explicitly instructed not to laugh, to cry, or
to speak with the other prisoners (Rahim, 2019). Another former inmate revealed that
prisoners were given designated times to cry every two weeks. Crying outside of these
designated times was met with verbal abuse and threats with an electric baton (Hoshur,
2019).
Reports have revealed that detainees are handcuffed and shackled as punishment
for disobeying the rules in the camps, as well as when they are subjected to interrogation,
and even while they sleep (Denyer, 2018; Hoja, 2019; Stavrou, 2019). One former
detainee described having to stand against a wall for five hours and then being placed in
solitary confinement without access to food (Shih & Kang, 2019). Numerous other
accounts of being deprived of food as a form of punishment also exist (Rivers & Lee,
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2019; Schmitz, 2018; Stavrou, 2019). Another former prisoner said that he was made to
wear a metal suit weighing over 50 pounds, which forced his arms and legs into an
uncomfortable, outstretched position for 12 hours at a time. The guards called this suit
“iron clothes” (Schmitz, 2018). A number of reports of being bound and immobilized in
another contraption called the “Tiger Chair” have also surfaced (Denyer, 2018). The use
of this torture device in Chinese prisons has been known for years (Human Rights Watch,
2015). Another former detainee described his experience of being thrown into a pit with
his hands and feet tied and having water poured onto him during a cold winter
(Abdurasulov, 2019). Yet another former prisoner recalled that during an interrogation,
he was “thrown into a hole in the ground, doused with cold water and severely beaten”
(Campbell, 2019, p. 2). This former detainee said, “Whenever we saw a bird or a dog
outside, we felt jealous of their freedom” (Campbell, 2019, p. 2).
Former inmates have described a torture room, which prisoners called the “black
room” because they were forbidden to speak about it. In this torture room, prisoners were
hung on a wall and beaten with electric batons, they were forced to sit on a chair of sharp
nails, and some had their fingernails torn out (Stavrou, 2019). A survivor recalled that she
“saw people return from that room covered in blood” (Stavrou, 2019, p. 7). It is important
to remember that none of these prisoners had been charged with committing a crime. As
the China Cables and Karakax List showed, they were detained for flimsy reasons or
simply suspicions related to being Uyghur or Muslim. According to survivors, people
were punished in the camps for anything (or nothing) ranging from not learning
Mandarin well or fast enough to not singing patriotic songs to not following the rules
(Rahim, 2019; Rivers & Lee, 2019; Stavrou, 2019).
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Women in the Camps
Although life in the camps is undoubtedly difficult for everyone, women have
particular issues to contend with. Women are thought to make up nearly a third of the
prisoners in the camps, but the actions against them—which focus on preventing their
ability to reproduce—have an enormous impact on the Uyghur population and culture as
a whole. Sexual assault, forced abortions, imposed birth control, and sterilization have all
been reported by former detainees (Ferris-Rotman, 2019; Hoja, 2019; Lynch, 2019;
Maizland, 2020; Stavrou, 2019; UHRP, 2019). Reports of women being forced to take
pills and receive injections of unknown substances that disrupted or stopped their
menstrual cycles first began to emerge in the fall of 2018 (Danilova, 2018; Lynch, 2019).
One former detainee stated, “There were women who were inside for one year and during
that entire time they never had their monthly period” (Hoja, 2019, p. 1). Other detainees
have corroborated this. Women have also reported having IUDs forcibly implanted while
in the camps, despite clearly stating that they didn’t want one (Ferris-Rotman, 2019;
Maizland, 2020; Stavrou, 2019). A woman who was detained in 2017 recalled that the
doctor who was forcibly inserting her IUD told her that “it’s a must for all women going
to the camp” (Ferris-Rotman, 2019, p. 5).
Mihrigul Tursun, a Uyghur woman who was detained three separate times in the
camps, spoke out after learning from American doctors that she had been sterilized, likely
from the forced medications (Lynch, 2019). Tursun testified before Congress in
November 2018 detailing her torturous experiences, which included being interrogated
for days on end without sleep, using the toilet under the constant gaze of security
cameras, and having to take turns sleeping because of lack of space in an overcrowded
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cell with 60 other women (Danilova, 2018). Tursun further described being electrocuted
with a helmet-like apparatus on her head and said that she suffered from seizures and
bouts of losing consciousness after being in the camp for three months (Danilova, 2018;
Meixler, 2018). One of the things Tursun clearly remembered from her electrocution
sessions was being explicitly told that being Uyghur is a crime (Danilova, 2018).
Other women have also recalled a range of violent and dehumanizing experiences
in the camps. In addition to constant, inescapable surveillance by both policemen and
cameras, survivors described being filmed in the shower as one of their many humiliating
experiences. Some also reported being forced to smear their genitalia with chili paste
(Ferris-Rotman, 2019). Among the more gruesome accounts from the camps include
those describing sexual abuse, which was widespread (Ferris-Rotman, 2019; Hoja, 2019;
Iones, 2019; Rivers & Lee, 2019; Stavrou, 2019;). Both men and women were reportedly
victims of sexual assault. One Uyghur survivor stated, “Any woman or man under age 35
was raped and sexually abused” (Stavrou, 2019, p. 10). She herself was raped repeatedly
and became pregnant twice while imprisoned. She was then forced to have abortions
(Stavrou, 2019). Other reports of forced abortions also exist (Ferris-Rotman, 2019).
Former female detainees have described policemen taking women out of their rooms in
the middle of the night and not returning them until the morning, if ever. Some of these
women were never seen again (Hoja, 2019; Rivers & Lee, 2019; Stavrou, 2019). Another
similar account describes police entering the rooms at night and putting “bags on the
heads of the ones they wanted” (Stavrou, 2019, p. 10).
One of the most distressing accounts from the camps is a case of gang rape in
front of the prisoners. This deserves mention because it reveals the abominable methods
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used in the camps to physically and psychologically control and subjugate the detainees.
A former inmate described the following experience after learning from the police in her
camp that “they were going to check to see whether our reeducation was succeeding,
whether we were developing properly” (Stavrou, 2019, p. 9). I believe it is best told in
her own words.
They took 200 inmates outside, men and women, and told one of the women to
confess her sins. She stood before us and declared that she had been a bad person,
but now that she had learned Chinese she had become a better person. When she
was done speaking, the policemen ordered her to disrobe and simply raped her
one after the other, in front of everyone. While they were raping her they checked
to see how we were reacting. People who turned their head or closed their eyes,
and those who looked angry or shocked, were taken away and we never saw them
again. (Stavrou, 2019, p. 9)
Organ Harvesting
China has a well-documented history of using executed prisoners—particularly
Falun Gong practitioners—as organ donors (China Tribunal, 2019). It is also known that
China executes more people than any other country, though exact numbers are difficult to
obtain because of the lack of transparency and veil of secrecy that surrounds China’s
official public reporting of information. Claims of forced organ harvesting, sometimes
from live patients, began to emerge in 2001 when there was a spike in transplant activity,
and Chinese websites were found to be advertising organs for sale (Smith, 2019). The
transplant industry is very lucrative. It is estimated that China’s transplant trade (as it is
called) is worth nearly one billion U.S. dollars per year (China Tribunal, 2019). In 2012,
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a Chinese health official announced that China will phase out the harvesting of organs
from prisoners over the coming five years (BBC, 2014). China had already been
criticized for taking prisoners’ organs without consent, and finally, in January 2015,
Chinese officials claimed that they had ended this practice (Merchant, 2016). An official
report published in June 2019 by an independent international tribunal based in London,
known as the China Tribunal, revealed something else.
The China Tribunal found overwhelming evidence which showed that forced
organ harvesting from Chinese prisoners—some of whom were still alive—has been
ongoing and continues to the present day on an even larger scale. These prisoners include
Falun Gong practitioners and more recently, Uyghurs (China Tribunal, 2019). In
interviews with survivors of the camps, the China Tribunal learned that prisoners
underwent physical examinations, blood tests, ultrasounds, and X-rays. The tribunal
concluded that this sort of medical testing is “highly suggestive of methods used to assess
organ function,” and “the use of ultrasound examinations further suggests testing was
focused on the condition of internal organs” (China Tribunal, 2019, p. 42). Furthermore,
the report specified that only Falun Gong and Uyghurs were tested—other prisoners were
not tested in these ways.
In 2017, Human Rights Watch reported that Uyghurs in Xinjiang were required to
participate in China’s recently developed free healthcare program called “Physicals for
All.” Physicals for All included collecting DNA samples and blood type information
from all residents aged 12-65 (Human Rights Watch, 2017). In January 2020, Taiwan
News reported that Uyghurs are being killed to provide Halal organs for wealthy Saudi
nationals, even though this notion is misguided and is not supported by Islam
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(Everington, 2020). A witness came forth and described the harvesting of organs from
live Uyghur prisoners, stating “they were slaughtered on the basis of demand”
(Everington, 2020, p. 1). She was told by officials that patients from Saudi Arabia
insisted on receiving organs from Uyghurs because they wanted Halal organs.
As the China Tribunal report concluded, “very many people have died indescribably
hideous deaths” (China Tribunal, 2019, p. 50). With respect to Uyghurs in particular, the
report stated,
Acts of torture have been inflicted on Uyghurs and generally reveal an overall
consistent attitude and approach of the PRC towards Uyghurs which is systematic
in nature and designed to punish, ostracise, humiliate, dehumanise and demean
Uyghurs. It is clear that Uyhgurs have been routinely forced to undergo regular
medical testing. (China Tribunal, 2019, p. 47)
Suicide
Given the extreme mental and physical anguish inmates have to endure, it is
perhaps not surprising that many people have committed or attempted suicide in the
camps (Campbwll, 2019; Denyer, 2018; Hoshur, 2018; Schmitz, 2018). One former
inmate recalled that his “torture was so unrelenting” that he eventually tried to kill
himself (Campbell, 2019, p. 2). Another former detainee described attempting suicide
“by banging his head as hard as he could against a wall” (Schmitz, 2018, p. 5). He awoke
in a medical facility and was told that his detention would be lengthened by seven years if
he attempted suicide again. Other survivors also describe their own and other former
inmates’ attempts (and successes) at suicide when faced with the constant oppression and
torment in the camps (Denyer, 2018). Mihrigul Tursun, mentioned above, stated that she
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“would rather die than go through this torture and begged them to kill me” (Danilova,
2018, p. 1).
In September of 2018, it was reported that a prominent Uyghur editor-in-chief of
a state-run magazine called Literature Translation had committed suicide in Xinjiang
(Hoshur, 2018). His name was Qeyser Qeyum, and he was 55 years old. Another Uyghur
editor-in-chief of a different publication, the Xinjiang Daily, whose offices neighbor
those of Literature Translation, had been arrested in mid-2017. Three Uyghur directors
of the Xinjiang Daily had also been taken away. In addition, it was known that the
Uyghur former vice president of Xinjiang University, Azat Sultan, had also been arrested
in July 2017. It is thought that out of fear of being imprisoned in the camps, Mr. Qeyum
committed suicide by jumping out of the eighth floor of his office building (Hoshur,
2018). This act indicates that the terror and desperation in Xinjiang extend beyond the
camps.
Deaths and Crematoria
In June 2018, Radio Free Asia reported that crematoria were rapidly being
constructed throughout Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The report stated,
Between March 2017 and February 2018, the XUAR government listed 5-10
million yuan (U.S. $760,000 to $1.52 million) tenders for contractors to build nine
“burial management centers” that include crematoria in mostly Uyghur-populated
areas throughout the region. (Hoja, 2018, para. 2)
These crematoria were also reported to be “staffed by dozens of security personnel”
(Hoja, 2018, para. 1). The timing of the building of these crematoria coincides with the
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ramping up of the crackdown on Uyghurs, which was also when reports first began to
emerge about the camps.
Southern Xinjiang, which includes Luopu County in Hotan prefecture, has
suffered disproportionately under Chinese repression because of its relatively large
Uyghur population and distance from other cities (Kuo, 2019). Luopu County is rural and
has a population of approximately 280,000 people, most of whom are Uyghur. Luopu
County is also home to eight internment camps, which reportedly grew significantly
between 2016 and 2018 (Kuo, 2019). A Uyghur from Hotan City who now lives abroad
said that people in Hotan prefecture have a saying: “If you go into a concentration camp
in Luopu, you never come out” (Kuo, 2019, p. 1).
In addition to the disturbing genocidal conclusions that may be drawn from the
rapid creation of the crematoria themselves, the presence of security at the crematoria,
and the local common knowledge that people don’t return from the camps, the mere
existence of crematoria should also be recognized as another way in which Uyghur
culture is being deliberately and systematically destroyed. Uyghur funerary traditions
include sacred burial practices, which they are prevented from engaging in under these
circumstances. In my discussions with Uyghurs in the diaspora years ago, prior to having
knowledge of the camps, I had already learned that the bodies of Uyghurs who died in
prison were not returned to their families for a proper burial. It seems that this has been
extrapolated to an even greater extent with no regard for Uyghur cultural and religious
practices (or rather, with a deliberate disregard toward these practices). In October 2018,
a scholar and historian of East Asia published a piece entitled “China's Final Solution In
Xinjiang” (Yu, 2018). This reference echoes the horrors of the Holocaust, and the
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international community must also make these linkages given the similarities in
repression occurring in Xinjiang.
From Camps to Prisons
Since at least 2018, many Uyghurs in XUAR have been transferred from the
camps to prisons, where they are serving multiple-year sentences for spurious charges
(Hoshur, 2019; Hoshur, 2022; Mauk, 2021; Wright, Watson, & Westcott, 2021). In 2019,
Radio Free Asia reported that authorities in Xinjiang were “covertly sending detainees to
prisons in Heilongjiang province and other parts of China to address an ‘overflow’ in
overcrowded camps” (Hoshur, 2019, para. 2). Officials in other provinces confirmed that
detainees from the camps in XUAR had also been sent to prisons in Gansu, Shandong,
and Shaanxi (Hoshur, 2019). The Uyghur prisoners are considered to be “high-risk” and
are reportedly shackled at all times and kept in solitary confinement with little hope of
ever being released (Hoshur, 2019).
A Uyghur living in Australia reported that her husband was detained in camps in
XUAR three separate times and was then sentenced to 25 years in prison, despite never
having been involved in any illegal activity (Wright, Watson, & Westcott, 2021). A
Uyghur woman who lives in Sweden revealed that her cousin was sentenced to six and a
half years in prison without having committed any crimes (Wright, Watson, & Westcott,
2021). Five Uyghur women from the same family, the eldest of whom is 78 years old,
were also sentenced to between seven and 20 years in prison (Hoshur, 2022). Many such
accounts exist, and diaspora members maintain that all charges against their relatives and
other Uyghurs are fabricated.
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Destruction of Uyghur Culture and Identity
As horrifying as the camps and prisons are, they are just one piece of China’s
totalitarian effort to subjugate Uyghurs and exercise social control. On April 1, 2017,
China imposed a ban on growing “abnormal” beards and wearing veils, hijabs, and/or
burqas2 throughout Xinjiang (Gan, 2017; Hunt et al., 2017; Shephard & Blanchard,
2017). Long beards, in particular, were “deemed to promote extremism" (Hunt et al.,
2017, p. 2). Similar restrictions had already been imposed in some regions of Xinjiang,
including Hotan prefecture and the northern city of Ghulja, but this new legislation
standardized and applied these mandates to the entire region of XUAR (Jacobs, 2016;
Shephard & Blanchard, 2017). The legislation included a statement about setting up
“special task forces to curb extremism” at multiple levels of society, including regional,
prefectural and county governments (Gan, 2017, p. 1). Furthermore, the new law
stipulated that public workers at airports and bus and train stations “will be required to
‘dissuade’ those who fully cover their bodies, including veiling their faces, from entering,
and to report them to the police” (Shephard & Blanchard, 2017, p. 2). Reporting people
to the police for these reasons is a clear attempt to criminalize cultural and religious
practices.
This same aforementioned legislation made it mandatory for the people of XUAR
to watch state television and listen to official state radio, as the “rejection” or “refusal” of
these media is thought to be related to extremism (Gan, 2017; Hunt et al., 2017; Shephard
& Blanchard, 2017). In addition, the new law outlawed “publishing, downloading or
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See this article for the difference between veils, hijabs, and burqas:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/24118241
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reading articles, publications and audio-video material containing extremist content”
(Hunt et al., 2017, p. 2). By all accounts, an explanation of what exactly makes
something “extremist content” was not provided, and it should be noted that this new
legislation was not implemented in other parts of China.
Destruction of Mosques and Cemeteries
In 2016, it was already known that mosques in southern Xinjiang were forbidden
to broadcast the call to prayer (Jacobs, 2016). In 2019, reports began to emerge of
mosques, shrines, and cemeteries having been desecrated and destroyed throughout
XUAR as part of a coordinated campaign since 2016 (Hiatt, 2019; Kashgarian, 2019;
Kuo, 2019; Rivers, 2020; Sintash, 2019). It is now known that dozens of cemeteries were
destroyed as early as 2014 (Rivers, 2020). Satellite images show that hundreds of
traditional Uyghur cemeteries were bulldozed and demolished within a period of just a
few years (Rivers, 2020; Sintash, 2019). Many of these cemeteries had existed for
centuries or longer. The notable Sultanim Cemetery in Hotan City, which was destroyed
in 2019, had a history of over 1,000 years and was regarded as a holy site by millions of
Uyghurs who visited every year (Sintash, 2019). Cemeteries are central to Uyghur
culture, particularly in villages, where they have served as gathering places for multiple
generations to visit their relatives and honor their ancestors (Rivers, 2020). The removal
of these cemeteries not only prevents Uyghurs from engaging in their traditional cultural
practices, but it also severs their connection to their own history and land.
The widespread destruction and alteration of mosques throughout Xinjiang
constitutes another attack on Uyghur culture and Islamic traditions as a whole. The
Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) published a meticulous report in 2019, which
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conservatively estimated that 80% of the mosques throughout the region have been
affected. This amounts to a staggering number of 10,000 to 15,000 mosques which have
been destroyed partially or completely, or they have been sinicized, as described below
(Sintash, 2019). The relatively few mosques which have been allowed to remain—for
tourism and propaganda—have had their domes, minarets, and religious symbols and
inscriptions removed (Hiatt, 2019; Kashgarian, 2019; Sintash, 2019). In many cases,
particularly in big cities, the religious inscriptions have been replaced with party banners
(Hiatt, 2019). According to the UHRP report, all mosques which do not serve a purpose
for tourism have been demolished (Sintash, 2019). It was recently reported that public
restrooms have been built upon the site of one demolished mosque in Kashgar prefecture,
even though there is no need for them in this relatively small area (Hoshur, 2020). In the
same region, a convenience store which sells alcohol and cigarettes was built upon
another former mosque site.
Even non-religious buildings in Xinjiang, such as department stores and bazaar
gates, have been altered by flattening domes and removing minarets (Kashgarian, 2019;
Sintash, 2019). According to a Uyghur historian, the aforementioned construction of
offensive facilities on the ruins of former mosques is considered a way to break the spirit
of Uyghurs, as well as an outright “declaration of war on Islam” (Hoshur, 2020, p. 3).
These efforts, coupled with the disappearances of Uyghur scholars and historians into the
camps, reveal another piece of the systemized, coordinated effort to suppress and
dismantle Uyghur culture and identity.
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Children’s Names
As early as the summer of 2015—a year before Chen Quanguo was assigned as
Xinjiang’s Communist Party chief—the local government in Hotan prefecture issued a
ban on boys’ and girls’ names that were associated with “extremism.” The list of 22
banned names included common Uyghur and Muslim names such as “Seyfulla” and
“Nesrulla” for boys, and “Aishe” and “Fatima” for girls (Sulaiman, 2015). The parents of
Uyghur children who already had any of these banned names were forced to change
them. A local mother reported that “village police came to our house and told us that we
must change our daughter’s name as soon as possible” (Sulaiman, 2015, p. 1). This
mother was instructed by the police to not “ask any foolish questions” regarding the
naming of her own children (Sulaiman, 2015, p. 1). During this period, reports also began
to emerge of children being denied access to education unless they had an “acceptable”
name (Sulaiman, 2015).
In April 2017, another ban on Uyghur and Muslim names was issued in the CCP’s
"Naming Rules For Ethnic Minorities," but this time it applied to all of XUAR
(Hernandez, 2017; Lin, 2017). This list of banned names included Muslim names
“Mohammed,” “Medina,” and “Mecca,” in addition to the previously banned names
(Haas, 2017; Hernandez, 2017; Lin, 2017). This new list was released as part of the effort
“to curb religious fervor” in Xinjiang (Hernandez, 2017, p. 1).
Throughout mainland China, households are required to register under the
national hukou system, which essentially determines where they can live and grants them
access to government services. The hukou system is problematic in itself and has been
widely criticized (Afridi et al., 2015; Wang, 2005); however, it is beyond the scope of
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this dissertation to go further into here. In terms of Uyghurs in XUAR, and particularly
those in rural areas, this new round of naming restrictions was coupled with officially
denying children with banned names access to registration within the hukou system. This,
in turn, meant that those children would not be provided with basic services, such as
healthcare, education and, eventually, working rights and retirement, if families did not
comply (Haas, 2017; Hernandez, 2017; Lin, 2017). This coercive tactic is one of many
that the CCP has used to subjugate Uyghurs.
“Guests” in Homes
In December 2017, China launched a program in Xinjiang called “Relatives’
Week,” which required local government officials to spend a week living with Uyghur
families in their own homes (Huang, 2017). This program was an expansion of what had
already been happening on a smaller, less intrusive scale since 2014 when government
officials regularly visited and surveilled Uyghur households, but did not stay in their
homes (Human Rights Watch, 2018). Prior to the establishment of “Relatives’ Week,”
China had initiated the “Becoming Family” campaign in 2016, which sent government
officials to visit Uyghur homes in southern Xinjiang every two months. It has been
estimated that approximately 110,000 officials were dispatched during the “Becoming
Family” campaign (Human Rights Watch, 2018). The introduction of the “Relatives’
Week” program, which included a home stay component, revealed a new level of
invasive surveillance and social control imposed by the CCP. Over one million
government officials were dispatched as part of this program to live with Uyghurs for one
week in their homes (Jiang, 2018; Human Rights Watch, 2018).
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In early 2018, authorities in Xinjiang expanded their “home stay” program to
require that government officials spend at least five days living in their Uyghur
“families” homes every two months (Human Rights Watch, 2018). This new iteration of
the campaign is sometimes referred to as the “Pair Up and Become Family Program”
(Baynes, 2018; Hoshur, 2018). In some locations, particularly in rural southern Xinjiang,
week-long visits were required every month or even more frequently (Human Rights
Watch, 2018; Jiang, 2018). By all accounts, these visits were imposed, and families could
not refuse them out of fear of being sent to the camps (Huang, 2017; Human Rights
Watch, 2018; Jiang, 2018; Seytoff, 2018). The purpose of these visits was clear: to search
out signs of “extremism” through observation and interrogation, and to impose “ethnic
unity” by speaking Mandarin, singing China’s national anthem, and celebrating national
holidays together (Human Rights Watch, 2018; Seytoff, 2018).
Government documents reveal that families were required to provide personal
details and information about their political and religious views during these visits (Jiang,
2018; Seytoff, 2018). Officials were tasked with reporting any “problems” and were
given leeway to “rectify” any issues (Human Rights Watch, 2018, p. 2; Seytoff, 2018, p.
2). This included identifying religious elements or symbols in homes and confiscating
them (Jiang, 2018). A prominent member of the Uyghur diaspora stated that this home
stay program is “not just a simple invasion of privacy, but the total annihilation of the
safety, security and well-being of family members” (Seytoff, 2018, p. 2). He further said
that the program has “in effect, turned Uyghurs’ homes into prisons from which there is
no escape” (Seytoff, 2018, p. 3). A senior researcher at Human Rights Watch stated that
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the home stay program is essentially “a forced political indoctrination and assimilation
program” (Jiang, 2018, p. 2).
One of the most unsettling aspects of the home stay program which should be
addressed is the impact it has had on women in Uyghur households. Most government
officials who stay with families are men. In many cases, the Uyghur men of these
households are absent because they have been imprisoned in the camps. Online photos
posted by government officials show families and their “guests” engaging in domestic
and intimate activities together, such as preparing and sharing meals, doing chores,
feeding and tutoring children, and sleeping in the same bed (Baynes, 2018; Hoshur, 2018;
Human Rights Watch, 2018; Jiang, 2018). It does not require much imagination to
conceive of the torment these women must endure in having to suppress their identity,
beliefs, and traditions, as well as those of their children—all while having to share a bed
with a communist party official and not knowing whether their husbands and sons are
alive or dead, or whether they will ever see them again.
Forced Family Separations and Boarding Schools
The same legislation that banned long beards and wearing veils and burqas in
Xinjiang in April 2017 also outlawed homeschooling and demanded that children receive
a national state education (Gan, 2017; Hunt et al., 2017). Toward the end of 2017, reports
began to emerge of children being placed in state care after having both of their parents
detained in the camps, even if grandparents were available to care for them (Feng, 2018;
Zenz, 2019). State-run facilities that house these children include orphanages, children’s
shelters, and boarding schools. By all accounts, most of these are large, overcrowded,
highly secured compounds with armed police officers, barred windows, and barbed wire
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fences (Hoshur, 2018; Wang & Kang, 2018; Zenz, 2019). The facilities include boarding
preschools, which admit children as young as a few months old (Zenz, 2019). Reporters
who have attempted to visit these children’s facilities have been confronted by police and
ordered to delete their photographs (Wang & Kang, 2018; Zenz, 2019).
In order for Xinjiang to accommodate large numbers of “newly orphaned”
children as adults were being imprisoned in the camps, the government “began to issue
urgent directives on how to deal with” them in 2018 (Zenz, 2019, p. 2). Part of this
included “a massive campaign to construct so-called ‘children’s rescue, care and
protection centers’” (Zenz, 2019, p. 4). In analyzing official government documents,
Zenz found that policies “designed to systematically boost the ability of the state to house
children of all ages in increasingly centralized and highly securitized educational
boarding facilities” were initiated much earlier, within six months of Chen Quanguo’s
appointment to Xinjiang (Zenz, 2019, p. 3). Under Chen’s leadership, the government has
invested billions of dollars into building these boarding facilities.
By the end of February 2017, nearly 4,400 “bilingual” preschools were being built
in southern Xinjiang, with the intention of accepting 562,900 new students (Zenz, 2019,
p. 11). By the end of 2017, the actual number of enrolled students was even higher,
totaling 759,900 (Zenz, 2019, p. 12). Prior to 2017, the enrollment ratio of children in
Xinjiang’s preschools (per 1,000 students) was far below the national average. Since
2017, Xinjiang has had the highest preschool enrollment ratio in all of China. In Uyghurmajority southern Xinjiang, the enrollment of students in local preschools has quadrupled
in recent years, and this has exceeded the national enrollment growth average by more
than twelve times (Zenz, 2019).
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Throughout 2017 and 2018, the Xinjiang government focused on increasing its
ability to house children of all ages in boarding facilities through the construction of
student dormitories. In 2018, the focus shifted from preschools to primary and middle
schools, often combining them into a single compound (Zenz, 2019). In June 2018, the
XUAR government issued a directive which stated that “all urban and rural regions in
Xinjiang were to establish boarding facilities, to promote ethnically mixed classes for
Han and minorities combined... and to centralize primary and middle school facilities as
combined units” (Zenz, 2019, p. 17). In Kashgar, boarding became mandatory for
students in fourth grade and higher, and in April 2018, “the county mandated the
relocation of 2,000 children from the surrounding rural areas to one single boarding
middle school in the county seat” (Zenz, 2019, p. 18). As previously mentioned, these
school facilities are highly secured. In a government document entitled “Special Work
Plan for Protecting Schools and Securing Campuses,” the instructions are clear: schools
must not have any “blind spots,” and “all educational facilities are to be secured through
‘hard isolation closed management measures,’” which include alarm systems, internal
and external surveillance, armed guards, and a police alert system (Zenz, 2019, p. 23).
These security measures have been implemented at a number of preschools, in addition to
primary and middle schools (Hoshur, 2018; Wang & Kang, 2018; Zenz, 2019).
During this period of establishing a wide network of preschools and building
boarding facilities for students of all ages, the XUAR government was also heavily
promoting Mandarin-only instruction throughout Xinjiang (Zenz, 2019). A document
issued by Xinjiang’s Education Department in June 2018 claimed that by the end of the
year, the nearly three million students attending school in the region “were expected to
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have a fully Chinese-medium language education” (Zenz, 2019, p. 21). Claims of
“bilingual” or “mixed-class” education are patently false. A Chinese news article from
2017 makes this clear: “On school campuses (that follow the) mixed-class education
model, there is only one kind of sound, that of the national language; only one type of
curriculum, which is the national curriculum.... The campus atmosphere is full of unity,
harmony…” (Zenz, 2019, p. 21). Reports have emerged of both teachers and students
being penalized for speaking Uyghur in these environments (Zenz, 2019; Wang & Kang,
2018).
The Chinese government has chillingly argued that
the children of detained parents derive significant benefits from this
separation, that both parents and children need to “study”, (and) that the
“left-behind children” of parents who “work” are “happily growing up
under the loving care of the Party and the government”. (Zenz, 2019, p. 2)
We need not look far for a historical precedent to this deliberate intergenerational
separation, dismantling of culture, and prevention of cultural transmission. The situation
in Xinjiang is hauntingly reminiscent of Indigenous children being forced into boarding
schools in the United States, Canada, Australia, and elsewhere, as an assimilationist
strategy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Brown & Estes, 2018; United Nations,
2009).
Forced Birth Control and Sterilization (Outside of Camps)
China has a history of controlling its population through mandatory measures,
such as the One Child Policy, which has included forced abortions, sterilizations, and
birth control throughout the country for those who exceeded the allowed child limit
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(Taylor, 2015). Even under the One Child Policy; however, ethnic minority groups in
both urban and rural areas were allowed more than one child. Urban minorities were
allowed two children, while rural minorities, including most Uyghurs, were allowed up to
three children. Before 2015, it was common for Uyghurs to exceed the three-child limit.
If they were caught, they simply paid a fine (Zenz, 2020). Historically, Uyghur
population growth rates have been much higher than those of Han. Between 1978 and
2016, average annual Uyghur population growth rates were 19.2 percent, compared to
just 9.75 percent for China as a whole and 12.65 percent for Han in Xinjiang (Zenz,
2020). In 2015 however, the population growth rate in all of Xinjiang’s minority counties
began to decline. Between 2015 and 2018, growth rates in Xinjiang’s two largest Uyghur
prefectures dropped by 84 percent and continued to decline further in 2019 (Zenz, 2020).
In 2015, when growth rates in Xinjiang started to decline, Chinese government
documents began to reveal a purported connection between population growth and
“religious extremism” in Xinjiang. In 2017, a “Special Campaign to Control Birth
Control Violations” was enacted. One of the initial impacts of this campaign was to
“severely attack behaviors that violate family planning (policies),” including those that
had occurred decades before in the 1990s (Zenz, 2020, p, 10). The Karakax List
confirmed that birth control violations were a common reason for people to be interned in
a camp. A second major impact of the campaign was directly aimed at women and their
ability to reproduce. In 2018, a notice was issued which stated, “violations that took place
since July 28, 2017, and where women had exceeded the birth quota by two or more
children, must ‘both adopt birth control measures with long-term effectiveness and be
subjected to vocational skills education and training’” (Zenz, 2020, p. 10). These “birth
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control measures with long-term effectiveness” include IUDs and sterilization, and
“vocational skills education and training” refers to internment in the camps. Zenz (2020)
found that 80 percent of all new IUD insertions in 2018 throughout China happened in
Xinjiang, even though it only makes up 1.8 percent of the nation’s population as a whole.
Furthermore, in 2019, family planning documents stated that “those who refuse to
terminate illegal pregnancies or do not pay related fines are referred to police authorities,
which will ‘subject such persons to centralized education’” (Zenz, 2020, p. 11).
“Centralized education”, again, means internment in the camps. Several Uyghur-majority
regions also “mandated that birth control violations that ‘came about due to the influence
of extreme religious thinking’ were to be ‘dealt with severely’” (Zenz, 2020, p. 12).
By 2019, the situation had become even more drastic. Over 80 percent of the
women in Xinjiang’s rural southern prefectures were “to be subjected to ‘birth control
measures with long-term effectiveness’” (Zenz, 2020, p. 12). This plan included bimonthly pregnancy checks, monthly family visits to a state doctor, and quarterly IUD
checks. For some people, these checks were to be completed even more frequently.
Statistics indicate that IUDs were implanted in women who had not exceeded their child
quota, and in fact, in Nilka County, “family planning policy in 2019 was to place IUDs
on women after their first child” (Zenz, 2020, p. 13). Perhaps even more concerning is
the mass sterilization (“free birth control surgery”) campaign launched in Xinjiang in
2019 to “Guide the masses of farmers and herdsmen to spontaneously carry out family
planning sterilization surgery, implement the free policy of birth control surgery,
effectively promote family planning work, and effectively control excessive population
growth” (Zenz, 2020, p. 16). A budget of over sixteen million dollars was allocated for
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this project in 2019, and another 19.5 million dollars was invested in 2020. In Hotan City,
14,872 female sterilizations were set as a goal, along with thousands in other Uyghurmajority locations.
To provide some context, between 1998 and 2018, sterilization rates across all of
China measured 2,557 people per 100,000 of the total population. In just one year, Hotan
City scheduled 7,322 sterilizations per 100,000 people, which is equivalent to 34.3
percent of married women of childbearing age in the region (Zenz, 2020). Guma County,
also in Hotan prefecture, scheduled 2,998 sterilizations per 100,000 people, or 14.1
percent of the local married women of childbearing age. In 2019, the Guma Health
Commission budget showed that sterilizations were expected to account for 75 percent of
the free birth control project money (Zenz, 2020). In 2019, the family planning policy in
Nilka County openly stated “that women with three or more children should be
sterilized” (Zenz, 2020, p. 18).
Constantly Surveilled Forced Labor
The issue of forced labor in Xinjiang has received quite a lot of press coverage, as
links to global supply chains have emerged since early 2020. It is known that Uyghurs
have been placed in highly secured factories with boarding facilities since 2017 (Fifield,
2020; Xu, 2020). Many Uyghurs have been transferred directly from the camps to these
factories in Xinjiang and other locations in China, including the far east. Government
documents openly “boast about the fact that the labor supply from the vast internment
camp network has been attracting many Chinese companies to set up production in
Xinjiang” (Zenz, 2019, p. 2). The Uyghur-majority city of Kashgar reported “that in 2018
alone it aimed to send 100,000 inmates who had been through the ‘vocational training
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centers’ to work in factories” (Buckley & Ramzy, 2018, p. 3). Between 2017 and 2019,
more than 80,000 Uyghurs were moved from Xinjiang to other locations to work in
tightly controlled factories across the country (Xu, 2020). These factory settings are not
so different from the camps in that the workers are constantly surveilled, are not allowed
to go home, and cannot express or participate in religious observances, including praying.
The workers are also required to take part in military-style drills, Mandarin classes, and
political indoctrination, including “ideological training”, outside of work hours (Buckley
& Ramzy, 2020; Fifield, 2020; Xu, 2020; Zenz, 2019).
After the Urumqi riots in 2009, the Chinese government began holding national
“Xinjiang Aid” conferences in the interest of “developing” and “maintaining stability” in
the region (Xu, 2020). Since then, the comprehensive Xinjiang Aid policy has grown into
specialized subcategories, including “medical Xinjiang Aid, technology Xinjiang Aid,
educational Xinjiang Aid, and industrial Xinjiang Aid” (Xu, 2020, p. 12). The transfer of
workers to factories falls under “industrial Xinjiang Aid”, and this is closely tied to the
government’s alleged claims of alleviating poverty in the region. “Poverty alleviation”
has been used to rationalize sending Uyghurs to work in factories, even though many
highly educated and formerly financially secure Uyghurs have been included in this
scheme.
In analyzing government documents pertaining to poverty alleviation in Xinjiang,
Zenz (2019) found vast, detailed spreadsheets which described adults’ employment (or
internment) status and ability to work. He also discovered detailed personal information
about unemployed minors’ education and training in the region. Zenz suggests this is
consistent with the Xinjiang government’s goal of ensuring that “every single person
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must be in a state-approved place of education, training, work, or approved nonemployment” (Zenz, 2019, p. 4). It is important to emphasize that participation in these
state-approved programs is not voluntary. In the cases of detainees being transferred
directly from camps to factories, they clearly have no choice. For people not interned in
the camps, “those who resist being ‘alleviated’ from their ‘poverty’ are subjected to
ideological education so that their thinking aligns with the state’s goals (Zenz, 2019, p.
4). Furthermore, those who resist poverty alleviation are accused of resisting
modernization, which is considered an indicator of “extremism”, which then becomes a
reason for them to be “re-educated” in the camps (Xu, 2020; Zenz, 2019).
In addition to forced labor and compulsory indoctrination, sending Uyghurs away
from their homes to work in highly restrictive factories raises other important concerns.
By all accounts, Uyghurs are forbidden to engage in any of their religious or cultural
practices in the factories. A Uyghur sent to work in Fujian in southeastern China reported
that “police regularly search their dormitories and check their phones for any religious
content. If a Quran is found, the owner will be sent back to the ‘re-education camp’ for
3–5 years” (Xu, 2020, p. 7). Removing Uyghurs from their families and traditional ways
of life is in itself another tactic to destroy their culture and identity. Moreover, the
Xinjiang government has made a concerted effort to employ women in factories, both in
their local villages and elsewhere. The slogan “from the stove to the machine” refers to
getting “minority women who would traditionally be responsible for running their
households” into factories (Zenz, 2019, p. 8). This slogan is commonly used by Chinese
companies to boast of their achievements in “liberating” women (Zenz, 2019). In most
cases, these women have children. In order to accommodate these children while both of
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their parents are working full-time, the government has created additional schools and
day care facilities, which, as aforementioned, essentially also serve as Mandarin-speaking
indoctrination facilities. Thus, Xinjiang’s poverty alleviation and modernization
strategies are directly linked to family separation and limiting intergenerational
transmission of language, religion, and culture among Uyghurs.
This chapter has discussed different dimensions of the Uyghur genocide,
including the multiple ways in which Uyghurs have been exploited, abused, and
oppressed, both in the camps and in Han Chinese-dominated society as a whole. Uyghur
culture and identity have been systematically destroyed by the CCP through direct
actions, such as the destruction of mosques and cemeteries, banning of Muslim names
and traditional dress, internment and indoctrination in the camps, forced labor, and family
separation. In addition to these direct actions, the conditions of living under ever vigilant
and ubiquitous surveillance, coupled with a constant threat of being detained, have
instilled a sense of fear and coerced compliance among Uyghurs in East Turkestan. The
next chapter will examine how the Chinese government has justified these actions and
how the Global War on Terror, rise of global Islamophobia, and international
development have enabled them.
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CHAPTER III: SITUATING THE UYGHUR EXPERIENCE IN CHINA’S
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT & THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR
“Identities shift and histories get rewritten as a result of changing political agendas”
(Mamdani, 2004, p. 35).
While the previous chapter discussed the actions taken by the Chinese
government to destroy Uyghur culture and identity within China and the Uyghur
homeland, this chapter aims to contextualize China’s actions within a broader global
context. Roberts (2020) suggests that “the fate of the Uyghurs inside China has been
facilitated by the intersection of local and global political processes” (p. xii). Though the
vilification of Uyghurs did not begin with the Global War on Terror, the current situation
in East Turkestan would not have been possible without the international support that
China garnered in labeling Uyghurs as terrorists in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.
Following Uyghur student protests in the 1980s and the Baren uprising of 1990,
the Chinese government “reversed its previous policy of tolerance” toward religious
activity (Bovingdon, 2004, p. 33). “Illegal” religious practices were prosecuted, and
mosques were closed, with further construction halted. “In 1990, cadres in Akto County
(where Baren is located) closed 50 mosques judged to be ‘superfluous’ and cancelled the
construction of 100 more out of fear that religion was getting out of control” (Bovingdon,
2004, p. 34). In the spring of 1997, it was publicly advertised that six Xinjiang University
students had been arrested for participating in religious study groups and were serving
prison sentences (Bovingdon, 2004). Since the late 1990s, Beijing has published reports
emphasizing the conflict in Xinjiang. By the time the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks
occurred in the U.S. in 2001, China was poised to crack down even further on religious
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freedoms, targeting Muslims and Uyghurs in particular as part of the Global War on
Terror.
In November 2001, the PRC submitted a document to the United Nations Security
Council entitled Terrorist Activities Perpetrated by “Eastern Turkistan” Organizations
and their Ties with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban (Roberts, 2012). This document
contained the first public mention of the little known Eastern Turkistan Islamic
Movement (ETIM) and claimed that ETIM was “a major component of the terrorist
network headed by Osama bin Laden” (Roberts, 2012, p. 2). Just a couple of months later
in January 2002, China released a “white paper” which detailed the “terrorist” activities
of ETIM and other Uyghur groups. This paper was entitled “East Turkistan” Terrorist
Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity. Despite a lack of prior knowledge about this
organization and the absence of conclusive evidence linking ETIM to violence in XUAR,
in September 2002, both the U.S. and the UN Security Council officially labeled ETIM a
terrorist organization.
The designation of ETIM as a terrorist organization made it an enemy in the
Global War On Terror launched by the United States in the wake of the September 11,
2001 attack. This made ETIM subject to international sanctions, and, most significantly,
its official status as a terrorist organization positioned Uyghurs as an international
terrorist threat. Moreover, the labeling of ETIM as a terrorist organization made it
unlikely that other nations would intervene in China’s policies against Uyghurs. The
recognition of ETIM as a terrorist organization “has been the single most important act
lending validity to China’s claims that it faces a substantial Uyghur terrorist threat”
(Roberts, 2012, p. 3).
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ETIM was removed from the United States’ terrorist organization list in
November 2020 (Kashgarian, 2020). Nonetheless, since 2002, China has steadily
increased its control over Uyghurs’ religious and political expression, which has been
justified by the “terrorist threat” they pose. Using the rhetoric associated with the Global
War On Terror, China has attributed violent acts committed by a few extremist Uyghur
individuals to the Uyghur Muslim community as a whole (Mahmut, 2019). The situation
has become such that “all Uyghurs have been deemed guilty of terrorist or extremist
inclinations and deemed a threat to the social order until proven innocent” (Roberts,
2018, p. 236).
Chinese Nationalism
In the 1990s, Uyghur loyalty to the Chinese state was encouraged primarily by
punishing perceived disloyalty. Back then, Uyghurs were expected to integrate into an
increasingly Han-dominated society in their own indigenous homeland, and resistance to
doing so was penalized under the bogus claim of fostering separatism. During this period,
the XUAR government censored “publications, music, and other artistic forms of
expression that the state viewed as promoting Uyghur nationalism”, arrested hundreds of
suspected separatists, and instituted limits on practicing Islam independently (Roberts,
2018, p. 237). In the early 2000s following 9/11, the discourse shifted from accusing
Uyghurs of separatism to being a terrorist threat. The U.S. had already linked Islamic
extremism with global terrorism as part of the Global War on Terror, and this “allowed
the PRC to logically justify suppressing unsanctioned religious activities in the XUAR,
which it deemed to be ‘extremism’, as an aspect of countering terrorism” (Roberts, 2018,
p. 238). The Strike Hard Campaigns in the early 2000s shifted from focusing on
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“separatists, terrorists, and hard criminals” to the “Three Evil Forces” of “terrorism,
ethnic separatism, and religious extremism” (Dupont, 2007; Roberts, 2018).
Since 2016, the “counter-terrorism” measures in Xinjiang have included an effort
to purge “two-faced” Uyghurs, including state officials and intellectuals. By all accounts,
the accusation of being “two-faced” is “a castigatory definition that Chinese politicians
are using to highlight the ‘failure’ of Uyghur intellectuals (and others) to manifest their
unwavering and unambiguous allegiance to the CCP” (Ala, 2018, p. 1). The notion of
Uyghur nationalism is a threat to the absolute loyalty, or Chinese nationalism, demanded
by the CCP. The efforts to identify “two-faced” people initially focused on lower-level
officials who committed violations such as underreporting the number of people
attending local mosques and refusing to smoke around village elders, both of which are
considered extremist behaviors (Roberts, 2018). By 2018, this campaign included the
targeting of prominent Uyghur businessmen and intellectuals. In January 2018 in
Kashgar, four wealthy businessmen were arrested on counts of “religious extremism,”
and in February 2018, the president of Xinjiang University in Urumqi was detained
(Niyaz, 2018; Roberts, 2018). Professors from universities throughout Xinjiang have also
been incarcerated in the camps because of their “politically incorrect” ideas and
“(Uyghur) nationalistic tendencies” (Ala, 2018, p. 1). By October 2018, “Almost all
prominent Uyghur intellectuals (had) either been incarcerated in the camps without a trial
or been charged with ‘separatism’ or links with ‘terrorism’ and given long jail sentences”
(Ala, 2018, p. 2).
Mass internment in the camps, or “Counter-Extremism Training Schools,” as they
were called in 2017, reflects the culmination of decades of Chinese repressive policies
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intended to quell Uyghur nationality and force their assimilation into Han-dominated
society. Roberts (2018) suggests that labeling Uyghurs as terrorists “evokes the presence
of a biological threat to society, akin to a virus that must be eradicated, quarantined, or
cleansed from those it infects” (p. 234). Hence, they are quarantined en masse “so as to
not infect the population of the country as a whole” (Roberts, 2018, p. 234). This is
consistent with government documents from 2017 which claim that “Transformation
through Education Classes Are Like a Free Hospital Treatment for the Masses with Sick
Thinking” (Zenz, 2018, p. 122). In this sense, when Uyghurs are forced to speak
Mandarin, sing patriotic songs, praise President Xi, confess their “faults,” and denounce
Islam while imprisoned in the camps, society as a whole is being “cleansed” and new,
compliant comrades are being produced. This logic and related rhetoric have not only
been used to rationalize and justify the government’s actions, but have also stoked
perpetual fear and suspicion of Uyghurs in the Chinese imagination. This, in turn, has
served to further exclude Uyghurs from society. Even outside of the camps, they “remain
under scrutiny as potential terrorists unless they literally condemn their own ethnic
heritage” (Roberts, 2018, p. 236).
Post-September 11th Playbook and Global Islamophobia
The September 11, 2001 tragic terrorist attacks in the U.S. are often cited as a
turning point for the way Muslims are viewed and treated in the U.S. and the West;
however, the roots of Islamophobia go much further back. Ali (2016) goes so far as to say
that “the figure of the Muslim has served as a primordial enemy upon which otherness
has been defined in Western culture,” and “the Muslim has served as as the template of
the existential Other from which Europe and the United States have defined themselves”
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(Ali, 2016, p. 80). Though it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to explore history
prior to the 20th century, one could examine the European Crusades of the 11th-13th
centuries or the Spanish Inquisition starting in the 1400s within the context of
Islamophobia dating centuries back. In fact, some suggest that the Crusades mark the
historical moment during which Muslims became the enemy of the West (Mamdani,
2004).
In 1978, Edward Said published his seminal book on Orientalism in which he
questioned the very notions of “the Orient” and “the West.” He suggested that both of
these ideological concepts serve to identify and reinforce “the Other” (Said, 1978). Said
insightfully pointed out that
these supreme fictions lend themselves easily to manipulation and the
organization of collective passion, (and this) has never been more evident than in
our time, when the mobilizations of fear, hatred, disgust, and resurgent self-pride
and arrogance—much of it having to do with Islam and the Arabs on one side,
“we” Westerners on the other—are very large scale enterprises. (p. xvii)
Though these words were written decades ago, they ring even more painfully true today.
Given the events in Xinjiang, as well as the ongoing refugee crisis, the Rohingya conflict
(UNHCR, 2021), and continued violence and discrimination against Muslims in India
(Ochab, 2022; Siyech & Narain, 2018), it is evident that “fear, hatred, and disgust” of
Muslims has resulted in their dehumanization beyond “the West” and now also comes
from “the Orient” itself, as well.
In 1990, the Atlantic—considered to be a liberal-leaning publication—published
an article by what Said would term an “Orientalist” scholar named Bernard Lewis. The
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title of his piece, The Roots of Muslim Rage, is incendiary in itself, and the article follows
suit. Lewis (1990) outlined the ways in which “the Muslim” has been “defeated,”
including “his loss of domination in the world,” “the undermining of his authority in his
own country,” and “the challenge to his mastery in his own house, from emancipated
women and rebellious children” (Lewis, 1990, p. 49). According to Lewis, it seems
perfectly natural that having suffered such disabling defeats, “the Muslim” has developed
a rage that is directed against the West, and against America in particular. Lewis’ piece is
full of stereotypes, judgements, assumptions, and insults against Muslims. His article
succeeded in not only perpetuating negative stereotypes of Muslims, and Arabs in
particular, but it also legitimized the conflation of religion with politics. It is in this article
by Lewis that we first encounter the public cultural notion of a “clash of civilizations.”
Samuel Huntington, a Harvard professor, wrote a similarly antagonistic piece in
1993 entitled The Clash of Civilizations. Huntington (1993) suggested that the roots of
international conflict can be explained as a “Clash of Civilizations.” He identified
religion as the most important difference between civilizations, thereby reinforcing
Lewis’ conflation of religion and politics, but also adding culture to the mix. He stated
that “conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been
going on for 1,300 years” (Huntington, 1993, p. 31). This not only emphasizes the divide
between “East (or the Orient)” and “West”, but specifically hones in on the “Islamic
world” and pits it against the West. In the final paragraph of his 27-page article,
Huntington suggests that an effort should be made “to identify elements of commonality
between Western and other civilizations,” but rather than stating this in a spirit of
solidarity or compassion, it follows an assertion that the West will have to “maintain the
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economic and military power necessary to protect its interests in relation to these (Other)
civilizations” (Huntington, 1993, p. 49).
After September 11, 2001, Islamophobia was openly practiced through legislation
and policy in the United States, and this continued through the Trump administration with
the travel ban from several Muslim-majority countries issued immediately after his
election in 2016. The ACLU published a detailed report in 2004 about the racial and
ethnic profiling which had been taking place since 9/11. During the days following 9/11,
thousands of men were detained and incarcerated, and all immigration hearings of Arabs
and Muslims were concealed (ACLU, 2004). The report states that “of the thousands of
men who were detained and questioned, not one (was) publicly charged with terrorism”
(ACLU, 2004, p. 5). What has been happening in Xinjiang bears a striking resemblance
to these tactics. Furthermore, in 2002, the U.S. government established a Special
Registration program, which required “all male nationals over the age of 15 from 25
countries... to report to the government to register and be fingerprinted, photographed,
and questioned” (ACLU, 2004, p. 6). In just one year, 83,310 foreign nationals registered
through this program. 13,740 of them were placed into deportation proceedings, and none
of them were ever officially charged with terrorism (ACLU, 2004). Though these figures
may be staggering, they are small in comparison to what has been happening in Xinjiang.
Moreover, Uyghurs are Chinese nationals.
During this post-9/11 period, the FBI arrived unannounced to the homes,
workplaces, and mosques of thousands of Arabs and Muslims across the country,
separating families and causing fear and confusion among these communities. Police
departments were also involved in official Islamophobic practices. After 9/11, the New

68

York Police Department had a program specifically intended to surveil Muslim
communities (Ali, 2016). This program “put American citizens (and others) under
surveillance and scrutinized where they ate, prayed, and worked solely because of their
ethnicity” (Ali, 2016, p. 78). One of the most insidious elements of this program was to
target Muslim students on their college campuses. We have seen these same tactics, as
previously mentioned, implemented in Xinjiang. There were also spies planted in various
community environments, which served to create a sense of mistrust and self-censorship
within and between these communities. Ultimately, this “muted their sense of democratic
engagement and attempted to undermine their efforts of political organizing” (Ali, 2016,
p. 79). According to interviews with Uyghurs, this has been happening in their
communities both in China and abroad for many years.
Ali finds that “although Muslims in the United States may be citizens, they are
also citizen-suspects” (Ali, 2016, p. 79). In the post-9/11 political climate, “every Muslim
was ‘bad’ until proven otherwise, and even ‘good’ Muslims (were) treated with continual
suspicion” (Ali, 2016, p. 80). Similarly, Mamdani (2004) discusses the concept of “good
Muslim” versus “bad Muslim.” Mamdani suggests that popular media, including the New
York Times, portray good Muslims as “modern, secular, and Westernized, but bad
Muslims are doctrinal, antimodern, and virulent” (Mamdani, 2004, p. 24). This suspicion
and stereotyping of Muslims, along with the justification thereof, has spread worldwide
since the inception of the Global War on Terror. Direct parallels to Muslims in Xinjiang
have already been discussed.
The notions of “good Muslim” and “bad Muslim” as created by pervasive
governmental policies and reinforced by societal pressures surely have an influence on
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how people perceive Muslims, as well as how Muslims perceive themselves. According
to Ali (2016), after 9/11, Muslim students in New York City and surrounding areas
censored themselves in one-on-one conversations, group meetings, on campuses, and in
youth organizations. In short, they did not feel free to be themselves and were “actively
responding to how they were, and are, perceived due to the appearance of being Muslim”
(Ali, 2016, p. 86). The young people in Ali’s study reported that after 9/11, “they
changed the way they associated with friends, as well as newcomers to their
communities” (Ali, 2016, p. 88). They were not able to trust people anymore and felt that
they were always being watched. Uyghur communities have similarly been fragmented in
both China and abroad.
Since 9/11, the perception of “the dangerous, violent, rebellious, and suspect
figure of the Muslim continues to haunt the American imagination” (Ali, 2016, p. 93).
This perspective has also spread widely across the globe. Mamdani reminds us that “it
does not make sense to think of culture in political—and therefore territorial—terms.
States are territorial; culture is not” (Mamdani, 2004, p. 27). Rather than continuing to
conflate culture, religion, and politics, as well as national origin and Islam, I suggest we
carefully consider the underlying reasons for such vilification of Islam and Muslims. If
the Middle East was not so rich in oil, I wonder if Islamophobia would be so prevalent in
“the West.” The same can be queried of Xinjiang. What has been presented as a “clash of
civilizations” could be considered alternatively as a conflict that actually is founded upon
the desire to control material and natural resources. Mamdani argues that “one has to
distinguish between civilization and power” (Mamdani, 2004, p. 33). Differences do not
necessitate conflict. Rather, conflict is fueled by political, social, and economic
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positioning. To continue to focus on differences in cultures and civilizations denies this
notion (or meticulously obscures it).
The notion of Mamdani’s Good Muslim, Bad Muslim reveals the colonial,
mistrustful, judgemental thinking that is still very much alive today, despite what Lewis
and others suggest. Ali suggests that “every Muslim was ‘bad’ until proven otherwise,
and even ‘good’ Muslims are treated with continual suspicion” (Ali, 2016, p. 80). The
aforementioned surveillance and justification for dismantling Muslim communities has
been enabled by the divisive, fear-based thinking that was promoted by Lewis,
Huntington, and many others, including government officials. This thinking is pervasive
and has translated into repressive and discriminatory policies aimed at Muslims around
the world, including refugees in Europe and the United States, the Rohingya in Myanmar,
Muslims in India, and those in East Turkestan (Ochab, 2022; Siyech & Narain, 2018;
Sito-Sucic, 2021; UNHCR, 2021).
Given all of the information available about the extent of egregious human rights
violations in Xinjiang, the lack of any significant response by the international
community is surprising. Since 9/11, “religion has increasingly become a focal point in
both public and academic discourses”, and “global Muslims have been generalized or
homogenized” as having an inherently violent nature (Mahmut, 2019, p. 25). Roberts
(2018) reminds us that “hate crimes against Muslims with no affiliation to terrorist
organizations are on the rise in both Europe and the United States” (p. 236). Abu-Lughod
(2002) suggests asking people to substitute “Christian or Jewish wherever you have
Muslim" in a question or statement to see if it would be acceptable or make sense (p.
784). If it were Christians or Jews being dehumanized and persecuted on such a large
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scale in Europe, the U.S., Myanmar, India, or China, perhaps there would have already
been a response on the part of the international community. Though global Islamophobia
may not be the sole explanation for the world’s inaction, it is likely a significant
contributing factor. Within China, there are also other reasons for the desire to control the
Uyghur population and the region which this ethnic population inhabits.
The Belt and Road Initiative
In 2013, Chinese president Xi announced his plans to develop a New 21st century
Silk Road stretching from East Asia to Europe, Africa, and Oceania, linking more than
100 countries through infrastructure, transportation, and trade (Chatzky & McBride,
2020; Ma, 2019). This New Silk Road consists of the Silk Road Economic Belt on land
and the Maritime Silk Road by sea. These were initially collectively referred to as the
“One Belt, One Road Initiative” but are now simply called the “Belt and Road Initiative”
(BRI). As of January 2020, more than sixty countries, which account for two-thirds of the
world’s population, had signed on to the BRI or had expressed interest in participating
(Chatzky & McBride, 2020). The amount of money China has invested in the BRI is
enormous. Though specific figures are difficult to confirm, it has been estimated that
trillions of dollars have been contributed by China, including loans given to participating
countries (Chatzky & McBride, 2020; Kuo & Kommenda, 2018; Ma, 2019).
The BRI has received both criticism and praise. Supporters tout it as “a way for
China to invest in emerging markets and strengthen ties,” while critics suggest it allows
China to “use money to leverage political gains and increase its global power,” including
by engaging in debt-trap diplomacy (Ma, 2019, p. 1). Countries including Djibouti,
Kyrgyzstan, Laos, the Maldives, Mongolia, Montenegro, Pakistan and Tajikistan are at
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risk of not being able to repay their loans and “will owe more than half of all their foreign
debt to China” (Kuo & Kommenda, 2018, p. 3). People have also voiced environmental
concerns related to specific BRI projects, such as constructing a coal plant in Kenya and
building a dam in Indonesia (Ma, 2019).
Development in Xinjiang
Significant to this dissertation is the fact that the Belt and Road Initiative cuts
through the heart of East Turkestan and relies on Urumqi as a central hub through which
to reach countries to the north and west of China. It has already been mentioned that
XUAR is rich in natural resources, and Han have been steadily migrating into the region
for decades. In fact, Xinjiang contains China’s largest oil and natural gas reserves
(Burgés et al., 2019). Fourteen years before plans for the BRI were declared, in June
1999 the Chinese government announced the “Western Big Development Project” in
Xinjiang, which included “construction of roads, airports, railroads and a US$ 14 billion
pipeline linking Xinjiang’s natural gas fields to Shanghai” 2,500 miles away
(Bhattacharya, 2003, p. 369). This is just one example of how the government has
siphoned off Xinjiang's resources to benefit Han in other parts of the country. All major
industries in Xinjiang are controlled by Han Chinese individuals, including the oil
industry. The China National Petroleum Company, for example, “brought most of its
workers in Xinjiang from other parts of China” (Bhattacharya, 2003, p. 369). These Hanrun companies hire Han workers, thereby further marginalizing and isolating Uyghurs
from participating in and benefiting from the development of their own land.
Since the official launch of the One Belt, One Road Initiative in 2015, Beijing has
overseen “a vast infrastructure transformation in Xinjiang” (Burgés et al., 2019, p. 15).
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One of the most significant BRI development measures in Xinjiang has been the
construction of a land port in Urumqi. This port is intended “to serve as China’s gateway
for materials being transported into Europe and the Middle-East” while offering “a ‘onestop,’ ‘integrated’ service, combining customs clearance, inspection and quarantine, train
transportation and freight logistics” to attract international business to Xinjiang (Burgés
et al., 2019, p. 15). This port and railway hub has now “opened 21 rail routes to 26 cities
in 19 European and Central Asian countries, with China-Europe freight trains making
over 2,200 journeys departing from Urumqi” (Burgés et al., 2019, p. 15).
In 2017, China invested about US$ 66 million for infrastructure in Xinjiang,
including the construction of highways and high-speed railways to connect the region to
other parts of China. This was a fifty percent increase over the previous year’s spending
(Shan, 2019). 2017 also marks the year the crackdown in Xinjiang, including mass
internment in the camps, reached its height. It has been reported that “Beijing hopes that
Xinjiang can serve as a transportation hub and commercial, logistics and cultural centre
for the region” (Shan, 2019, p. 1). One might inquire which culture President Xi plans to
display in this Indigenous Uyghur homeland. Given what has been happening in recent
years, it is clear that Uyghurs are not to be included in these modernization and
globalization efforts on their land.
What is happening in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is reminiscent of
other settler colonial projects, “which sought to break the will and destroy the
communities of Indigenous populations, quarantine and decimate large portions of their
populations, and marginalize the remainder while subjecting them to forced assimilation”
(Roberts, 2020, pp. 4-5). Roberts suggests that the overall goal of China’s current
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campaign is the forced assimilation of both “the territory of XUAR and its people into the
PRC’s version of a modern China” (p. 4). Despite an abundance of evidence, most of the
international community has stood silently by, while some nations—particularly those
who stand to benefit from the BRI—have gone so far as to praise China’s supposed
counterterrorism measures, thereby allowing the PRC to act with impunity. This study
seeks to humanize the crisis in XUAR by highlighting not only the unprecedented
repression Uyghurs are experiencing, but also how they continue to resist Chinese
brutality and hegemony, even at great risk to themselves and their family members.

CHAPTER IV: METHODOLOGY
Restatement of the Purpose
What is happening to the Uyghurs in East Turkestan amounts to genocide, as has
been shown in Chapter Two; yet, until recently, relatively little attention has been given
to this issue. This dissertation highlights the realities of Uyghur people through the
perspectives of those in the diaspora, and the ways in which they continue to struggle to
survive, with the hope that it leads to greater awareness of and action in the face of the
crimes against humanity taking place in their homeland. I hope that this, in turn, will
draw more attention to this situation so that it will be regarded as a significant human
rights issue which deserves closer examination and action by the international
community.
Uyghurs around the world have been speaking out and organizing in resistance to
Chinese hegemony at great risk to themselves and their family members. As an ethnic
group, they are struggling to retain their identities and prevent their culture from being
exterminated. Members of the Uyghur diaspora have shared their experiences and those
of their family members in this study to raise awareness of the magnitude of this
egregious human rights issue. I would like to honor their stories and highlight their
resistance in the face of tremendous struggle.
To restate, the research questions this study explores are as follows:
1. What are the perspectives of North American Uyghurs of the diaspora on
the genocide happening in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region?
2. How have Uyghurs of the diaspora engaged in acts of resistance against
Chinese, state-sanctioned, colonial hegemony?
The methodological plan detailed below was followed to answer these questions.
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Research Design
This study is a qualitative case study, which positioned the Uyghur people’s
experiences, perspectives, and resistance—as reflected through the voices of those in the
diaspora, as well as a review of archival evidence and available texts produced by
Uyghurs—at the center of a human rights crisis amounting to crimes against humanity
and genocide. Creswell (2013) suggests that case studies are most useful when the setting
is critical to a study. This particular study focuses on a specific geopolitical area in China
where human rights violations have been taking place for decades against the Uyghur
people. Moreover, according to Creswell (2013), a case study is the most appropriate
methodological approach for this research because of the application of diverse sources
of data, including interviews, observations, field notes, archival evidence, and document
analysis.
The use of testimonio as a research method is relevant to this study, as “the
collective goal of testimonio is to name oppression and to arrest its actions whether as
genocide, racism, classism, xenophobia, or any other type of institutionalized
marginalization” (Reyes & Curry Rodríguez, 2012, p. 527). Furthermore, the use of
testimonio “is intentional and political,” which allows Uyghurs as narrators “to show an
experience that is not only liberating in the process of telling but also political in its
production of awareness to listeners and readers alike” (Reyes & Curry Rodríguez, 2012,
p. 527). Distinct from testimonials, which seek to provide an authoritative and accurate
account of a given experience, a central tenet of testimonio is understanding that “a
narrative ‘I’ is called upon to represent the experiences of the ‘we,’ in which the narrator
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speaks as a member of an oppressed community or social group who utilizes the genre to
bring attention to a collective social problem” (DeRocher, 2018, p. 4).
Although testimonio is typically relayed in block quotes or long passages, I have
taken portions of individual quotes from my participants and interspersed them with each
other and additional data to protect their possible identification. In utilizing testimonio as
a method with populations under massive repression who are facing state violence,
protecting the identity of participants—and preventing reprisals for their participation—is
of the utmost importance.
I am aware that all too often, “The stories that are considered most compelling,
considered most authentic in social science research are stories of pain and humiliation”
(Tuck & Yang, 2014, p. 812). My goal is not to expose and parade these stories, but
rather, to provide a space for Uyghurs to be heard and share what they wish with others,
based on an expressed interest in doing so. They have guided the epistemological
foundation upon which their stories are presented, and I have learned from their
experiences—“often painful, but also wise, [and] full of desire and dissent” (Tuck &
Yang, 2014, p. 812). As a researcher and scholar, rather than upholding and reaffirming
the historical superiority and legitimacy of hegemonic knowledge, I am “committed to
producing research knowledge that documents social injustice, that recovers subjugated
knowledges, that helps create spaces for the voices of the silenced to be expressed and
‘listened to’, and that challenges racism, colonialism, and oppression” (Smith, 2012, p.
198).
Tuck and Yang (2014) state that using research methods which “rely upon a
researcher’s observations already make a claim about knowledge, how it is acquired, and
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who is in the position to acquire it” (p. 815). Hence, “observation itself is making an
epistemological claim, rooted in the dynamics of gaze, space, and power” (Tuck & Yang,
2014, p. 815). I am acutely aware of this, and as such, I have made every effort to center,
uphold, and honor the experiences of the participants who have been bravely willing to
share. I renounce my claim to objectivity, and I refuse to objectify those who have
participated in this project. Instead, I observed “the objectifying space and its sexual,
racial, and biopolitical architecture” (Tuck & Yang, 2014, p. 816). I have also
emphasized policies, institutions of power, and the relationships of Uyghurs to such
oppressive forces rather than “studying” them and their problems.
In working with Uyghur people themselves, I used Linda T. Smith’s decolonizing
methodologies as a framework for disrupting “relationships between researchers and
researched… (and) between a colonizing institution of knowledge and colonized peoples
whose own knowledge (has been) subjugated” (Smith, 2012, p. x). I have
centered their experiences and stories as those with authority, and I have worked with
them as partners rather than research participants.
I conducted individual interviews with ten Uyghurs of the diaspora to
complement the reports in my literature review and learn about their resistance efforts
related to the genocide. I also had many informal conversations with Uyghurs of the
diaspora over the course of a year, both in-person and over Zoom, which I recorded by
hand as observations and field notes. We focused on the following topics, though a
number of other issues arose during our conversations, which are reported in Chapter
Five: repression in XUAR, transnational oppression of Uyghurs, internment in the camps,
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fabricated accusations of criminal behavior, destruction of culture, and religious
intolerance.
Many Uyghurs directed me to the testimonies collected during the Uyghur
Tribunal—an independent investigation of China’s crimes against humanity held in the
United Kingdom in June, September, and November 2021, which was during the time of
my data collection. Diaspora members also pointed me to the Xinjiang Victims Database,
which is an archive containing over 25,000 detailed records of those who have been
detained in the camps and prisons. Both of these sources were examined and provided
primary source data, which is included in Chapter Five to supplement the accounts
contributed by diaspora members.
Method One: Interviews
The interviews held with diaspora members highlighted how Uyghurs have
actively struggled to survive and continue to do so through acts of resistance, both in
China and abroad. Smith (2012) suggests that “struggle is a tool of both social activism
and theory,” and “struggle can be mobilized as resistance and as transformation” (p. 199).
I recognize that participation in this study is in itself a form of resistance and puts my
participants at risk. As such, I engaged in both purposeful and snowball sampling as I
continued to develop trust within the Uyghur community. I included the testimonios of
Uyghurs collected through interviews and observations in my research findings as
approved by the participants.
Interviews were conducted for 45 minutes to one hour, one-on-one, with ten
individual Uyghurs with whom I had developed a rapport. These interviews were
intended to both “discover [and] understand” the perspectives and experiences of the
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participants (Bhattacharya, 2017, p. 93). The interviews followed the “general interview
guide approach” (Turner III, 2010, p. 755), as well as the “informal open-ended
interview” method, combined with natural conversation (Bhattacharya, 2017, p. 127).
Essential to my project as a whole has been developing trust within the Uyghur
community. As such, my interviews were informal to provide the feeling of having a
casual, open, and safe conversation. After collectively identifying key areas to discuss, I
guided the participants “through insightful probes that create a conversation” while using
“broad probing questions… to move the conversation forward” (Bhattacharya, 2017, p.
127). This general interview guide approach allowed for flexibility and “a relaxed and
informal manner” while maintaining some basic structure (Turner III, 2010, p. 755). This
approach also helped “to develop rapport with the participants,” which was critical in
creating a safe, encouraging, and supportive environment (Turner III, 2010, p. 755).
Diaspora members shared that the last iteration of their Chinese ID cards included
a voice sample. As such, not all participants were comfortable being audio recorded. Four
of the interviewees permitted audio recording, while the other six preferred that I take
notes. They were very accommodating in repeating their statements and speaking slowly
so I could record the details by hand. We then reviewed the material together to ensure its
accuracy.
Method Two: Observations and Field Notes
Between January and December 2021, I met Uyghurs of the diaspora in the
United States and Canada by participating in various advocacy efforts. During the
summer of 2021, I spent nearly every weekend with Uyghurs of the San Francisco Bay
Area diaspora community. Over the course of this year (2021), I attended community
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gatherings, social events, and was invited to Uyghurs’ homes. I engaged in many
informal conversations during which I observed and actively listened to their experiences
and expressions of both struggle and solidarity as a community. I kept a field journal
where I meticulously recorded my observations by taking notes during and after my time
spent with diaspora members. I informed everyone I interacted with that I was recording
information to possibly include in my dissertation. People were surprisingly forthcoming,
particularly after they had met me a few times, though they insisted on strict conditions of
anonymity.
Maxwell (2012) suggests that “observation can enable you to draw inferences
about someone’s perspective that you couldn’t obtain by relying exclusively on interview
data” (p. 94). I found this to be true in my study, as people were quite comfortable and
communicative having casual conversations in an informal setting, and there was no
structure or expectation, which differed from the interviews. I also found that
participating in activities and interacting with Uyghurs in a natural setting was very
valuable in enhancing my understanding of the issues and dynamics their diaspora
community faces.
Deggs and Hernandez (2018) suggest that “with field notes in particular,
reflective practices can prove to be useful to help qualitative researchers make meaning
out of the data they have collected through empirical processes'' (p. 2553). I have made
every effort to engage in purposeful reflection throughout my data collection, analysis,
and writing of this dissertation. My observations and field notes were used both as a
record from the field and as a source for reflexive practice.
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Method Three: Document Analysis
I used document analysis in combination with interviews, observations, field
notes, and archival research as a means of triangulation. According to Bowen (2009), “as
a research method, document analysis is particularly applicable to qualitative case
studies” (p. 29). Several Uyghur organizations have been active since the 1990s and early
2000s in creating websites and publishing reports as a way to mobilize and organize
Uyghurs of the diaspora. I examined a number of their publications and websites as
primary sources. Specifically, I looked at material produced by the World Uyghur
Congress, the Uyghur American Association, the Uyghur Human Rights Project, and
Campaign for Uyghurs, respectively.
In addition to triangulating the data, document analysis was helpful in providing
additional data “on the context within which research participants operate,” as well as
historical insight and background information (Bowen, 2009, p. 29). As such, the
documents analyzed serve as sources of supplementary research data. Content from some
of the documents also provided leads for asking additional questions during the
interviews and casual conversations.
Method Four: Archival Research
The Xinjiang Victims Database3 documents and maintains detailed records of
people who have been detained in the camps, prisons, or otherwise disappeared in
XUAR. This project is ongoing, and as of March 2022, it contained over 26,000 entries.
The goal is to document the details of individual cases “so as to both protect them now

3

https://shahit.biz/eng/#home
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and hold the Chinese authorities accountable later, by creating the foundations for future
legal action and reparations” (Xinjiang Victims Database, 2021). In addition to
documenting and maintaining individual records, the Xinjiang Victims Database contains
eyewitness accounts from survivors of the camps, letters from detention, official court
documents, before-and-after photos of survivors, transcripts of phone calls, and other
primary source evidence. As such, it serves as an archive of information pertaining to the
atrocities in XUAR.
I read 53 eyewitness accounts and examined 50 records of Uyghurs in the
database who have been detained, imprisoned, or whose whereabouts are unknown. Some
of this information is included in Chapter Five to supplement data from the interviews,
observations, field notes, and testimonies from the Uyghur Tribunal. Subotić (2021)
states that “traditionally, ‘legitimate’ archives were official, public places where people
of privilege (white, male, wealthy) deposited their documents, or the archives considered
only those kinds of people worthy of archival files” (p. 344). She recommends that we
“think more creatively about what kind of archival sources we could use in addition to
official state archives” (Subotić, 2021, p. 349). The Xinjiang Victims Database provides a
set of archival records focused entirely on those who have been victimized by the
Chinese state.
Rather than asking victims to recount their traumatic experiences repeatedly, an
archive may provide their testimonies and other accounts as primary sources to be
considered for research. Heng et al. (2018) propose that “A significant strength of
archival research over other methodological designs is the ability to examine socially
sensitive phenomena in an ethical,… non-confrontational and indirect manner” (p. 18).
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Uyghurs themselves directed me to the Xinjiang Victims Database as a source for painful
testimony and details which they have not directly experienced, but are intimately
familiar with.
I examined the evidence in the Xinjiang Victims Database after having spent a
substantial amount of time with the Uyghur diaspora community and learning a great deal
about their history and current struggle. This is consistent with Gaillet’s (2012)
suggestion that “archival researchers must immerse themselves in the study of the place,
time, and culture they are researching.” She recommends “talking with members of the
community when possible, broadly reading any contemporary materials, addressing
pertinent issues of time and place, and triangulating data,” as I have done throughout my
study (Gaillet, 2012, p. 44). The information from this archive describes the current
situation in East Turkestan in the words of those who have experienced it directly, thus
maintaining the integrity of the data.
Data Analysis
In my analysis of the data, I identified common primary themes and sub-themes
that emerged from my observations and field notes, interview transcriptions, and the
documents, tribunal testimonies, and database entries reviewed. I engaged in an inductive
approach to coding, initially creating two large categories of data that applied to either of
my two research questions. I then examined these large categories line-by-line to create
overarching (primary) themes. Further analysis revealed sub-themes within the primary
themes. Finally, I identified and assessed the primary and sub-themes’ relevance to this
study. The themes and sub-themes relevant to each research question are described in
Chapters Five and Six, respectively. Some additional questions were generated from the
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data, which were clarified by speaking with diaspora members and led “back to the data
for further analysis to refine the study findings” (Hennink, 2014, p. 129).
Tuck and Yang (2014) remind us that “researchers make claims for a living,” and
“the work of data analysis is the alchemy of becoming-claims” (p. 814). I have not lost
sight of the fact that these becoming-claims come from the lived experiences of real
people: “their stories, their worries and desires, their sense of the way the world works”
(Tuck & Yang, 2014, p. 814). Throughout my research, I have been guided by the
question of “who benefits from this work?” I have tried to ensure that the answer is
always “Uyghurs.” I have checked my content with diaspora members to ensure that I am
not gratuitously sharing their stories.
Population
Ten Uyghur adults of the diaspora community in the San Francisco Bay Area
were interviewed for this study. In addition, Uyghur diaspora members in the United
States and Canada shared their perspectives and experiences with me informally. No
names or other identifying details have been included to protect the safety of those
involved and their relatives in East Turkestan. All of my research was conducted with the
utmost respect for the privacy, security and well-being of the Uyghur people. I have
cleared everything with my participants (in a process of “member-checking” utilized in
community-based research), to the extent that they have been interested in participating,
before sharing or publishing their stories and research findings.
Limitations
One limitation to this study is that I was not able to go to Xinjiang and collect
data and make observations in person, as it would have put Uyghurs at tremendous risk. I
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learned from one of my Uyghur contacts in the Bay Area that after a journalist visited
East Turkestan to speak with Uyghurs about their experiences, all those who she spoke to
were arrested. Also, I do not speak or read the Uyghur language or Mandarin, so I had to
rely on one of my Uyghur contacts to translate for those who do not speak English. All
interviewees spoke English fluently, so this was not an issue. It was during social
gatherings and community events that I occasionally had the help of a translator.
I was initially uncertain of how many members of the Uyghur diaspora would be
willing to speak with me as part of this study, which I expected to be a limitation. I found
that as I got to know people and built trust within the community, many diaspora
members willingly shared their experiences with me. I also expected that continually
unfolding events in XUAR and possible threats to family members would limit people’s
willingness to speak openly and share their experiences. I actually discovered that as the
situation grew worse, more people wanted to participate in the hope of drawing more
attention to this ongoing crisis.
Positionality
Since my earliest memories, I have been aware of the direct impacts of Soviet
Communist oppression and anti-Semitism on my own family members. I have never
known my grandparents, though I do know that my maternal grandmother was orphaned
as a young child and didn’t know her own birthday, and my maternal grandfather was
killed because he was Jewish. Growing up with the awareness of religious and political
persecution, coupled with constant reminders of the Holocaust, fostered my personal
commitment to never allow such atrocities to happen again. As such, I feel a strong sense
of responsibility to speak out against the Uyghur genocide. At the same time, I am
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acutely aware of my privilege as a White, non-Indigenous person conducting this work as
a doctoral student with the support of a progressive department within a social justiceoriented university. I acknowledge the violence that has been committed against
Indigenous peoples by the Academy, and I recognize that the consequences of
colonialism continue to the present day. In this study, I aim to dismantle the research
binary between researcher and subject, and I intend to center Uyghur stories of resistance
over pain narratives. Furthermore, Uyghur epistemologies will serve to unsettle the
Chinese settler colonial knowledge, which China continues to publicly proclaim.
As aforementioned, I returned to this subject after being contacted by local
Uyghur community members and learning about the scale of Uyghur internment in the
camps. We organized a public program at USF in November 2018 to raise awareness of
what was happening in XUAR following the internment of one of my Uyghur contact’s
relatives in the camps. This event was co-sponsored by Amnesty International and
Human Rights Educators USA. The trust I have established within the local Uyghur
community served as the foundation upon which my research was conducted.
Conclusion
The methodology in this qualitative case study was designed to center and honor
the knowledge and experiences of Uyghurs of the diaspora in relation to the genocide
occurring in their Indigenous homeland. Although Uyghurs inside of China remain
largely powerless in the present context, Uyghurs of the diaspora “may be able to
complicate PRC designs on the erasure of their culture and identity” (Roberts, 2020, p.
239). Many Uyghur exiles have become politically active since their family members
have disappeared into the camps, and Uyghur youth have become involved in
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mobilization efforts in the west. Despite attempts by the PRC to silence them, these
Uyghurs continue to raise awareness of what is happening to their friends and relatives in
East Turkestan. This dissertation presents the perspectives of Uyghurs of the diaspora
based on a year of engaging in dialogic spaces together, which I have been privileged to
take part in.
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CHAPTER V: UYGHUR DIASPORA PERSPECTIVES ON THE GENOCIDE IN
EAST TURKESTAN
This chapter presents evidence to contribute to the growing body of testimonios
and other accounts confirming the systematic, targeted, unlawful, inhumane treatment of
Uyghurs by the Chinese state (Danilova, 2018; Denyer, 2018; Ferris-Rotman, 2019;
Maizland, 2020; Newlines Institute, 2021; Uyghur Tribunal, 2021; Zenz, 2019; Zenz,
2020). The information presented here is guided by the following broad research
question: What are the perspectives of North American Uyghurs of the diaspora on the
genocide happening in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (East Turkestan)? The data
in this chapter is based on interviews conducted with ten Uyghur community members in
the San Francisco Bay Area over six months between June and December 2021, as well
as many informal conversations with Uyghur diaspora members living across North
America from January to December 2021. 4 Although there are different perspectives and
experiences within the Uyghur diaspora, every respondent agreed upon the fact that a
deliberate, multifaceted genocide is taking place with the aim of destroying Uyghur
culture and identity and breaking the spirit of the Uyghur people worldwide.
Participants
Ten Uyghur diaspora members ranging from 30-60 years of age were interviewed
for this study. Six men and four women generously and courageously agreed to share
their perspectives with me under strict conditions of anonymity. All interviews were held

4

All quotes in this chapter, unless specifically cited, are from Uyghur diaspora participants in my study. To
protect their identities and given the high-level of surveillance of the Chinese state, I have attributed
information and quotes broadly “members of the Uyghur diaspora.”
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in person in public parks in the San Francisco Bay Area. Four of these interviews were
audio recorded, while the other six were transcribed by hand. Other conversations took
place either in person, on the telephone, via email, or on Zoom with Uyghur diaspora
members in various locations in the United States and Canada. The table below indicates
the interviewees’ gender, age range, level of education completed, and language fluency.

Table 5.1: Participants’ Data
Gender

Age Range

Education

Language Fluency

Male

30-45

MS

Female

45-60

MS

Uyghur, Mandarin, Russian,
English
Uyghur, Mandarin, Russian,
English

Uyghur, Mandarin, English

Female

45-60

BA

Male

45-60

PhD

Male

45-60

BS

Uyghur, Mandarin, English
Uyghur, Mandarin, English

Female

30-45

BS

Male

30-45

BS

Female

45-60

MA

Uyghur, Mandarin, English,
Turkish
Uyghur, Mandarin, English
Uyghur, Mandarin, English
Uyghur, Mandarin, English

Male

45-60

MS

Male

30-45

BS

Uyghur, Mandarin, English
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Many diaspora members referred me to the testimonies provided during the
Uyghur Tribunal5 held in June, September, and November 2021 in the United Kingdom.
These testimonies were live-streamed and are documented online. Diaspora members
also directed me to the Xinjiang Victims Database, 6 which maintains detailed records of
over 25,000 adults and children who have been detained in the camps or other state-run
facilities, along with survivor and witness testimony. Some of this information is also
included as primary source archival evidence in this chapter. In addition, reports
published by the Uyghur Human Rights Project7 were used to triangulate and supplement
the data from the other aforementioned sources. The following overarching themes and
sub-themes emerged through the process of inductive coding and analysis of all of this
data.
Intense Repression Started in 2014
Some Uyghurs hold the perspective that “China has been suppressing and
brainwashing Uyghurs since 1949 (when the PRC was established)” (interviews). Others
say that “the worst nightmare started for Uyghurs after 9/11” (interviews). A number of
the diaspora members I have spoken to point to the Urumqi uprising of July 2009 as “the
beginning of real trouble for Uyghurs in XUAR.” Although most media sources state that
the current genocide began in 2017, Uyghurs suggest that it actually started in 2014 when
the concentration camps were first being built. They also believe that the camps have
been in active operation since 2016.
5

https://uyghurtribunal.com/

6

https://shahit.biz/eng/#evidence

7

https://uhrp.org/
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According to Uyghur community members, China freely issued passports to
Uyghurs in XUAR from 2011-2014. Many Uyghurs traveled abroad during this time.
Then, in 2014, according to respondents, “the Chinese Communist party started
forcefully collecting (their) passports.” Uyghurs of the diaspora began hearing about
widespread arrests and prison sentencing for Uyghur intellectuals, scholars,
businesspeople, and anyone who had shown signs of patriotism toward East Turkestan.
Many people were targeted for having traveled abroad, particularly to Turkey. Some
Uyghurs who left China during this period had arrest warrants issued for their return.
According to those I interviewed, “the situation was terrifying and very tense for Uyghurs
(both in China and in the diaspora) during that time,” and “after May 2014, most of the
people in prisons (in XUAR) were Uyghurs.”
The Situation Became Worse in 2016
By 2016, Uyghurs of the diaspora heard stories about widespread, high-tech
surveillance taking place throughout XUAR. Police stations were built every few hundred
meters in the residential areas of Urumqi, and they were staffed by Han Chinese men who
were brought from other provinces to Xinjiang. Armed police and security cameras
became ubiquitous, and accounts began to emerge of police entering Uyghur homes and
taking family members to camps if they were deemed suspicious. Police were free to
check Uyghurs’ computers and cell phones for images and content related to Islam, such
as verses from the Quran and pictures of the Turkish flag. Applications, including
WhatsApp, Facebook, and Skype became forbidden. The presence of these apps, Islamic
materials, having traveled abroad, or evidence of communication with relatives outside of
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China were all justification for detaining people in camps. There are also accounts of
people being detained for “kitchen knives (being) too large” (interview).
Testimony from the Uyghur Tribunal further suggests that Uyghurs were forced
to install a special application on their phones during this time to be constantly
monitored. A participant in the Tribunal stated that after installing this application on
their phone, “each time I said anything related to the Muslim religion, the police would
call me immediately after and ask me what I had said” (Uyghur Tribunal, 2021).
Furthermore,
The police also installed an unknown device with QR code in my home and every
two days, residential committee members would enter my home to scan this
device. After that, even within my home, we were afraid to say anything related to
the Chinese government or our Muslim religion. Our internet routers in our home
were confiscated by the police and we were given new ones issued by the
authorities. (Uyghur Tribunal, 2021)
2016 was the last year that Uyghur diaspora members were able to go home to
visit their relatives. Those residing in the United States who visited in 2016 had to wait
months for a visa, and they reported being interrogated at the Beijing Airport for hours,
despite having American passports. In private interrogation rooms they were asked to
write in Mandarin and relay details from their early childhood. They were also asked how
long they had stayed in the United States and whether they were spies. Once they finally
arrived in East Turkestan, they were visited by police regularly at their family homes, and
they were followed by government officials throughout their stay. Every Uyghur diaspora
member I have spoken to has said that since 2016, they “can’t go back to (their) home
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because (they) will not be allowed to come out.” They will not risk being imprisoned and
abandoning their family members in the diaspora.
2017
Forced or Coerced Return to China
Uyghur diaspora members were becoming aware of the dangers in their homeland
and knew “things were getting very bad in 2016” (interview). In 2017, the repression
reached a new level. In early 2017, Uyghurs of the diaspora began hearing about Chinese
security officials coming to relatives’ homes in the middle of the night to interrogate
them. A Uyghur Tribunal participant stated, “At that time, the Chinese Communist Party
was summoning the relatives of Chinese citizens from abroad, then hooding them and
taking them to camps as soon as they crossed the border” (Uyghur Tribunal, 2021).
Diaspora members have reported that China’s transnational repression of Uyghurs has
been ongoing since the late 1990s. The latest iteration, which utilizes a vast and
sophisticated system of algorithmic surveillance and takes advantage of China’s
economic power, “started in 2014 and continues to today” (interviews).
Chinese officials, former colleagues, and family members in East Turkestan
contacted Uyghurs of the diaspora in 2017 to tell them to return to XUAR for various
supposed business or health-related matters. Many of the people who returned during this
time had their passport and documents confiscated upon arrival and ended up in the
camps. Others had their documents confiscated and lived under a sort of house arrest, not
able to go anywhere while being constantly monitored. Diaspora members have reported
that some of their relatives in Xinjiang have been “allowed to make international phone
calls,” but it is clear they were being monitored by government officials during the calls
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based on “how they were talking and what they were saying” (interview). Also, phone
calls were “very short, no more than five minutes,” which is much shorter than their usual
calls of “one hour or more” (interviews).
Diaspora members reported receiving calls from their relatives in 2017 asking
them to “come home to take care of (their) father or brother, or some other relative”
(interviews). Others were asked to return to sign paperwork related to former business or
education in China. In some cases, family members in East Turkestan openly stated that
they would be taken to a camp unless the diaspora member returned immediately.
Uyghurs of the diaspora have been acutely aware of the pressure that has been placed on
their family members in XUAR to try to convince them to return home. This remains a
great hardship for them, particularly in cases where diaspora members feel responsible
for their relatives being taken to camps as a result of their resistance to this Chinese state
tactic.
Among the documented cases of Uyghurs who were forced or coerced to return to
China, there are many commonalities. Upon their arrival in China, their passport and
other official documents were confiscated so they could not leave or move around within
China. They were constantly surveilled and had to endure repeated interrogations. In
some cases, people were taken to camps as soon as they arrived, while others were placed
in camps after being under house arrest for six months or more (Uyghur Human Rights
Project, 2021; Xinjiang Victims Database, 2021).
Even Uyghurs who lived abroad for years and had not been involved in any
political activity inside or outside of XUAR were susceptible to China’s tactics. One
Uyghur diaspora member who had lived abroad for nearly ten years and intentionally
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avoided political activity had her passport confiscated when she arrived at the Urumqi
airport and was taken to a camp soon afterward. Two Uyghur brothers studying abroad
returned to XUAR after their father called and told them they had to come home. All
three of them were then taken into police custody. Diaspora members have reported that
during the summer of 2017, many Uyghur students who were studying abroad returned
home for supposed government-mandated registration. They were also detained, and
many of them have not been heard from since. The Uyghur Human Rights Project (2021)
reported that it has been confirmed that some of these students have died.
China has close economic and political ties to a number of countries which are
involved in the Belt and Road Initiative. Many of these countries have voiced their
support for China’s policies and have detained Uyghurs within their own borders.
Diaspora members remain concerned not only about these detained Uyghurs, but also
their deportation back to China. The Uyghur Human Rights Project (2021) has
established that “since 2017, 682 Uyghurs have been detained in Egypt, Indonesia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan,
Thailand, Turkey, the UAE, and Uzbekistan” (p. 44). They have also corroborated that
several of these countries, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE), have deported Uyghurs back to China (Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2021).
Cut off From Family and Friends
In response to the intensifying crackdown, many Uyghurs in East Turkestan
severed contact with their relatives in the diaspora in 2017. This is a tremendous source
of pain for Uyghur diaspora members, as family is at the root of Uyghur culture. Elders in
particular are highly respected, and intergenerational cultural transmission is considered
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to be of utmost importance. I have heard many times that “Uyghurs always listen to their
grandparents, especially grandmothers” (interviews). It is difficult to comprehend the
immense sacrifice Uyghur relatives in East Turkestan have made for the sake of
protecting their family members in the diaspora. This should be recognized as a reflection
of the severity of the situation they are facing in Xinjiang.
Since 2017, Uyghurs in the diaspora have been told by their relatives in XUAR
not to call them anymore, and in some cases have been told to “forget about us,” referring
to their family members in XUAR, and “never come home” (interviews). Initially, some
diaspora members maintained occasional contact with their mothers who told them that
their “father, brothers, and sisters don’t want to talk to you” (interviews). A number of
house phones and mobile numbers were disconnected during this time. Some Uyghurs
tried to continue to communicate with their family members through trusted
intermediaries, but even that became too dangerous. News of their family members has
become limited to whatever they can learn from acquaintances, which they can never
entirely trust.
Uyghurs of the diaspora learned that Chinese officials were actively harassing and
interrogating their family members in XUAR in 2017, and in some cases, officials were
living inside of their relatives’ homes. They heard through informants that their parents
and in-laws were being constantly monitored and were repeatedly told that “your son (or
daughter) is a terrorist,” and officials needed to know the “terrorists’ whereabouts”
(interviews). One diaspora member described the last time her husband spoke to his
family in Xinjiang:

98

When my husband called his mother that day, she told him not to call them
anymore. My husband knew there were Chinese people living inside of his
parents’ house at that time, and that is the last communication he ever had with
his entire family. When he tried to call again after several weeks, the house phone
and their mobile phones were all disconnected. (Uyghur Tribunal, 2021)
In April 2017, Uyghurs of the diaspora learned that “Uyghurs were disappearing
in the middle of the night” (interviews). Since the summer of 2017, many Uyghurs of the
diaspora have not been able to locate or receive news of their relatives in East Turkestan.
People have told me that they “have no idea where” their parents, in-laws, sisters,
brothers, aunts, uncles, cousins, nieces, nephews, and friends are, “whether they are in a
camp or free,” or “whether they are alive or dead” (interviews). Many Uyghurs have
dozens of family members missing, including young children. By 2018, Uyghurs
considered themselves lucky if they knew fewer than ten people in the camps.
People Have Been Detained for Illegitimate Reasons
It is important to acknowledge that the millions of people who have been detained
in the camps have not been given any form of due process, and the reasons for their
internment focus largely on unsubstantiated claims of terrorist, extremist, or separatistrelated activities, which include the practice or observance of Islam. As many Uyghur
diaspora members have pointed out, their “friends and relatives in the camps are already
very well-educated and have never committed any crimes, so why are they really there?”
(interviews). Diaspora members have also stated that “qualifications of ‘good’ and ‘bad’
Uyghurs have changed over time,” and “since 2016, it has been the worst (they) can
remember” (interviews).
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Travel Abroad
Many Uyghurs have been detained in the camps or given prison sentences simply
for visiting other countries, despite obtaining all of the required legal permissions to do
so. Travel to Turkey in particular has been treated as a grave offense by the Chinese state,
likely because of the large Uyghur diaspora community residing there. A diaspora
member shared that a friend “was sentenced to three years in prison for going to Turkey.
Three years have passed, and he is still not free” (interview). Another diaspora member’s
brothers were detained in the camps in 2018 for having visited Turkey in 2014. Yet
another person was reportedly sentenced to seven years in prison because she visited
Turkey. A witness for the Uyghur Tribunal testified that in 2016, his “brother took (his)
mother to Turkey, and then 15 days later he returned home and was arrested and
sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. The accusation was (that) he had been to Turkey”
(Uyghur Tribunal, 2021).
People have been placed in the camps or given prison sentences for visiting or
spending extended time in other countries, as well. “One lady was (reportedly) sentenced
to nine years just because she went to Saudi Arabia.” “Another woman ended up in a
camp because she (had) lived in Kazakhstan for five years” (interview). Uyghur diaspora
members assert that there are many stories like this. A camp survivor described one of his
interrogation sessions in which officers “fastened chains on (his) hands and hit (him) with
plastic batons” while they “asked (him) why (he) had visited all these countries”
(Xinjiang Victims Database, 2021). They also asked him “which Uyghurs (he) had met
there, why (he) had applied for a U.S. visa, and which Uyghurs (he) knew in the U.S.”
(Xinjiang Victims Database, 2021).
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Contact with Family Members Abroad
In addition to traveling or living abroad, merely having relatives in another
country or being in contact with family members outside of China have also been treated
as criminal offenses. Uyghur diaspora members have stated that “everyone who has
relatives abroad is known” (interviews). One Uyghur diaspora member said that “many
of my relatives were imprisoned. The reason for all these imprisonments is that they had
contacts with us” (interview). Reports from camp survivors also include statements about
people being detained just for having relatives abroad. A survivor with family members
in the diaspora said that one of her cellmates in the camp had a daughter who lives in
Europe, and “the women who came (the) next day also had relatives living abroad. So, I
understood the logic why we ended up in the detention center again” (Xinjiang Victims
Database, 2021).
Financial transactions between Uyghurs in China and those in the diaspora have
also resulted in people being placed in the camps. Relatives in China have been detained
“for sending or receiving money from abroad,” and diaspora members have not been able
to support their families in XUAR financially since 2016 (interviews). They see this as a
direct mechanism by which China is disempowering and oppressing them as a people.
Uyghurs have even been punished retroactively for sending money to relatives abroad. In
one case, a woman was sent to a camp in 2016 for “transferring money to her mother in
Australia in 2013” (Xinjiang Victims Database, 2021). Another woman was sentenced to
10 years in prison because she had sent money to someone in Turkey years before
(Uyghur Tribunal, 2021).
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Allegedly Extremist Religious Activities
Numerous accounts exist of people being detained in the camps for engaging in
purportedly excessive or extremist religious activities. A diaspora member stated, “I can’t
call my mom right now, but if I could and called to say ‘as-salamu-alaykum’ (peace be
upon you), she would be taken to a camp” (interview). Another diaspora member said
that he realized things were getting worse when he called his mother in 2016 and said
“as-salamu-alaykum,” which was his usual greeting, and his mother responded with, “I’m
good” (interview). He knew then that she was being monitored and it was no longer safe
to call. An examination of records from the Xinjiang Victims Database (2021) reveals
that reasons for detainment include wearing a headscarf or long skirt, growing a beard,
praying at home, or attending a Muslim wedding.
An account from a witness in XUAR describes women ranging from 30 to 70
years of age being “beaten and dragged into police cars and brought to the camps for…
wearing scarves under their chin,” while “some other women were arrested for wearing
longer skirts” (Xinjiang Victims Database, 2021). This witness also stated that before
arresting them, “the police officers brutally beat the ladies saying ‘Don't you know that
it’s forbidden to wear a long skirt or dress or wearing a scarf?” (Xinjiang Victims
Database, 2021). Another witness reported that “police officers arrested so many
Uyghurs from the villages, towns, and city centers including the ordinary public, imams,
secretaries of mosques, anyone who had religious knowledge even though they did not do
anything wrong” (Uyghur Tribunal, 2021).
Diaspora members have stated that “no one feels safe praying anywhere in East
Turkestan, and we cannot even acknowledge—let alone celebrate—our holidays and
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traditions,” as these are seen as extremist or separatist activities and have resulted in
detention in the camps (interviews). People have shared that their relatives have been
arrested for nothing more than praying at home or speaking to neighbors during holidays,
and some have been given long prison sentences for these allegedly extremist activities.
A woman reported that her former classmate “has been sentenced to seven years in prison
for praying,” and many people have been “given prison sentences for gathering in private
homes to pray together” (interview). One account describes seven women who were
initially taken to a camp and then sentenced to seven years in prison for praying and
organizing a meal during Ramadan (Uyghur Tribunal, 2021). A diaspora member
revealed that her “brother-in-law was sentenced to 18 years in jail for fasting during
Ramadan and for obeying the traditions of Islam” (interview).
People have also been detained for participating in Muslim socal events, including
weddings, which typically do not include drinking alcohol. Abstaining from alcohol is
seen as a sign of extremism. A witness reported that her friend was arrested for
“attending a wedding in 2014 held according to Islamic traditions, so there was no
dancing, singing, or drinking alcohol,…(and) all of the four-hundred people who attended
that wedding were arrested and taken to camps” (Xinjiang Victims Database, 2021).
Diaspora members suggest that the possession of allegedly extremist and forbidden items,
including photographs of family members wearing a hijab, photographs taken abroad,
anything written in Arabic, and copies of the Quran and other Islamic materials, are also
reasons for detention in the camps. This has been corroborated by witness statements
from the Uyghur Tribunal (2021) and records in the Xinjiang Victims Database (2021).
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Other Alleged Violations
According to diaspora members and survivors, in addition to the preceding
reasons, Uyghurs have been arrested in XUAR for having an expired ID card, having too
many children, and possessing certain applications on their phones. Prior to 2016,
Uyghur diaspora members widely used WhatsApp to communicate with their family
members in East Turkestan. Since then, it has become too risky, and Uyghurs are afraid
to contact their relatives using any sort of communication app, as they know they and
their relatives are being monitored. A number of camp survivors have stated that the
possession of WhatsApp on their phone was the reason for their detention. One person
said, “they told me I was (t)here because they’d found WhatsApp on my phone. ‘You are
guilty of using WhatsApp,’ they said. They claimed it contradicted the law” (Xinjiang
Victims Database, 2021). Another said that “They found a whole bunch of forbidden
stuff in my phone, (including) WhatsApp” (Xinjiang Victims Database, 2021).
Survivors and witnesses have described the ages of people in the camps ranging
from teenagers as young as 15 to people in their eighties. Diaspora members have
speculated that their missing nieces and nephews have been arrested for using or
possessing communication apps on their phones, which is tied to the alleged violation of
having contact with relatives abroad, or generally having contact with the outside world.
Uyghur community members have suggested that apart from the activities of
Uyghurs themselves, police quotas have also contributed to the unlawful mass arrests in
Xinjiang as “part of the government's way to punish as many Uyghurs as possible”
(interview). A witness statement in the Xinjiang Victims Database (2021) corroborates
this: “Although at first Uyghurs who traveled abroad and ‘religious’ Uyghurs were being
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targeted, in order to meet their quota, police officers started detaining Uyghurs without
reason.”
Uyghurs of the diaspora have suggested that there was a brief period in 2019
when some people were released from the camps, possibly after global attention to the
issue. However, “in 2020 people started to be taken again, and things are even worse now
than before” (interviews). A diaspora member stated that “China has lied about
everything from the beginning, and since nothing is happening, they can keep doing the
same thing without real consequences from the rest of the world” (interview). To date,
China continues to deny the genocide and related atrocities in East Turkestan, and
Uyghurs continue to disappear from society.
Accusations of Separatism and Terrorism
The aforementioned alleged offenses are tied to China’s claims of Uyghur
separatism, which, in turn, contribute to Communist Party narratives of harming public
unity and disturbing social order. A survivor of the camps stated that she was told that her
“ideology is wrong” because she had “been to a foreign country” (Uyghur Tribunal,
2021). Numerous records contained in the Xinjiang Victims Database list “separatism” as
the official reason for detention. For example, a prominent Uyghur poet 8 and editor was
detained for his involvement in writing Uyghur-language textbooks. He was charged with
“inciting ethnic hatred” and “separatism,” with the purported goal of “splitting the
motherland” (Xinjiang Victims Database, 2021). Another editor 9 of Uyghur textbooks,

8

https://shahit.biz/eng/#2361

9

https://shahit.biz/eng/#2375

105

who was also involved in protecting Uyghur-language education, was detained for
“separatism” and has been sentenced to eight years in prison (Xinjiang Victims Database,
2021). There have been many similar accounts.
Other records in the Xinjiang Victims Database reveal that many people in the
camps have been officially charged with terrorism. An examination of records of those
detained suggests that no actual terrorist activity has taken place, but merely the suspicion
of “preparing to commit terrorist activities” has been enough to sentence these people to
prison. For example, a 51-year old woman who was a housewife and mother of four
children is now serving 13 years in prison for “preparing to commit terrorist activities”
(Xinjiang Victims Database, 2021). Her 57-year old husband was detained for
“disturbing public order” and also “preparing to commit terrorist activities.” He has been
sentenced to 17 years in prison (Xinjiang Victims Database, 2021). Yet another woman
in her fifties was detained because she was “suspected of assisting in terrorist activities"
(Xinjiang Victims Database, 2021).
Some people have been accused of both separatism and terrorism, or other
combinations of offenses. For example, a Uyghur scholar whose current status remains
unknown was detained for being an “East Turkistan Separatist” and a “suspected
terrorist” (Xinjiang Victims Database, 2021). Others have been accused of going abroad,
contacting family members outside of China, practicing religion, being in possession of
forbidden items, or “past transgressions,”10 despite not having a previous criminal record
(Uyghur Tribunal, 2021; Xinjiang Victims Database, 2021). Many people have not been
charged with anything at all, yet their whereabouts remain unknown. Uyghur diaspora
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members maintain that all of the charges (stated or otherwise) are bogus and are part of
China’s attempt to remove Uyghurs from society and destroy them as a people.
China’s Goal Is the Extermination of the Uyghur People
In my conversations with Uyghurs of the diaspora, many people have stated that
“China’s (ultimate) goal is to exterminate Uyghurs as an ethnic group” so the government
can have full control over their land, including its shared borders and resources. This has
been corroborated by survivor and witness testimony given during the Uyghur Tribunal,
and it is also documented in statements contained in the Xinjiang Victims Database.
Survivors have said that placing people in camps “was not a matter of detaining and
interrogating perpetrators who had somehow committed a crime or wrongdoing, but
locking up the entire people who had Uyghur identity” (Uyghur Tribunal, 2021). A
witness stated that the “camps were meant to detain Uyghurs, and then interrogate and
torture them to the point of death” (Xinjiang Victims Database, 2021).
In addition to the system of mass internment in the camps and the issues described
above, draconian policies have reduced the number of births among Uyghurs, children
and families have been separated within XUAR, and Uyghurs are subjected to regular
home visits by Han officials, as discussed in the literature review (Hoshur, 2018; Human
Rights Watch, 2018; Seytoff, 2018; Zenz, 2019; Zenz, 2020). Diaspora members have
also shared that “many Uyghur ladies have been forced to marry Han Chinese men” as an
assimilationist strategy (interviews).
Furthermore, as also discussed in the literature review, important cultural and
religious sites have been destroyed, the Uyghur language has been banned, Uyghur
neighborhoods have been razed and rebuilt, and Uyghurs have been sent to forced labor
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facilities throughout China, sometimes far from their homes and family (Hernandez,
2017; Kashgarian, 2019; Rivers, 2020; Sintash, 2019; Xu, 2020; Zenz, 2019). A few
more dimensions to this ongoing crisis are described below.
Cultural Genocide Started Long Ago
During the interviews conducted with Uyghur diaspora members, several
participants stated that “a cultural genocide was happening during my time, and I didn’t
even realize it.” One diaspora member said that when he began actively practicing Islam
as an adult in the 1990s in East Turkestan, some of his friends who were teachers or
government employees couldn’t go to the mosque to pray because they were asked to spy
on other Uyghurs and report back to government officials. It was easier for them not to
participate, though this meant publicly giving up their cultural and religious traditions. “If
they didn’t name somebody (after going to the mosque), their job was in jeopardy”
(interview). In the Uyghur language, people refer to this as “cooking meat in its own oil,”
and it is widely known that “the Chinese government has been actively sending Uyghurs
to spy on other Uyghurs,” both in China and abroad (interview).
Another participant recalled that in the nineties, his father said that his “family
could not go to the mosque next to our home. We had to go to some village. Somewhere I
didn't know and nobody knew” (interview). He acknowledged that “At that time I knew it
was not allowed, but practicing, going to prayer on Eid is very important to us”
(interview). He described that “all of our brothers had to get a van to go to some village
where nobody knew us” so they wouldn’t be reported to government officials by spies
who could name them (interview).
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A diaspora member shared that her friends and relatives who were teachers in
Xinjiang were “pressured to eat during (the fasting times of) Ramadan” (interview). They
were provided with “free lunch that they couldn’t refuse” (interview). This was likely
experienced by Uyghur government employees, as well. Another community member
who worked as a Mandarin teacher at a Uyghur school in XUAR during the 1990s
confirmed that she “could not openly acknowledge Uyghur cultural traditions, despite
working with Uyghur students and families” (interview). She also recounted the
increasing pressure to speak exclusively in Mandarin with her students.
Islamic education was permitted by the Chinese government in the 1980s.
According to diaspora members, by the 1990s, Islamic schools “became heavily
controlled by the police—it wasn’t an open educational system anymore” (interviews).
One person stopped attending these schools because he was told by the people around
him, including his father’s friends, that “they wouldn’t be able to protect (him) in the
future, as they had access to the new policies that (said) those with a religious
background would be targeted for arrest by the authorities” (Xinjiang Victims Database,
2021). We have now seen these discriminatory policies enacted. Diaspora members have
also reported that in recent years, discussions of the Quran have been “scripted by the
Chinese government” (interview). In addition to surveillance cameras inside of mosques,
“only the most basic stuff in the Quran is allowed, and every imam in every mosque has
to talk about the same things” (interview).
Diaspora members have also described “China’s assimilation program to move
Uyghur children to inner China at a young age,” which started long before the current
genocide (interview). Uyghur families were offered reduced tuition rates and were
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encouraged to send their children away for middle school for “greater opportunities.”
Diaspora members now understand this as part of China’s intention to separate families
and indoctrinate children, which continues today on a larger and more severe scale. “Kids
are separated from families in state-run schools and are then sent to spy on their families,
if they return at all” (interview). Those who do not return “are forced to change their
name to a Chinese name and live a Chinese life” (interview). Now, with many of their
parents detained in camps, Uyghur children are placed in state-run facilities permanently
without access to their language and culture.
China’s assimilationist intentions have backfired in some cases. One person who
was sent away from his family and culture stated that, “The constant discrimination and
humiliation I experienced as a young Uyghur in a Chinese school in a Chinese city made
me realize that I was different from the majority Han population” (Xinjiang Victims
Database, 2021). This served to make him “more conscious of (his) ethnic identity,”
rather than destroying it (Xinjiang Victims Database, 2021). He is likely not the only one.
Uyghur Culture and Identity in Xinjiang Are Performative
Uyghurs of the diaspora maintain that authentic Uyghur culture has disappeared
from public view in XUAR, and all that remains is intended “to (falsely) show that
Uyghur culture is still alive to protect China’s image” (interviews). China has been
actively promoting domestic tourism to Xinjiang. 11 Photographs online show Uyghur
men and women lined up in their traditional clothing, holding textiles and instruments,
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being photographed by Chinese tourists. A Uyghur diaspora member shared that even in
the 1990s, she and her classmates were “forced to dance for Chinese officials” as part of
the state’s “propaganda to show ethnic unity” (interview). China is now profiting from
the exploitation of superficial, tightly controlled Uyghur culture while Uyghurs are
forbidden from practicing their actual traditions in their own homeland.
Under conditions of harsh repression, with their significant cultural, historical,
and religious sites destroyed, Uyghurs must share a sanitized version of their cultural
heritage and endure happily performing for predominantly Han tourists as though they
are not experiencing any hardship. In Urumqi, the capital of XUAR, the Xinjiang
International Grand Bazaar, sometimes referred to simply as “the Grand Bazaar” or “the
Urumqi Bazaar”, is a major attraction for tourists. It was built in the early 2000s and has
been remodeled in recent years to accommodate more goods and experiences for tourists,
including attending a Uyghur dinner and dance show with live music. According to
Uyghurs, the Grand Bazaar actually has little to do with authentic Uyghur culture.
Repression Is Widespread Outside of the Camps
Uyghurs living in XUAR outside of the camps must contend with heavy
surveillance, and they are closely monitored even in their own homes. Diaspora members
have experienced this from the outside when trying to communicate with their family
members in East Turkestan, as described above. A survivor reported that when she was
released from the camps, she discovered the “forced pairing system, which authorized
Han Chinese to live with Uyghur families” (Xinjiang Victims Database, 2021). She
described this experience as follows:
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The authorities paired a family of four Han Chinese with my family (myself and
my three children). They slept with us. They had to stay for ten days in our home
every month. I had to treat this family very well, including shopping for them. I
also had to answer the questions they asked me correctly. We had to regularly
send the Chinese authorities evidence that they were living with us, by submitting
photos of us together. (Xinjiang Victims Database, 2021)
Diaspora members describe this as another way that the Chinese government “deprives
Uyghurs of peace and dignity even when they are released from the camps” (interview).
A Uyghur diaspora member insisted that “government officials will use any
excuse to punish Uyghurs” (interview). He described an incident in which a Uyghur man
ran a red light in Hotan and was shot by police. I had to clarify this to make sure I
understood him correctly, and he confirmed that, indeed, this person was shot simply for
running a red light. He continued, “Yes, they make it so ugly. That is their strategy. They
want Uyghurs gone. It was never their intention (for us) to live together” (interview).
Uyghurs’ Land and Property Sold to Han Chinese
Diaspora members have reported that they have heard many accounts of people
being released from the camps to find that their home has been sold and is no longer
theirs. People have no choice but to move in with relatives upon their release, if they are
fortunate and have relatives outside of the camps to live with. Uyghur community
members have also explained that it is difficult for people who have faced detention to be
hired because they are stigmatized for having been in the camps. Their opportunities are
extremely limited, and they are essentially “paralyzed in society” (interview).
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The Uyghur Human Rights Project (2021) has confirmed that since 2017, the
Chinese government has seized and sold the property and assets of detained Uyghurs
while they have been in the camps or imprisoned. Several documented cases of
successful Uyghur businesspeople and real estate developers reveal that hundreds of
millions of dollars in assets have been taken by the Chinese government and auctioned
and sold online. A Uyghur diaspora member who lives in Turkey reported that his two
“brothers’ bank accounts (were) frozen and their properties in Urumqi, Korla, and Hotan
(were) seized” (UHRP, 2021, p. 20). The total worth of his brothers’ assets is estimated
to be approximately one billion yuan, which is equivalent to about 140 million U.S.
dollars. The brothers were detained in 2017 and have since been sentenced to long prison
terms of 25 and 15 years, respectively (UHRP, 2021). The diaspora member in Turkey
suspects that his brothers’ “imprisonment might be related to their charitable work in
supporting Uyghur students and donating money to the construction of mosques,” but
ultimately, they have been targeted “for their success and wealth” (UHRP, 2021, p. 22).
Uyghurs of the diaspora also suggest that this is yet another way in which China
is stripping Uyghurs of their power and preventing them from participating in society.
Even worse, “the Chinese government is (unlawfully) taking Uyghurs’ hard-earned assets
and benefitting from them while Uyghurs waste away in prison for no reason”
(interview). Furthermore, “any wealth that family members have earned is intended to
(be) passed down to children and grandchildren. Now, they too have nothing”
(interview).
In another example, 28 Uyghur individuals were given prison sentences for
“helping terrorist activities,” and, as in the situation above, their assets were seized and
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their bank acounts frozen (UHRP, 2021, p. 29). In yet another instance, 16 Uyghurs were
sentenced for “helping terrorist activities,” including two women in their seventies and an
80-year old man (UHRP, 2021, p. 34). A large building and a gas station, both worth
millions of dollars (tens of millions of yuan), were among the assets belonging to these
people, which were auctioned off by the Chinese state. Uyghurs of the diaspora suggest
that these examples highlight the absurdity and injustice of what is happening in XUAR:
“How can an 80-year-old man be a terrorist threat?” (interview). The seizure and sale of
Uyghur assets is a direct mechanism by which China is dispossessing Uyghurs in their
homeland.
“It’s Been Seven Years”
Uyghurs of the diaspora have repeatedly expressed their frustration and
disappointment at the lack of action by the international community related to the
ongoing genocide. Though a small number of world governments and independent
reports have declared genocide in XUAR and sanctions have been imposed on Chinese
officials, little direct action has been taken to stop the Chinese government from
continuing to persecute the Uyghur people in their homeland and abroad. Uyghurs have
tried to understand this refusal to take action in the following ways.
The Genocide is Political, not Humanitarian
Diaspora members have become accustomed to being interrogated when speaking
about the genocide, though they find this to be extremely disheartening. A diaspora
member stated, “at first I was surprised when I talked to my colleagues about what was
happening in East Turkestan, and they did not show sympathy or concern, but (instead)
asked me why China was doing this” (interview). Another Uyghur community member
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said, “I have now come to expect questions (instead of compassion) when talking to
people about the genocide, but it upsets me every time” (interview). Yet another diaspora
member shared that “sometimes I just don’t have the strength to explain to people what is
happening in our homeland. I wish they would believe me and do their own searching
(for information) about it” (interview).
In a discussion with several diaspora members, it became clear that they feel
politics prevail over human rights. One community member stated, “it’s hard to
(maintain) hope when so much information is now available and people still don’t believe
it, or just don’t care” (interview). Another diaspora member added, “everyone is afraid of
China, and they should be, but the world must do something before it’s too late for
everyone,” referring to China’s growing global economic and military power (interview).
He continued, “if people are controlled by fear and can’t even admit (to) a genocide when
it’s happening, we are all in trouble” (interview).
Economic Interests Are More Important than Human Rights
A number of Uyghurs believe that, ultimately, “countries do not want to take a
stand against China because of (the possibility of) damaging their economic interests”
(interview). In other words, “money is more important than people” (interviews). They
find this particularly disappointing in the case of Muslim-majority countries. “We have
lost hope that our Muslim brothers and sisters (in other countries) will do anything to
help us” (interview). In fact, since 2016, China has established itself as one of the biggest
investors and trade partners in the Middle East (Khan, 2021). Diaspora members
recognize that people in some Muslim-majority countries, such as Indonesia, have spoken
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out against China’s treatment of Uyghurs, “but the Indonesian government deported
Uyghurs back to China (in 2020) anyway” (interview).
Corporations and businesses are complicit, too. One Uyghur diaspora member
said, “Just look at what the NBA (National Basketball Association) is doing. They
obviously want to protect their profits and don’t care about human rights at all”
(interview). The NBA’s business in China is worth billions of dollars, and they have not
supported their athletes who have spoken out about the ongoing human rights abuses in
China (Blank, 2019). Diaspora members feel similarly about the companies which
participated in the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, such as Coca-Cola and Airbnb. A
diaspora member stated, “the fact that Beijing is being allowed to host the Olympics is
unacceptable in the first place. The companies that are participating have no morality”
(interview).
False Narratives of Western Smear Campaigns Against China
China has repeatedly denied all claims of genocide in XUAR and has suggested
that these accusations are intended to slander and spread false information while
meddling in China’s internal affairs. The Chinese government has gone so far as to say
that accusations of human rights violations, which they refer to as lies, “serve as a
political tool for some Western countries and anti-China forces” (Richardson, 2021, p. 1).
Uyghurs of the diaspora fear that people take these claims seriously and hesitate to take
action out of fear of being complicit in unjustifiably targeting China. One diaspora
member stated, “apparently people can more easily believe that the U.S. and other
Western countries are trying to criticize China for their own interests (rather) than accept
that China is committing genocide,” despite all of the existing evidence (interview).
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Another community member said, “I am worried that (people are) too soft on China and
will not take a strong enough position to stop the genocide,” thereby enabling the
continued oppression of the Uyghur people (interview).
International Human Rights Mechanisms Are not Helpful
Although a number of Uyghur organizations engage with international
governments and human rights mechanisms, including those of the United Nations, many
Uyghur diaspora members feel that these efforts are largely ineffective. One diaspora
member asked, “how many reports have to be published before people actually do
something?” (interview). Another diaspora member said, “while they (officials) are
talking, Uyghurs are dying” (interview). Yet another community member emphasized
that “there is (already) so much evidence that shows what China is doing” (interview).
Many diaspora members have asked, “what else needs to happen before the world tries to
stop this?” (interview). In my own research, I have seen that reports about the atrocities
in XUAR have been consistently emerging since 2018, and the evidence supporting
genocide is overwhelming. Indeed, it seems a greater effort is required to deny these
claims than to accept them at this point.
In October 2020, China was elected to the United Nations Human Rights Council.
This was an affront to Uyghurs around the world. Many diaspora members reported that
this caused them to lose hope and trust in the United Nations and the international
community, especially since the atrocities committed against Uyghurs were well known
by 2020. A diaspora member stated, “the United Nations is supposed to protect human
rights around the world” (interview). She continued, “this (China’s election to the HR
Council) makes us feel hopeless and alone” (interview). Another diaspora member said,
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“the United Nations is a joke. How can China be a member of the Human Rights
Council?” (interview). Other diaspora members hold a more moderate view, suggesting
that “even though the United Nations isn’t great, it is one of the ways we can (continue
to) try to make the world see what’s really happening in East Turkestan” (interview).
Uyghurs of the diaspora continue to engage with multiple international human rights
mechanisms to raise awareness of the genocide and advocate for their freedom and
dignity, as will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.
Conclusion
In addition to directly killing Uyghurs, inflicting serious bodily and mental harm
upon them, preventing future births, and transferring their children to state-run
institutions, the testimonios provided by Uyghur diaspora members, witnesses, and
survivors of the camps demonstrate a clear pattern of systematic dispossession of
Uyghurs in their homeland. When considered collectively, these actions indicate a
deliberate attempt on the part of the Chinese government to inflict “conditions of life
calculated to bring about (Uyghurs’) physical destruction in whole or in part” with the
intention of destroying them as a distinct religious and ethnic group (Genocide
Convention, 1948, art 2). As a Uyghur diaspora member stated, “Uyghurs’ religion,
language, wealth, family, and dignity are all being taken away” (interview).
Uyghurs are fully cognizant of China’s intentions to disempower them and
eliminate their identity and expression as an ethnic group. Of all of the tactics employed
by the Chinese state, Uyghurs consider forced family separation to be the most painful.
They are also acutely aware that the fear of harming their family members has limited
their public advocacy and activism. The following chapter will discuss ways in which
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Uyghurs of the diaspora have courageously engaged in acts of resistance against Chinesestate violence as a matter of survival for their culture and their children, despite the
tremendous risks to themselves and their family members.
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CHAPTER VI: UYGHUR DIASPORA RESISTANCE TO CHINESE STATE
VIOLENCE
Uyghurs have a long history of resistance to Chinese state violence, both inside of
China and in the diaspora worldwide. In this chapter, I address the following research
question: How have Uyghurs of the diaspora engaged in acts of resistance against
Chinese, state-sanctioned, colonial hegemony? I focus on resistance efforts of the Uyghur
diaspora from the mid-20th century to the present day through document analysis of
Uyghur-created websites and publications as primary sources, as well as conversations
and experiences I have had with members of the Uyghur diaspora, primarily in the San
Francisco Bay Area. A table with a timeline of major events is provided at the end of this
chapter. Despite facing great risks to themselves and their family members in East
Turkestan, Uyghurs of the diaspora continue to courageously advocate for their rights and
engage in resistance efforts in a number of ways, both publicly and privately.
Uyghur Organizations and Related Efforts
Isa Yusuf Alptekin was one of the first Uyghurs to leave China and begin
organizing a resistance movement. He fled China for Turkey shortly after the PRC was
established in 1949 (Shichor, 2018). Alptekin, along with Mehmet Emin Bughra, were
early diaspora leaders in Turkey. They published books and journals and established the
Association of Eastern Turkestan Emigrés in 1960. Bughra died in 1965, but Alpketin
continued his efforts. In 1970, he submitted an appeal to Richard Nixon in which he
asked for U.S. support and “emphasized the need to denounce ‘China’s atrocities’, to
preserve Uyghur national heritage, and, above all, to gain independence.” (Shichor, 2018,
p. 125). Alptekin and Bughra focused on Uyghur identity and indigeneity as the
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framework for their activism and emphasized the threat of Uyghur assimilation as a direct
result of Chinese government policies.
It wasn’t until the 1990s that the Uyghur cause became more visible and global.
In 1994, the Eastern Turkestan Students Union was formed in Ankara by Uyghur
university students who were studying in Turkey (Bonnenfant, 2018). In 1995, Isa Yusuf
Alptekin died. The Students Union, along with young Uyghur diaspora members around
the world, organized the World Uyghur Youth Congress in Almaty, Kazakhstan that year
to renew the momentum of the diaspora movement. The following year, in 1996, the
Youth Congress and its main organizers moved to Munich, Germany.
In 1998, more than 40 Uyghur leaders and approximately 300 representatives
from 18 different countries created the Eastern Turkestan National Center (ETNC) in
Istanbul (Shichor, 2007). Within a year, the ETNC headquarters moved to Munich, and in
1999, the ETNC became the East Turkestan National Congress. During this time, the
Eastern Turkestan Union in Europe was also founded in Munich. This period marked a
shift in the center of Uyghur diaspora activism from Turkey to Europe. Also, the
framework of the movement expanded during this time to include a strong focus on
human rights in addition to Uyghur identity and indigeneity. In the mid-1990s, small
Uyghur diaspora groups began to settle throughout Western Europe.
By the early 2000s, the number of Uyghur diaspora organizations had grown, and
activism efforts were becoming more visible. Erkin Alptekin, the son of Isa Yusuf
Alptekin, became involved in coordinating these efforts. Under his leadership, many
diaspora organization representatives met in Munich in 2004 and agreed to create an
umbrella organization to combine their activities (Bonnenfant, 2018). After several
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months, the aforementioned East Turkestan National Congress and the World Uyghur
Youth Congress merged to create the World Uyghur Congress. Erkin Alptekin was
elected as the first president of the World Uyghur Congress, which he served from 2004
to 2006 (Bonnenfant, 2018; Shichor, 2007).
World Uyghur Congress
The stated objective of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) is “to promote the
right of the Uyghur people to use peaceful, nonviolent, and democratic means to
determine the political future of East Turkistan” (World Uyghur Congress, 2021). Their
leadership is elected democratically to serve three-year terms, and the elected leaders 12
represent Uyghur diaspora communities around the world. The organization as a whole
raises awareness of the plight of Uyghurs and engages in advocacy campaigns which
highlight the human rights violations of Uyghurs in the PRC. They work with the U.S.
Congress, European Union member states—including the European Commission and the
European Parliament, and the United Nations, particularly engaging with U.N. human
rights mechanisms.
The WUC has published a number of statements and reports which have been
submitted to U.N. Treaty Bodies, specifically the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD), the Committee Against Torture (CAT), the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR). The WUC has also worked closely with the U.N. Human Rights

12

https://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/steering-committee/

122

Council and related special procedures, including Special Rapporteurs, Independent
Experts, and Working Groups (World Uyghur Congress, 2021). In addition, they have
taken part in the U.N. Forum on Minority Issues and have submitted reports for China’s
Universal Periodic Review (UPR). These reports are all available on the World Uyghur
Congress website.13
The WUC’s mission statement says that their aim is “to promote democracy,
human rights and freedom for the Uyghur people and use peaceful, nonviolent, and
democratic means to determine their political future” (World Uyghur Congress, 2021).
Furthermore,
The WUC declares a nonviolent and peaceful opposition movement against
Chinese occupation of East Turkistan and an unconditional adherence to the
international accepted human rights standard as laid down in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and adherence to the principals of democratic
pluralism and rejection of totalitarianism, religious intolerance, and terrorism as
an instrument of policy. (World Uyghur Congress, 2021)
In addition to publishing reports, engaging with world governments, and participating in
U.N. human rights mechanisms, the World Uyghur Congress works with civil society
organizations to arrange conferences and demonstrations to raise awareness of the
Uyghur genocide. They also maintain an active social media presence and post Uyghurrelated news14 on their website. Moreover, their website provides information about
Uyghur history and culture.15

13

https://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/activities-overview/
https://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/category/news/
15 https://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/east-turkestan-2/
14

123

Uyghur Tribunal
In June 2020, the President of the World Uyghur Congress, Dolkun Isa, formally
requested the creation of “an independent people’s tribunal to investigate ‘ongoing
atrocities and possible Genocide’ against the Uyghur, Kazakh and other Turkic Muslim
populations” (Uyghur Tribunal, 2020). Sir Geoffrey Nice, a British Barrister, former law
professor, and human rights advocate who was the lead prosecutor of Slobodan Milošević
at the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, served
as the Chair of the Uyghur Tribunal (Uyghur Tribunal, 2020). The Uyghur Tribunal was
launched on September 3, 2020, and hearings were held for several days in June,
September, and November 2021.
The objectives of the Uyghur Tribunal centered on “reviewing evidence in order
to reach an impartial and considered judgment on whether international crimes are proved
to have been committed by the PRC” (Uyghur Tribunal, 2020). The Tribunal was clear
about the impossibility of bringing China to any formal international court because,
despite China being a signatory to and ratifier of the Genocide Convention, the PRC has
refused to join the International Criminal Court (ICC) and has entered a reservation
against the U.N. International Court of Justice (ICJ). As such, the main objective of the
Tribunal was to provide evidence
for States, international institutions, commercial companies, art, medical and
educational establishments and individuals to determine how to apply the
Tribunal’s Judgment, whatever it may be, in their dealings with the PRC. This
could include, but is not limited to, trade and other sanctions including against
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individuals, proscribing the sale of technologies, surveillance and medical
equipment and the declaration of ineligibility for visas. (Uyghur Tribunal, 2020)
Furthermore, the evidence submitted to the Tribunal has become a permanent record,
which could “serve as a deterrent to impunity” moving forward (Uyghur Tribunal, 2020).
The evidence itself consists of many hours of testimony from scholars, human
rights attorneys, and non-governmental organization representatives (“expert witnesses”),
as well as Uyghur diaspora members, including survivors from the camps and people
who worked there (“fact witnesses”). All of the witness statements and reports 16 are
available as primary source documents on the Uyghur Tribunal website. They include
accounts of the suffering of relatives in the Uyghur homeland; firsthand narratives of
harrowing experiences in the camps; stories of Uyghur diaspora members being harassed
and intimidated by the PRC for speaking out; detailed information about the
criminalization of Uyghur everyday activities and guilt by association as justification for
detention in the camps; the particular struggles of Uyghur women in XUAR; and the
ubiquitous surveillance Uyghurs face in their homeland (Uyghur Tribunal, 2020).
A final judgement was declared on December 9, 2021. After reviewing the
evidence, specialists in international criminal law determined that China is committing
genocide, crimes against humanity, and torture against Uyghurs and other ethnic
minorities in Xinijiang (Uyghur Tribunal, 2020). It is important to acknowledge that
Even though the judgments of independent people’s tribunals have no (official)
legal standing, they can provide a mechanism for survivors, victims, and their
families to have their cases independently assessed, a determination made in
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respect of allegations of responsibility of possible perpetrators, and a sense of
closure or resolution. (Uyghur Tribunal, 2020)
Despite the Tribunal’s judgement, as of this writing (May 2022), no official action has
been taken in response to their findings.
Uyghur American Association
The Uyghur American Association (UAA), established in 1998, was the first
Uyghur organization in the United States, and it remains the largest in terms of
membership. Like the World Uyghur Congress, the UAA elects their leadership
democratically every three years. The UAA is based in Washington D.C., though its
elected leaders and members live throughout the country. It is considered “the primary
hub for the Uyghur diaspora community in the United States” (UAA, 2021).
The UAA’s mission statement declares that its main goals are “promoting and
preserving Uyghur culture, and supporting the right of Uyghur people to use peaceful,
democratic means to determine their own political futures” (UAA, 2021). Their website
contains detailed information about Uyghur history, identity, and culture, as well as news
and published reports about East Turkestan and the ongoing genocide.
The UAA now emphasizes the struggles of Uyghurs in the 21st century. They
issue statements and press releases in response to international news about Uyghurs, and
they maintain active social media campaigns on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and
YouTube. Since 2016, the UAA has focused on “closing the concentration camps and
ending the Uyghur genocide” (UAA, 2021). They have made direct connections to the
Holocaust and publicly ask the question, 17 “How can the World Watch in Silence as the
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Worst Genocide Since the Holocaust Takes Place?” (UAA, 2021). They suggest that “By
leveraging our collective voice, and upholding democratic values and human rights to the
highest value, we aim to create the political will necessary to improve the lives of
Uyghurs in their homeland” (UAA, 2021).
As with other Uyghur organizations, the UAA calls for action and support from
individuals, organizations, and institutions outside of the Uyghur community itself as a
means to raise awareness and hold China accountable for its crimes against humanity.
Recognizing that “education is a powerful tool for facilitating change,” they have created
a detailed and substantial educational resource called the “Teach Uyghur Project,” 18
which provides background information, lesson plans, and supplementary resources to
inform people about Uyghurs, counter CCP narratives, raise awareness of the genocide,
and encourage educators to include this information in their school curricula (UAA,
2021).
Uyghur Human Rights Project
In 2004, the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) was founded as part of the
Uyghur American Association to publish reports and provide recommendations “to
defend Uyghurs’ civil, political, social, cultural, and economic rights according to
international human rights standards” (UHRP, 2021). In 2016, the UHRP became an
independent nonprofit organization. To date, they have published more than 80 reports
and over 400 statements and press releases as part of their research-based advocacy.
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Their reports and policy recommendations have been submitted to individual
governments, the United Nations, and the European Union, and UHRP staff and board
members have testified before a number of international governing bodies. Their reports
and statements have also been published in most major Western media sources, including
the New York Times, Washington Post, BBC, Associated Press, Reuters, and Foreign
Policy, among others.
The Uyghur Human Rights Project has been publishing statements since its
inception. Their first statement in 2004 addressed already existing concerns about the
Chinese government’s plans to develop East Turkestan. They called upon investors to
“immediately divest all money in these projects for the sake of the occupied people”
(UHRP, 2004, para. 6). They further asked that investors “not help the Chinese
government repopulate our lands with Chinese people and extract all the resources (for
themselves)” (UHRP, 2004, para. 6).
A statement from 2006 detailed the torture of a 31-year old Uyghur man named
Tudahun Hoshur who was being held in a center under suspicion of “conspiracy to split
the state” (UHRP, 2006, para. 4). Mr. Hoshur was reportedly denied food for three days
and was beaten while suspended from a ceiling by his hands. He was punished for not
learning “all 45 articles of the detention center’s regulations in Chinese by heart” (UHRP,
2006, para. 2). Mr. Hoshur did not speak Mandarin. This statement also suggested that
“any form of Uyghur political opposition to Chinese rule” in East Turkestan is considered
to be “splittist” and is punished accordingly (UHRP, 2006, para. 5). It included the
example of a writer from Kashgar named Nurmuhemet Yasin who was “sentenced to 10
years in prison in 2005 (for) having written a short story comparing the plight of Uyghurs
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in East Turkistan to that of caged birds” (UHRP, 2006, para. 5). These cases, among
many others, demonstrate that China was using unlawful and discriminatory tactics
against Uyghurs well before the genocide began.
On September 11, 2006, a UHRP statement addressed the changes that had taken
place in East Turkestan since September 11, 2001. Though the statement served as a
declaration of solidarity, support, and condolences “to all people affected by terrorism,” it
emphasized that “9/11 marked the beginning of a new wave of oppression and injustice at
the hands of the Chinese regime,” enabling “the Chinese government to attempt to
portray the Uyghur people’s struggle for the recognition and protection of their
fundamental human rights as being motivated by violent and ‘terrorist’ intent” (UHRP,
2006, para. 5).
In 2007, the UHRP published its first official report entitled “Political Persecution
of Uyghurs in the Era of the ‘War on Terror’” (UHRP, 2007). This report detailed how
the PRC used the concept of “terrorism” to justify the repression of Uyghurs in East
Turkestan, including arrests, torture, and executions. The report stated that “in 2005
alone, 18,227 individuals were arrested in East Turkestan for ‘endangering state security’,
a jump of 25 percent from the previous year” (UHRP, 2007, p. 4). The report also
described accounts of intimidation of Uyghurs overseas. Even then (in 2007), it was clear
that “human rights abuses as the result of ‘security’ campaigns in East Turkestan will
continue” (UHRP, 2007, p. 5).
In 2008, the UHRP issued a statement of concern about escalating government
restrictions that prevented Uyghurs from practicing their Islamic faith freely. In addition
to having to meet with government officials every month, Uyghur Imams were required
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to take political education classes (UHRP, 2008). The length and content of their sermons
were restricted, and only official, approved versions of the Quran were permitted.
Furthermore, Uyghur government employees were forbidden from practicing Islam
altogether and were not permitted to attend mosques or fast during Ramadan. Minors and
students were also “forbidden from entering a mosque or engaging in religious study,”
and restaurants were required to remain open during fasting hours (UHRP, 2008, para. 7).
This statement also mentioned the confiscation of Uyghur passports so that Uyghurs
could not travel to Mecca for their Hajj pilgrimage, except “with an expensive official
tour, in which applicants (were) carefully vetted for their ‘obedience to the law’” (UHRP,
2008, para. 8).
In 2013 (five years after the aforementioned statement), the UHRP published a
nearly 100-page report detailing the extent of religious repression, criminalization, and
persecution among Uyghurs in China since 2005. Many accounts of Uyghurs being
harassed and detained for allegedly illegal religious activities were described in the
report. Their offenses included teaching about the Quran at friend’s homes, participating
in religious study groups and gatherings, and generally “studying and teaching religious
activities without government approval” (UHRP, 2013, p. 43). Men, women, and children
were all detained or jailed for their involvement in religious activities. In one case, a 56year old religion teacher named Aminan Momixi was arrested on August 1, 2005 along
with 37 of her students.
Momixi was teaching the Koran to students between the ages of 7 and 20 in her
home in Tuoyipu when police rushed in. They accused Momixi of “illegally
possessing religious materials and subversive historical information” and
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reportedly denied her access to a lawyer. Some children were freed after paying
fines ranging from USD 800 to 1,200. Momixi’s whereabouts and sentence
remain unknown. (UHRP, 2013, p. 44)
Another case described a teacher who was arrested for teaching the Quran and Islamic
doctrine to youth and was beaten to death while in detention (UHRP, 2013). China “has
justified many of its (religious) restrictions through claims that it faces an organized
threat to security in the form of the ‘three evil forces’ of terrorism, separatism and
religious extremism,” despite a lack of credible evidence to support these claims (UHRP,
2013, p. 12). This rhetoric is still being used today to validate the crackdown on all
aspects of Uyghur religious, cultural, and social life.
The UHRP continues to regularly publish statements and reports, as well as opeds, to raise awareness of the plight of Uyghurs in East Turkestan and call for
international condemnation of China’s actions. Since 2018, they have focused on the
mass internment of Uyghurs in concentration camps, including all prominent Uyghur
intellectuals; the eradication of Uyghur culture and assault on the Uyghur language; the
ongoing religious repression Uyghurs face; and the harassment, intimidation, and
coercion of Uyghur diaspora members by the PRC (UHRP, 2021). In addition, their
website includes a “take action” page, 19 which provides links to petitions and information
about existing bills and resolutions being considered by Congress. They also hold online
programs to inform people about various aspects of the genocide.
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Campaign for Uyghurs
Campaign for Uyghurs was founded in 2017 in Washington, D.C. by Rushan
Abbas, who has been advocating for Uyghur rights since before she arrived in the United
States in 1989. Abbas created Campaign for Uyghurs “to advocate and promote human
rights and democratic freedoms for Uyghurs, and mobilize the international community
to act to stop the human rights atrocities in East Turkistan” (Campaign for Uyghurs,
2021). In her role as Executive Director, Abbas writes, speaks, and travels widely to urge
governing bodies, organizations, and individuals to stop the Uyghur genocide. She has
testified before Congress, met with a number of U.S. lawmakers and other government
officials, and spoken on numerous panels. Abbas also provided a witness statement 20 for
the Uyghur Tribunal, in which she described the forced disappearances of a number of
her family members, including her sister, Dr. Gulshan Abbas. Part of her advocacy
efforts include a special focus on empowering Uyghur women and youth.
In 2018, Abbas led a global effort to raise awareness of the plight of Uyghurs by
working with a network of Uyghur women of the diaspora in the United States and
Europe. They organized demonstrations in 14 countries and 18 cities around the world
and coordinated this “One Voice, One Step Initiative” as an “action to mobilise and unite
the Uyghur women in the diaspora community to work together to improve the situation
for the Uyghur people through concrete actions” (World Uyghur Congress, 2018).
Demonstrations took place on March 15th, 2018 and included activists in the United
States, Germany, Belgium, France, Finland, Turkey, Japan, and Australia, among others.
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This effort was supported by the World Uyghur Congress (World Uyghur Congress,
2018).
In October 2021, Campaign for Uyghurs held an advocacy workshop21 for young
Uyghurs of the diaspora in Berlin where “attendees were given the opportunity to
participate in seminars and activities aimed at improving their advocacy skills, and
preparing them to become empowered leaders and spokespersons for the Uyghur cause”
(Campaign for Uyghurs, 2021). Uyghur youth are regarded as the next generation of
activists for Uyghur rights, and Campaign for Uyghurs is committed “to walk alongside
these young activists on their journey, and to provide them further opportunities to grow
and share challenges” (Campaign for Uyghurs, 2021).
In July 2020, Campaign for Uyghurs published a report detailing the ways in
which China is committing genocide against Uyghurs in East Turkestan by meeting all of
the criteria in the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Campaign for Uyghurs, 2020). The report includes accounts of
torture, sexual violence, Chinese officials living in Uyghur homes, Uyghur girls being
forced to marry Han Chinese men, abortions and sterilizations without consent, and the
separation of children from their families. There are also a number of photographs in the
report. These images show the public burning of Islamic religious materials, Uyghur
women forcibly marrying Han Chinese men in group ceremonies, and Chinese
government officials spending time in Uyghur homes. The report concludes with specific
policy recommendations for democratic governments, the United Nations, the European
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Parliament, educational institutions, NGOs, corporations, and individuals (Campaign for
Uyghurs, 2020).
Campaign for Uyghurs is very active on social media, and they post current
Uyghur news and press releases on their website. They also connect camp survivors with
ally organizations to raise awareness of the genocide. One such example was a program
hosted by the Holocaust Memorial and Tolerance Center of Nassau County in New York
in June 2021. I was honored to speak during this event and bear witness to testimony
given by Tursunay Ziyawudun, a survivor who shared her moving and harrowing
experiences through an interpreter (another Uyghur woman). Prior to the 2022 Beijing
Olympics, Campaign for Uyghurs was focused on calling “for a relocation and boycott of
the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics,” which many Uyghurs referred to as the “genocide
Olympics” (Campaign for Uyghurs, 2021).
Uyghur Times
In May 2018, a Uyghur diaspora member named Tahir Imin Uyghurian founded
an online news site called Uyghur Times as “a media for Uyghurs, for justice, and for
rightness” (Uyghur Times, 2021). Uyghur Times is based in Washington, D.C., and their
goal is “to reveal the censored news and true stories of Uyghurs under the Communist
Chinese regime” (Uyghur Times, 2021). Uyghurian is from Kashgar and has direct
experience with the Chinese prison system as a former political prisoner. He worked as a
religion teacher in Kashgar and was placed in detention for seven months in 2000 “just
for studying and teaching Islamic knowledge” (Uyghur Times, 2021). He was arrested
again in 2005 and served a two-year prison sentence “for his activism for the Uyghur
culture” after having written an article entitled Uyghur Culture in Danger (Uyghur
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Times, 2021). He describes his time in prison as being “full of hunger, pain, torture and
terror” (Uyghur Times, 2021). This was long before the mass detention centers of recent
years, which by all accounts are even more horrific now.
Uyghurian left his homeland in February 2017 “due to the increasingly oppressive
political environment” (Uyghur Times, 2021). His wife and daughter had to stay behind
because they could not secure passports. In July 2017, Chinese authorities asked him to
return, but he refused and settled in the United States. He hasn’t been in contact with his
family since early 2018 when they told him to stop contacting them, and as of March
2021, at least 28 of his relatives had been sent to the camps or imprisoned (Lapin, 2021).
This has not stopped Imin from speaking out widely, including writing an op-ed
(Uyghurian, 2019) for The Guardian about how China has destroyed Uyghur families,
and continuing to maintain the Uyghur Times.
Uyghur Times posts news from around the world related to Uyghurs. This
includes current events, statements from government and organizational leaders, news
from diaspora communities, updates on Uyghur advocacy efforts, and Uyghur
perspectives on Chinese colonialism and the genocide (Uyghur Times, 2021). Their
motto is “humanity dies in silence,” and they remain the “true voice of Uyghur people
under genocide” (Uyghur Times, 2021).
High Profile Individuals
Nury Turkel
In addition to Rushan Abbas, whose activism efforts were described above in the
section on Campaign for Uyghurs, there are several Uyghur diaspora members who are
publicly involved in advocacy work in various capacities. One of the most influential and
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visible has been Nury Turkel, who has served as the Vice Chair of the U.S. Commission
on International Religious Freedom since June 2021. Turkel is also a Senior Fellow at the
Hudson Institute where he focuses on human rights, foreign policy, religious freedom in
China, digital authoritarianism, and forced labor and supply chains (Hudson Institute,
2021). In addition, Turkel is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and is
highlighted as a prominent activist and attorney by the Human Rights Foundation. 22
Turkel was born in a re-education camp in Kashgar during the Chinese Cultural
Revolution, as his mother was detained when she was six months pregnant. In 1995, he
came to the United States for graduate school and never returned to China. He has been
dedicated to promoting Uyghur human rights throughout his career by engaging with
democratic policies and practices in the United States, Europe, Australia, and Turkey
(USCRIF, 2021). He served as the former president of the Uyghur American Association,
and he co-founded the Uyghur Human Rights Project. Turkel was instrumental in
enacting the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act in 2020, which is now a federal law23 that
“imposes sanctions on foreign individuals and entities responsible for human rights
abuses in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region and requires various reports on
the topic” (Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, 2020). Turkel also represents Uyghur
political refugees seeking asylum in the United States.
Turkel has received widespread public acclaim for his work. He was included in
Time magazine’s list of the “100 Most Influential People in the World” in 2020, and he
was listed as one of the “World's 50 Greatest Leaders” in Fortune in May 2021
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(USCRIF, 2021). The University of Notre Dame Law School also awarded him their first
ever Notre Dame Prize for Religious Liberty 24 in June 2021 (University of Notre Dame,
2021). In response to this award, Turkel said that he “cannot fully rejoice in recognition
while such brutal violations of religious freedom and human dignity persist. This
genocide and its implications, the culmination of decades of oppression, looms dark and
threatening in our world” (University of Notre Dame, 2021). Turkel continues to use his
platform widely to advocate for Uyghur rights by working on policy and legislation,
testifying before government bodies, publishing articles and op-eds, and speaking on
panels and major world news outlets (USCRIF, 2021).
Jewher Ilham
Jewher Ilham is the daughter of the highly respected Uyghur economist and
scholar, Ilham Tohti. In 2013, when Jewher was 18 years old, she and her father were
traveling to Indiana University together for her father’s fellowship. Her father was
detained at the Beijing Airport, and with his encouragement, Jewher went ahead without
him. She has remained in the United States and has not seen her father since then (Ilham,
2015). Ilham Tohti was sentenced to life in prison in September 2014 on bogus charges
of separatism. Professor Tohti is well known for his writings and efforts to promote
mutual understanding, dialogue, and peace between Uyghurs and Han Chinese people in
China.
Jewher has become an active public figure and advocate for the Uyghur cause. In
2015, she published a book entitled Jewher Ilham: A Uyghur’s Fight to Free Her Father,
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in which she described her journey to becoming a spokesperson for her father and the
Uyghur people. She has testified before the U.N. General Assembly, the U.S.
Congressional Executive Committee on China, and she has met with politicians in both
the United States and the European Union to discuss her father’s arrest and China’s
repression of Uyghurs in her homeland. Jewher publishes and speaks widely about her
father and the numerous issues Uyghurs face.
Ilham Tohti has been awarded a number of prestigious prizes since his arrest in
2014, which Jewher has accepted on his behalf. These include the PEN/Barbara
Goldsmith Freedom to Write Award in 2014, the Martin Ennals Award for Human Rights
Defenders in 2016, the Liberal International Prize for Freedom in 2017, and the Freedom
House Freedom Award in 2019 (Abdilim, 2020). In receiving the PEN/Barbara
Goldsmith Freedom to Write Award, Jewher said, “My father spoke up… for those who
have been wrongly imprisoned, who have been beaten, who have been discriminated
against because of their religion, language, and culture, and who have been disappeared”
(Ilham, 2015, p. 118). In 2019, Ilham Tohti was awarded the Sakharov Prize for Freedom
of Thought, which Jewher also accepted on his behalf. In her acceptance speech, she said
Today, there is no freedom for Uyghurs in China... Not at school, not in public,
not even in private homes. My father, like most Uyghurs, has been labeled a
violent extremist, with a disease that needs to be cured and a mind that needs to
be washed. It is under this false label of extremism that the government has put
one million people – probably more – into 'concentration camps' where Uyghurs
are forced to give up their religion, language and culture, where people are
tortured and some have died. (EU Affairs, 2019)
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Ilham Tohti was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019, to which Jewher
responded, “The entire Uyghur community needs this. We need this award to regain our
hope again and to help us believe things can get better” (Abdilim, 2020). Though Tohti
was not selected to receive the Prize, his nomination helped to raise global awareness of
the Uyghur issue.
San Francisco Bay Area Resistance and Activism
I have been getting to know the Uyghur diaspora community of the Northern
California Bay Area since 2016. We have had numerous conversations, and I have
participated in many collaborative advocacy efforts, including speaking on panels and
participating in protests. I have also attended social events and have been graciously
welcomed into their homes where I have spent time with their children. Over the past five
years, I have heard many statements 25 about the widespread mistrust within the Uyghur
diaspora community. People have told me that they “don’t talk to each other about the
situation (in East Turkestan)” because “many Uyghur spies have been sent abroad to
monitor Uyghur diaspora activity” (interviews). Diaspora members have openly
acknowledged that “there is suspicion among Uyghurs,” and several people have stated
that “the only person I really trust is my (spouse)” (interviews). While this mistrust could
serve to limit the organized efforts of the Uyghur diaspora, which is likely the intended
outcome of the Chinese government, Uyghurs instead continue to gather publicly and
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engage in resistance in multiple ways, which they see as a matter of survival for their
people.
During the summer of 2021, I had the privilege of spending nearly every weekend
from June through August with the local Uyghur community, and it was during this time
that I came to fully appreciate the extent of their resistance efforts and the great risks they
are willing to take to preserve their culture and speak out against the genocide. Their
intentional survival as an ethnic group is itself a form resistance in the face of the
ongoing genocide. Even at great risk to themselves and their family members back home,
while also facing the danger of being spied upon, they organize programs and events to
actively keep their culture alive and pass it down to their children. In the following pages,
I seek to highlight their resistance and honor their strength and courage in engaging in
these efforts.
Uyghur Wellness Initiative
I learned about the Uyghur Wellness Initiative (UWI) from a Uyghur community
member in the Bay Area who helped to create the organization’s website after many of
his friends and colleagues in the diaspora had experienced long bouts of depression and
severe anxiety over the situation in East Turkestan. The Uyghur Wellness Initiative,
which is called the Spiritual Wellness Initiative in the Uyghur language, “is a
collaborative effort led by Uyghurs, for Uyghurs” (Uyghur Wellness Initiative, 2021).
Their mission is “to create a safe, dedicated space for Uyghurs to come together in this
time of crisis for our holistic wellbeing - as individuals, families and a community”
(Uyghur Wellness Initiative, 2021). They are supported by the Uyghur Human Rights
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Project, the Uyghur American Association, and Campaign for Uyghurs, as well as Peace
Catalyst International.
Coping with the ongoing genocide in East Turkestan has taken “an immense
emotional, social, mental, spiritual and physical toll on the Uyghur diaspora community”
(Uyghur Wellness Initiative, 2021). Uyghurs of the diaspora continue to experience
“grief and trauma due to the disappearance, imprisonment, and death of loved ones”
(Uyghur Wellness Initiative, 2021). This has been compounded by their inability to
communicate with loved ones in East Turkestan since 2017, as many diaspora members
do not know where their relatives are, or whether they are alive or dead. I have heard
many painful statements along the lines of “I can’t sleep because I imagine what my
relatives are going through,” and “my hope is just that they survive” (interviews). One
Uyghur community member stated, “On the outside, I look alive for the sake of my
children, but on the inside, I am dead” (interview).
The Uyghur Wellness Initiative was launched “to support the holistic wellbeing of
diaspora Uyghurs through public events, shared resources for coping with grief and
trauma, and pro bono wellness professional referrals” (Uyghur Wellness Initiative, 2021).
The UWI acknowledges the pain, trauma, and survivor's guilt many Uyghurs of the
diaspora contend with and offers mental health services, as well as a shared community
understanding of their collective experience. They state,
Uyghurs' souls are broken by what we are suffering, which can never be forgotten
and will cause terrible pain forever. But we do not need to suffer alone. We have
the right to help and support. We can call on helping hands and community
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support to cherish our hearts and help us to not give up on life, despite our pain.
(Uyghur Wellness Initiative, 2021)
The UWI connects diaspora members with mental health professionals who specialize in
trauma for individual and family therapy. The UWI also encourages hope for a better
future through new generations of Uyghur children who will “find the gifts of hope and
love, pride in who they are, and healthy lives, despite the overwhelming trauma and grief
of the Uyghur people” (Uyghur Wellness Initiative, 2021).
Uyghur Cultural Advancement Association
The Uyghur Cultural Advancement Association (UCAA) is a Bay Area
organization which aims to preserve and celebrate Uyghur culture and identity. It was
founded in 2020 after it became abundantly clear that the situation in East Turkestan was
only getting worse, and there was no indication of China stopping its repression and
control of the Uyghur people. The UCAA supports the local diaspora community by
organizing activities and events for Uyghur families to speak their native language,
celebrate Muslim holidays, wear traditional clothing, and eat homemade Uyghur food. I
have been fortunate to attend a number of these events where I have witnessed moving
moments of joy and relief when diaspora members connect with each other and practice
their traditions freely.
One of the regularly scheduled activities organized by the UCAA is a weekly
soccer practice for both adults and children. Soccer is a very popular sport in East
Turkestan. This soccer practice takes place on weekends in a public park where adult
Uyghur men gather early in the morning to play on a team which was established in 2014
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and is now part of the Uyghur American Cup. 26 According to Uyghur community
members, playing soccer provides an opportunity for them to come together and share
enjoyable experiences without politics. This builds connections and helps them to feel
united as a community around something positive, which provides a reprieve from the
ever-present weight of the genocide.
Entire families come to these soccer practices, which serve as social spaces as
much as actual practice time. Boys and girls aged five to twelve play on a kids team,
which is coached by a former professional Uyghur soccer player who donates his time for
his community. Younger children run around the park and entertain themselves, never too
far from their parents. Teenagers gather together to socialize on the fringes of the park,
and they sometimes play volleyball. While their kids play, adults spend time catching up.
Uyghur women stroll around in small groups, talking and hugging each other, and men
who are not playing soccer engage in quiet conversation.
A Uyghur community member told me that she looks forward to weekends
because she can be with her people, regardless of what they are doing, and she is grateful
that her children can have a safe and healthy childhood with other Uyghur kids. Another
community member, a young Uyghur woman, said that she only recently started
attending these gatherings after much discussion with her family, who felt it was too
dangerous to participate in anything that had Uyghurs together in one place. Although she
now participates regularly to be connected to other young Uyghurs, her parents do not.
They fear being targeted by an extension of the Chinese government, as well as reprisals
against their relatives back home in East Turkestan.
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In addition to weekly soccer practices, the UCAA organizes events every few
months to celebrate Uyghur holidays and bring the diaspora community together. These
are most often potluck picnics held in a public park. Uyghurs from all over Northern
California come to these gatherings, sometimes driving hours to get there. People bring
overflowing containers of homemade, traditional Uyghur dishes to feed the crowd. The
first time I attended one of these picnics, I had never seen so many Uyghurs together in
one place, and I was incredibly moved by the generosity and seeming normalcy of it all,
except for the noticeable absence of grandparents and elders. These gatherings provide a
space for Uyghurs to be themselves. Many community members have told me that these
are the only spaces where they don’t have to explain who they are or what they are
experiencing as a people. The collective understanding of their trauma allows them to
celebrate their culture and identity freely and cultivate a sense of Uyghur pride in their
children.
During the height of the Covid pandemic, the UCAA held online meetings and
programs to keep the diaspora community connected. The programs included practical
workshops, such as learning how to file taxes, and cultural information sessions. They
met to discuss the meaning of Ramadan and how to celebrate, as many diaspora members
were prohibited from learning this in China. They also held Uyghur dance classes online
during Covid, which were attended by diaspora members across the country. A UCAA
board member said that they were grateful to be able to continue to gather and share their
culture during the pandemic, and the participation was even greater than they expected,
indicating a need for such spaces.
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Uyghur Language and Culture School
Uyghurs of the Bay Area are actively engaging in efforts to preserve their culture
and identity in a number of ways as a means of deliberate resistance to Chinese cultural
erasure. One of their most significant achievements is the creation of a school for their
children to learn the Uyghur language and cultural traditions. One of the diaspora
mothers initially wanted to create a preschool for young Uyghur children, but there has
been so much interest that the program has grown from just one class with a few
participants to multiple classes on the weekend for children ranging from 2-18 years old.
The motivation for the weekend school was born out of the realization that Uyghur
diaspora children may never be able to go to East Turkestan or talk to their family
members, including their grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. Thus, the
responsibility of cultural transmission lies with their parents and the local community.
The school meets weekly, and their stated purpose is “to learn about Uyghur
language, culture, and religion, and to be proud of their Uyghur identity” (interview). All
of the students learn about Uyghur cultural and religious traditions, and they celebrate
together as a community. Younger students learn to read and write in the Uyghur
language, while older students learn literature. This is significant because, according to a
Uyghur community member, Uyghur literature and poetry have disappeared from
bookstores in China, so it is up to diaspora members to carry on this cultural knowledge.
During the summer of 2021, classes were held in a public park, and they added a
special summer intensive program, which met daily for two weeks. This included reading
the Quran and learning Uyghur songs and dances. The students shared what they learned
during a talent show on the last day of the program. Some of them recited passages from
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the Quran, while others sang traditional songs and danced. All of their parents were there,
proudly cheering their kids on. As with other Uyghur events, there was a noticeable
absence of photography. Many diaspora members have shared that they do not feel
comfortable having their pictures taken for fear that they will be posted online, which
may cause them to be targeted.
Muslim Cultural Festival
Bay Area Uyghurs have also participated in local events hosted by Muslim
Community Centers as a way to raise awareness of their culture, as well as the genocide.
I attended a Muslim Cultural Festival where they were one of many groups showcasing
their rich cultural heritage. The Uyghur booth had examples of Uyghur paintings, textiles,
crafts, instruments, and traditional hats (doppas), along with a poster of dozens of
Uyghurs who have disappeared in China. As people stopped by their booth, Uyghur
community members explained over and over again what was happening to their relatives
in East Turkestan. Many visitors had not heard about Uyghurs before, let alone the
genocide, and they reacted with surprise, which was followed by questions. I realized that
this is yet another part of Uyghurs’ daily struggle. Not only do they have to painfully
endure what is happening in East Turkestan and live with the constant uncertainty of the
whereabouts and safety of their relatives, but they also have to constantly explain who
they are and what is happening to their people. This speaks to their determination and
strength, and they continue to patiently raise awareness of their plight with tremendous
grace and dignity.
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Kashgar Photographs
In July 2021, I attended a Uyghur cultural event to view photographs of Kashgar
from the early 1980s. The city of Kashgar, which is considered a historical and cultural
center for Uyghurs, has been modernized to serve as an international commercial hub as
part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).27 The BRI is an enormous development
project spanning from East Asia to Europe, which began in 2013. The Old City of
Kashgar was demolished in the early 2000s, despite containing “most of the bestpreserved examples of traditional Central Asian urban residential architecture in the
world” (Roberts, 2020, p. 137).
The photographs showed largely undeveloped land with groups of veiled women,
bearded men wearing traditional hats, and smiling children going about their daily lives.
There were scenes of crowded streets, musicians, markets, children playing in alleys, and
traditional Uyghur food. Each time a photo appeared with a group of Uyghurs gathered
together, a collective sigh of regret spread throughout the room, and the sorrow was
palpable. These sorts of gatherings simply do not take place anymore under Chinese rule.
A Uyghur community member told me that “anytime three (or more) Uyghurs are
together, police come and ask what they are doing. They cannot even speak to each
other” (field notes). There were also photographs of young children listening carefully to
elders, particularly grandmothers. Elders are highly respected in Uyghur culture, and this
disconnection is a source of deep sadness and loss for Uyghur diaspora members.
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The old photographs of Kashgar also included many beautiful, intricate, colorful,
tiled mosques and Uyghur cemeteries. The response was similar. As people viewed the
photographs, they looked at each other and shook their heads mournfully. Some people
blotted their eyes, as most of these places no longer exist. One Uyghur community
member said that the last time he was in Kashgar ten years ago, he couldn’t even
recognize the building where he grew up. He stated, “It was like a foreign place to me.
Every Uyghur’s childhood memory of home is now only a memory” (field notes).
Public Protests
Although most Uyghur activities and events are held privately or by invitation
only, Uyghurs of the diaspora also engage in public resistance and activism, including
participating in marches and protests. Every year, the Uyghur diaspora community of the
Bay Area organizes a Uyghur Freedom March on July 5 to commemorate the Urumqi
massacre28 of July 5, 2009 in which Uyghurs were brutalized and arrested en masse
following what began as a peaceful protest. Many Uyghurs see this event as the turning
point in the deterioration of Uyghur-Han relations in China.
About 50 people attended the Uyghur Freedom March in the summer of 2021,
which began and ended in front of the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco. Uyghur
community members, along with some allies, marched to the lawn behind City Hall
carrying East Turkestan flags and signs, chanting, “Stop the Uyghur Genocide,” “Close
the Concentration Camps,” and Terrorist, Xi Jinping.” Some Uyghurs appeared publicly
for the first time during this event and were concealed under masks, sunglasses, and hats.
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They conveyed that they felt they had to do something, even though they were afraid to
show their faces. During the march, people gave impassioned speeches about standing up
for Uyghurs and holding China accountable. A Uyghur youth also expressed that she
dreams of a day when her teachers and non-Uyghur friends will know who Uyghurs are
and what they have endured in recent history.
October 1st marks the day that the People’s Republic of China was formally
established in 1949. This is also referred to as China’s birthday, or Chinese National Day,
and it is celebrated as a holiday in the PRC. In 2021, a joint protest was held on October
1st in front of the Chinese Embassy in San Francisco with members of the Uyghur
diaspora, Tibetans, Vietnamese activists, and Hong Kongers. They gathered collectively
to protest the Uyghur genocide, the oppression of Tibetans, the Chinese presence in the
South China Sea, and the crackdown on freedoms in Hong Kong. Representatives from
each group gave a speech, and the crowd chanted, “Down, Down, CCP,” “Terrorist, Xi
Jinping,” and “Stop the Genocide Olympics.” Uyghurs carried a banner that said “Uyghur
Lives Matter,” the Tibetan group sang a somber traditional song, and a Vietnamese
activist spoke about China as a hegemonic, greedy, world-dominating superpower. The
Hong Kongers brought out posters of Xi Jinping, which people stomped on and set on
fire. Though their participation in this kind of protest was risky, the Uyghur diaspora
members who were there did not shy away from being actively involved. One of the
diaspora members gave a speech in which he implored people to “see the truth of what’s
happening in China” (field notes).
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Conclusion
An examination of Uyghur-created websites, documents, and individual and
community actions clearly demonstrates that Uyghurs are engaging in nonviolent
resistance in a number of ways against ongoing Chinese genocidal policies. Though
China continues to deny the atrocities in East Turkestan and portrays Uyghurs as
terrorists, there is no evidence in the diaspora efforts to suggest that Uyghurs are using
violence to bring attention to their cause. In fact, most Uyghurs engage in peaceful
protest and seek democratic means to advocate for themselves. They also work with
government bodies and international human rights mechanisms, including those to which
China is a signatory.
Uyghur-published reports and documents show a history of unlawful arrests and
torture of Uyghurs long before the widespread, intense crackdown started in earnest in
2016. These were precedents for the horrors now occurring, and Uyghurs have been well
aware of what could happen in their homeland long before it was public knowledge. The
PRC was able to commit these crimes with impunity then, and it continues to violate
Uyghur human rights to the present day without being held accountable by the
international community, with few exceptions. Despite Uyghurs’ reports on the abuses in
their homeland for many years, very little concrete action has been taken to stop these
atrocities.
In the face of the ongoing genocide and China’s threats to Uyghurs of the
diaspora, telling one’s story is itself a courageous act of resistance. Despite the
psychological toll Uyghurs experience from telling, retelling, and listening to testimony,
they continue to do so as a matter of survival for their people and future generations.
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Their intergenerational approach to resistance, by training youth and passing cultural
knowledge to their children, provides some hope that future generations of Uyghurs will
know who they are and will embrace their culture and identity proudly.
Given the horrors and trauma that Uyghurs are contending with, it is incredibly
moving and inspiring to see them engage in acts of resistance against Chinese state
violence. They feel that this is their moral obligation, as they recognize all too well that
silence is not a neutral act.
The table below provides a timeline of Uyghur diaspora resistance from the midtwentieth century to the present day. Despite all of their efforts, little has been done to
hold China accountable for the ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity in East
Turkestan. The following chapter will discuss recommendations for action based on
international laws to which China is a signatory.

Figure 6.1: Timeline of Uyghur Diaspora Resistance
Year

Events

1949

Establishment of PRC
Isa Yusuf Alptekin leaves China, begins resistance abroad

1960

Alptekin and Mehmet Emin Bughra establish the Association of Eastern Turkestan
Emigrés in Turkey

1965

Mehmet Emin Bughra (-1965)

1970

Alpetkin asks U.S. President Richard Nixon for support to gain independence

1994

Uyghur university students form Eastern Turkestan Students Union in Ankara, Turkey

1995

Isa Yusuf Alptekin (-1995)
World Uyghur Youth Congress organized in Almaty, Kazakhstan

mid-1990s

Small Uyghur diaspora groups begin to settle throughout Western Europe
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1996

Youth Congress and organizers move to Munich, Germany

1998

Eastern Turkestan National Center (ETNC) created in Istanbul, Turkey
Uyghur American Association (UAA) established in Washington D.C.

1999

ETNC becomes East Turkistan National Congress, moves headquarters to Munich,
Germany
Eastern Turkestan Union in Europe also founded in Munich, Germany

2004

Disapora groups meet in Munich, Germany; East Turkestan National Congress and
World Uyghur Youth Congress merge to create the World Uyghur Congress
Erkin Alptekin elected first president of the World Uyghur Congress (2004-2006)
Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) founded as part of UAA

2016

UHRP becomes independent nonprofit organization

2017

Campaign for Uyghurs founded by Rushan Abbas

2018

Rushan Abbas and women of the Uyghur diaspora organize global One Voice, One Step
Initiative on March 15

2018

Uyghur Times founded online by Tahir Imin

2020

Dolkun Isa, President of World Uyghur Congress, formally requests creation of Uyghur
Tribunal to investigate genocide and crimes against humanity by PRC

2020-2021

Uyghur Tribunal held in London

2020

Uyghur Wellness Initiative launched

2020

Uyghur Cultural Advancement Association founded
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CHAPTER VII: SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND
CONCLUSION
Summary
When I started writing this dissertation, I expected to examine the ethnic
cleansing of Uyghurs in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, which I now refer to as
East Turkestan out of respect for the Uyghur community. Since 2018, a growing
abundance of evidence coupled with testimonios given by Uyghurs of the diaspora,
witnesses, and survivors of the camps have revealed that the situation is much worse than
I initially understood. It has become clear that Uyghurs have been targeted by Chinese
government policies in their homeland to such an extent that they are undergoing a
multifaceted genocide and are experiencing crimes against humanity, as this dissertation
demonstrates. The research questions guiding this study enabled me to gather and
compile information that establishes multiple dimensions of the oppression and
subjugation of Uyghur people in their Indigenous homeland and abroad. Over the course
of writing this dissertation, I have gotten to know a number of Uyghurs of the diaspora
who I now consider to be friends, and I have seen how resilient they are. I have tried to
highlight Uyghurs’ tremendous strength and courage as a people so they will be
perceived not simply as victims to be pitied, but rather as members of a rich and
fascinating culture who continue to persevere despite all of the hardship they have
endured.
At the time of this writing (May 2022), the United States and the parliaments of
the United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Lithuania, and
France have all declared genocide in XUAR (Gerin, 2021; Rivet & De Clerq, 2021).
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Reports, including one written by the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of
Genocide at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, have also declared genocide in
Xinjiang (Newlines Institute, 2021; U.K. House of Commons, 2021; U.S. Holocaust
Memorial Museum, 2021). In June 2020, a group of U.N. independent experts wrote a
letter expressing their concerns about human rights in China and requested “the UN
Human Rights Council (HRC) to act with a sense of urgency to take all appropriate
measures to monitor Chinese human rights practices” (OHCHR, 2020, para. 11). In
September 2020, nearly 400 organizations wrote an open letter to the United Nations
calling “for an international mechanism to address the Chinese government’s human
rights violations,” and urged the U.N. Secretary General, High Commissioner for Human
Rights, and member states “to take decisive action to achieve this goal” (Human Rights
Watch, 2020, para. 1). Furthermore, as Beijing was selected to host the 2022 Winter
Olympics, the United States, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Lithuania, Kosovo,
and Denmark announced a diplomatic boycott of the games, citing China’s human rights
abuses and specifically naming Uyghurs in Xinjiang (Hamilton, 2021; Kim, 2022).
Nonetheless, very little direct action has been taken to stop the ongoing atrocities in East
Turkestan.
Discussion
Uyghur Diaspora
This dissertation highlights how Uyghurs of the diaspora engage in nonviolent
resistance to Chinese state violence as a matter of survival for their people at great risk to
themselves and their family members. The work of Uyghur NGOs, high-profile
individuals, and grassroots community activism, as described in Chapter Six, has resulted
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in global awareness of the genocide in East Turkestan, as well as recognition of the
Uyghur people. A Uyghur community member stated that “ten years ago when (he)
talked to people and said (he) was Uyghur, nobody knew what that meant. Now, eight out
of ten people know who Uyghurs are” (interview). The actions undertaken by Uyghur
advocates, activists, and allies in different sectors of society have led to sanctions being
imposed on Chinese businesses and government officials by Canada, the United States,
the European Union, and Britain (Cook, 2021). New laws protecting Uyghurs have also
been created in the United States.29
In addition to these concrete actions, the number of people and organizations
speaking out about the Uyghur crisis has grown significantly in recent years, with human
rights-focused NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch closely
following and reporting on the situation since 2019 (Amnesty International, 2019, 2020,
2021; Human Rights Watch 2019, 2020; Richardson, 2021). Several Jewish
organizations, including Jewish World Watch 30 and the Jewish Movement for Uyghur
Freedom31 have also engaged in advocacy work as allies alongside Uyghurs in the spirit
of never again allowing mass atrocities to occur.
Grassroots activism by local Uyghur organizations and diaspora communities has
focused on raising awareness of the gross human rights violations occurring in East
Turkestan, as well as supporting Uyghur community members, including children.
Intentionally practicing and promoting Uyghur culture has been an important part of
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Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-15722/pdf/COMPS15722.pdf
Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act: https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/65/text
30
https://www.jww.org/
31 https://jewishmovementforuyghurfreedom.org/
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resisting Chinese state violence, as described in Chapter Six. By deliberately exercising
their right to self-determination within the larger context of the genocide through actively
practicing their religion, speaking their language, and educating their children, Uyghurs
of the diaspora are affirming their humanity and transmitting their culture to future
generations as a matter of ethnic survival.
Human Rights Education
As discussed in Chapter Six of this dissertation, Uyghurs of the diaspora have
been engaging in transnational activism to raise awareness of the genocide in East
Turkestan and call people to action. Uyghur NGOs have written statements and reports
which have been submitted to U.N. bodies, world governments, and news outlets. In
addition, Uyghur NGOs, individuals, and community-based organizations have published
educational materials, organized conferences and workshops, participated in panel
discussions, and conducted demonstrations to educate people about the human rights
violations occurring in East Turkestan.
The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Education and Training states
that “Human rights education and training comprises all educational, training,
information, awareness-raising and learning activities aimed at promoting universal
respect for and observance of all human rights and fundamental freedoms” (U.N. General
Assembly, 2011, art. 2, para. 1). Mihr and Schmitz (2007) furthermore suggest that HRE
“focuses primarily on ending current abuses and preventing future ones” (p. 993). Tibbits
(2017) also reminds us that the central goals of HRE are preventing and eliminating
human rights violations.
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The ways in which Uyghur diaspora members and organizations have engaged in
advocacy and activism are consistent with the features of Tibbits’ (2017) ActivismTransformation Model of HRE. Uyghur diaspora efforts have largely been sponsored by
civil society organizations, participation is voluntary, and their education has been
“carried out in the nonformal education sector, including through trainings, popular
education, youth and community development” (Tibbits, 2017, p. 17). Furthermore,
Uyghurs of the diaspora have clearly articulated a critical stance toward both China’s
actions and the lack of response by the international community, as well as the human
rights system itself. Their work has been oriented directly toward transformation,
including building the self-confidence and pride of Uyghurs themselves and developing
their capacity to take action and participate in human rights activism for long-term and
permanent social change. For Uyghurs of the diaspora, strategies “for reducing human
rights violations (are) immediate and personal as well as long-term, public and
collective” (Tibbits, 2017, p. 18).
Tibbits (2017) suggests that HRE may provide healing for those who have
personally experienced human rights violations, systematic discrimination, and
oppression. Although Uyghurs of the diaspora will not be able to fully heal until they
know their relatives are safe and China is held accountable, their activism gives them
hope that change is possible and justice may eventually be achieved. As Bajaj (2011)
says, “HRE can no longer be characterized as a singularly understood practice” (p. 489).
By highlighting how Uyghur organizations, high profile individuals, and the Bay Area
diaspora community have utilized different approaches to raise awareness of the
genocide, build solidarity, and advocate for their rights, this case study illustrates “the
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richness and possibility of HRE” as a means to enact positive social change (Bajaj, 2011,
p. 508).
Testimonio
The use of testimonio as a method has been critical to this study in centering and
honoring the voices of Uyghur diaspora members. The relatively small number of
participants in this study were acutely aware of their positionality in representing
Uyghurs as an entire ethnic group facing extreme oppression in China. They were also
painfully aware of the dangers they could face by participating in this study. Their
knowledge, perspectives, and experiences drove the findings reported in this dissertation,
both through the process of data collection and in prioritizing the themes and subthemes
that emerged during coding. Local Uyghur diaspora members and I worked
collaboratively to determine how their knowledge and lived experiences would be
represented and shared, with the goal of raising awareness of the genocide and urging
people to take action. Testimonio has served as a powerful tool in this dissertation, and it
can similarly be used to honor the voices of communities and democratize and equalize
hierarchies in other human rights-related research.
Genocide
This dissertation contributes to the growing body of evidence which demonstrates
beyond a reasonable doubt that China is committing genocide and crimes against
humanity against Uyghurs in East Turkestan. China is not a party to the Rome Statute,
which would enable the investigation and possible persecution of these crimes by the
International Criminal Court (ICC). In fact, the ICC refused to investigate the atrocities in
Xinjiang after Uyghurs of the diaspora provided evidence and called for a formal inquiry
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in 2020 (VOA, 2020). China is also a permanent member of the United Nations Security
Council, which grants them veto power when considering resolutions. Moreover, China
has failed to ratify the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
both of which apply directly to the situation Uyghurs are facing in XUAR. As such, the
response to the Uyghur genocide using international human rights mechanisms has some
significant limitations. China has, however, ratified the U.N. treaties listed in the table
and described below, all of which can be applied to the situation in East Turkestan under
international human rights law. As a signatory to the Genocide Convention, China has an
obligation to prevent genocide and punish genocide as a crime under international law
(U.N. Genocide Convention art. 1).
United Nations Treaty Violations
Figure 7.1: PRC Violations of U.N. Treaties
U.N. Treaties

Articles

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention)

Article 2: a, b, c, d, e

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)

Articles 1, 2, 4, 9

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)

Articles 9, 11, 12, 15, 16

International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)

Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, 7

International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)

Articles 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15

Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)

Articles 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9,10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17,
29, 30, 37
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The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
states that,
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (U.N.
Genocide Convention art. 2)
As noted in the Convention, genocide refers to any of the acts listed above. Currently, the
ongoing atrocities occurring in XUAR meet all of these criteria, as has been described in
detail in this dissertation and other reports (Human Rights Watch, 2020; Newlines
Institute 2021; Uyghur Tribunal, 2021; Wong & Buckley, 2021; Zenz, 2019; Zenz,
2020).
The extreme physical and emotional abuse endured by Uyghurs in XUAR has
been widely reported, including in Chapters Two and Five of this dissertation. China has
used the false narrative of terrorism to rationalize and justify its campaign of repression
and torture against Uyghurs, as discussed in Chapter Three. The Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) makes
clear that even under purportedly “exceptional circumstances,” torture is unjustifiable
(U.N. CAT art. 2). We have seen that China has not only failed to acknowledge the many
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torturous acts against Uyghurs as criminal offenses, but the Chinese government itself
has encouraged this inhumane treatment of Uyghurs and other Turkic groups (AllenEbrahimian, 2019; BBC, 2019; Ferris-Rotman, 2019; Human Rights Watch, 2019;
Ramzy & Buckley, 2019; Zenz, 2022).
Women have had to contend with a host of issues, both inside and outside of the
camps in XUAR, as discussed in Chapter Two. Former detainees have reported numerous
experiences of sexual assault, forced abortions, imposed birth control, and sterilization,
including being forced to take pills and receive injections of unknown substances that
disrupted or stopped their menstrual cycles (Danilova, 2018; Ferris-Rotman, 2019; Hoja,
2019; Lynch, 2019; Maizland, 2020; Stavrou, 2019). Furthermore, Uyghur women
outside of the camps have had to endure mandatory Han Chinese “guests” in their homes
and in their beds for days at a time, making them vulnerable to sexual assault whilte their
husbands are in the camps or prisons (Human Rights Watch, 2018; Jiang, 2018). Uyghur
women have also been forced or coerced into marrying Han Chinese men, sometimes in
mass ceremonies (Kashgarian, 2020; interviews). Uyghurs of the diaspora refer to these
practices as “government-sponsored mass rape” (field notes). All of the aforementioned
actions are in violation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
It is abundantly clear that Uyghurs have been targeted as a distinct ethnic group
in China and are continuing to suffer under institutionalized discriminatory policies, as
described in Chapters Two and Five of this dissertation. Chapter Three describes how
China’s narratives of national unity and related assimilationist strategies serve to
privilege Han citizens and eliminate Uyghur culture and identity, which are in sharp
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contrast to the rights granted by the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). Moreover, the Chinese state itself is
responsible for creating propaganda which otherizes, dehumanizes, and positions
Uyghurs as criminals, and Chinese leaders are the architects of the systems of mass
internment and cultural destruction in East Turkestan, which have effectively removed
Uyghurs from society (Zenz, 2022).
The multidimensional ways in which the Chinese government has impeded
Uyghurs’ right to political, economic, social, and cultural self-determination in their
homeland have been described throughout this dissertation. Not only are Uyghurs unable
to freely take part in their cultural practices, but the Chinese government has virtually
erased most significant and authentic elements of their culture. The International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) ensures that all people
“have the right of self-determination,” which allows them to “freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (U.N.
ICESCR art. 1). As discussed in Chapters Two and Five, Uyghur mosques and cemeteries
have been demolished, expressions of Islam are tightly controlled, and restrictions have
been placed on Uyghurs’ physical appearance and children’s names (Hiatt, 2019; Hunt et
al., 2017; Kashgarian, 2019; Kuo, 2019; Rivers, 2020; Sintash, 2019; Sulaiman, 2015).
At the same time, China has been profiting from performative expressions of Uyghur
culture by promoting tourism to Xinjiang, as Chapter Five of this dissertation describes.
In addition, the organized forced labor program reported in Chapter Two is in clear
violation of the rights granted by ICESCR.
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Children and Families
One of the most tragic elements of the genocide is the forcible separation of
Uyghur children and families. As discussed in Chapters Two and Five, since at least
2017, Uyghur children of all ages have been separated from their families and placed in
state-run facilities, including orphanages, shelters, and boarding schools, even if their
grandparents were available to care for them (Feng, 2018; Zenz, 2019). The Chinese
government has referred to some of these children as “newly orphaned,” despite their
parents being alive in the camps (Zenz, 2019, p. 2). It is clear that China is not providing
protection and assistance to families as granted by article ten of ICESCR, and instead has
engaged in an organized campaign to assimilate Uyghur children while intentionally
keeping them separated from their families, as described in Chapter Two.
Separating children from their families and preventing them from developing their
cultural identity is in violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),
which clearly says that states are obligated to “respect the right of the child to preserve
his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations” (U.N. CRC art. 8).
The CRC also explicitly states that “a child shall not be separated from his or her parents
against their will,” and that a child who is separated from their parents has the right “to
maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis” (U.N.
CRC art. 9). Furthermore, if the State is responsible for the separation, “that State Party
shall, upon request, provide the parents, the child or, if appropriate, another member of
the family with the essential information concerning the whereabouts of the absent
member(s) of the family” (U.N. CRC art. 9). China has repeatedly ignored and denied
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requests for family reunification after forcibly separating children from their families
without consent or legal justification (Amnesty, 2020; Human Rights Watch, 2019).
The CRC includes special protections for children who are members of an ethnic,
religious, or linguistic minority, all of which apply to Uyghur children in China. Article
30 states that
a child belonging to such a minority or who is indigenous shall not be denied the
right, in community with other members of his or her group, to enjoy his or her
own culture, to profess and practise his or her own religion, or to use his or her
own language. (U.N. CRC art. 30)
The violations of this article have already been described above and in Chapter Two of
this dissertation.
Inefficacy of International Human Rights Mechanisms
Despite all of the documented violations of international human rights treaties,
including those described above, China continues to commit atrocities in East Turkestan
with impunity. Moreover, the PRC has consistently denied all allegations of human rights
violations against Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples and continues to be supported by
other countries in the United Nations. In 2019, 22 countries signed a letter to the U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights voicing their concerns about China’s policies in
Xinjiang. This letter was countered with another letter from China, which was endorsed
by 37 U.N. member states who supported Beijing’s alleged counterterrorism efforts and
commended ”China’s remarkable achievements in the field of human rights” (Human
Rights Council, 2019, para. 2). This letter stated that because of China’s “counterterrorism and deradicalization measures in Xinjiang… safety and security has returned to
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Xinjiang and the fundamental human rights of people of all ethnic groups there are
safeguarded (Human Rights Council, 2019, para. 3). The letter also voiced appreciation
for “China’s commitment to openness and transparency,” despite China’s refusal to allow
unfettered access to Xinjiang (Human Rights Council, 2019, para. 4).
In 2020, 39 countries endorsed a statement presented to the U.N. General
Assembly calling again for China to “respect human rights, particularly the rights of
persons belonging to religious and ethnic minorities, especially in Xinjiang and Tibet”
(Putz, 2020, para. 2). In response, 45 member states supported a statement which
defended and praised China’s policies while opposing the “politicization of human rights
issues” (Putz, 2020, para. 4). Many of these countries are involved in China’s Belt and
Road Initiative.
The United Nations was created in response to the atrocities of World War II “to
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person,
in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small” (U.N. Charter
preamble). One of the primary purposes of the U.N. is “to establish conditions under
which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of
international law can be maintained” (U.N. Charter preamble). These conditions are not
being met, as evidenced by the ongoing genocide itself, as well as member states’ support
for China’s repressive policies. Furthermore, the lack of action on the part of the
international community, along with barriers to taking action, such as the ICC’s refusal to
investigate these crimes against humanity, indicate major flaws in the existing system.
Even without an official international genocide determination, there is enough
evidence and documentation of human rights violations that should call for a serious need

165

to take action. After the horrors of the Holocaust, people were able to say that they didn’t
know what was happening or they would have tried to intervene sooner. This time, the
world is fully informed, and yet very little is being done to take direct action to stop the
Uyghur genocide. The following section presents recommendations to address the
genocide and provides suggestions for repairing some of the damage that has been done
to Uyghur culture and identity.
Recommendations
For Policy and Practice
Crises of this scale require an international approach with the participation of
multiple governments and organizations across sectors. In addition to enforcing existing
international human rights laws or creating new legislation, governments should
prioritize their own investigations of allegations of genocide and crimes against humanity
in XUAR. Human rights organizations, other NGOs, researchers, scholars, and affected
individuals should be encouraged to act as partners in these efforts, and governments
should allocate resources for the work of researching and documenting these atrocities.
Significantly, the perspectives and recommendations of those who are directly affected
by the genocide and other crimes against humanity should be prioritized and centered,
especially in countries such as China, where a history of suppressing information is well
documented.
In addition to utilizing U.N. conventions and other human rights standards to hold
countries who are directly responsible for these atrocities accountable, these laws may
also be applied to other states who are complicit. In the case of the Uyghur genocide,
countries that have deported people back to China to face persecution can be held

166

accountable under article 3 of the U.N. Convention against Torture (CAT), which says
that “No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture” (U.N. CAT art. 3).
Given the abundance of evidence that now exists, countries and U.N. bodies
should name the atrocities in East Turkestan as genocide and call for an immediate
disbandment of the internment camps in Xinjiang and forced labor facilities throughout
China. They should also ask for proof showing that they have been closed. States and
officials should also insist on having unfettered access to Xinjiang to verify the situation
for themselves. Furthermore, countries and human rights groups should demand that the
Chinese government immediately cease the mass sterilization campaign against Uyghur
women. There should also be a concerted effort to stop family separation and reunite
children with their relatives.
There is likely not much that countries can do to protect Uyghurs in China
without a coordinated global response. U.N. member states, possibly through the Human
Rights Council, could establish a Commission of Inquiry or organize a fact-finding
mission or other formal investigation, as has been done in relation to other grave
violations of humanitarian law, such as in Palestine, Libya, and Myanmar (U.N. Human
Rights Council, 2021). Uyghurs of the diaspora, however, can be supported by offering
them refuge through a streamlined process of immigration or citizenship, and providing
them with protection and resources in their host countries.
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
promotes “cultural heritage and the equal dignity of all cultures” (UNESCO, 2021, para.
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2). UNESCO was created after World War II to help combat anti-Semitism and violence.
Now, “cultural diversity is under attack and new forms of intolerance, rejection of
scientific facts and threats to freedom of expression challenge peace and human rights”
(UNESCO, 2021, para. 3). It seems appropriate that UNESCO should be involved in
preserving Uyghur culture, which, as previously discussed, has been largely destroyed as
a means of assimilating and stamping out Uyghurs’ freedom of cultural and religious
expression.
For Further Research
The impacts of the Uyghur genocide are not yet fully known or understood. As
the situation continues to evolve, research should be conducted to understand the scale
and extent of the erasure of Uyghur culture and identity, as well as the physical,
psychological, and economic toll the genocide has taken on Uyghurs and their family
members. This includes assessing the impacts of family separation and incarceration on
Uyghur children. Further study could also investigate the extent of property and assets
seized by the Chinese government as a means of Uyghur dispossession.
It may also be useful to conduct a retrospective study to identify the early warning
signs and mechanisms of the genocide, alongside the responses of world governments
and the United Nations. This could be compared to similar data collected on other
genocides as a means to understand and assess how the international community and
existing human rights mechanisms recognize, acknowledge, and respond to crimes
against humanity.
Continued research with diaspora members will also help to better understand the
many dimensions of this situation and its impacts on all those affected. Further research
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could explore additional means of resistance and how diaspora members have coped with
this immense tragedy while continuing to persevere. As diaspora children get older, their
perspectives may also be valuable as witnesses to their relatives’ struggles and as proud
Uyghurs who carry on their language and culture without restraint. Critically, whatever
research questions are pursued should be examined in consultation or partnership with
Uyghur community members, as I have done in this dissertation.

Conclusion
Uyghurs of the diaspora have suggested that what has been happening in East
Turkestan should be a warning to the rest of the world. We have seen that the human
rights mechanisms of the United Nations have been largely ineffective, and the responses
of the international community have been slow and dishearteningly limited, despite an
abundance of evidence which clearly demonstrates that China is committing crimes
against humanity in XUAR. Moreover, there is growing international support for China,
likely because of its increasing influence over developing states as part of the Belt and
Road Initiative. Given China’s transnational economic and political influence, it is
unlikely that many countries will stand up against the repressive policies in XUAR or
other places where China is setting up infrastructure and sending their military.
The PRC continues to deny the atrocities in East Turkestan, and I believe they
have been emboldened by the lack of a strong international response to the genocide. It
appears that the majority of the world has accepted these crimes against humanity, as
there have been few repercussions and no real accountability. The international
community should consider what kind of message this sends not only to China, but also
to other authoritarian regimes around the world. When it becomes acceptable for
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governments to blatantly prioritize their economic interests over human rights, it is
implied that human rights are not a priority. This is a dangerous path. A witness to the
atrocities stated that
what we’re seeing is not the problem of the ethnic minorities who are there, but a
problem concerning the whole world. We need to be vigilant. If we want to live in
a democracy, we need to act together. Otherwise, it will be too late for all of us.
(Xinjiang Victims Database, 2022)
There is still opportunity to act. Inaction or silence reinforce the message that committing
genocide is not a major offense.
Until people are freed from the camps, prisons, and forced labor facilities;
children are reunited with their families; Uyghurs are allowed to freely practice their
religion and culture; and China discontinues its repressive policies, we must continue to
speak out and act. A Uyghur diaspora member said, “we are screaming as loud as we can,
but not everyone is listening” (interview). I hope after reading this dissertation that they
have been heard. Calls of never again must be heeded now.
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